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Abstract: Theories of spatial cognition are derived from many sources. Psychologists are concerned with determining the features of the mind
which, in combination with external inputs, produce our spatialized experience. A review of philosophical and other approaches has convinced
us that the brain must come equipped to impose a three-dimensional Euclidean framework on experience - our analysis suggests that object
re-identification may require such a framework. We identify this absolute, nonegocentric, spatial framework with a specific neural system
centered in the hippocampus.
A consideration of the kinds of behaviours in which such a spatial mapping system would be important is followed by an analysis of the
anatomy and physiology of this system, with special emphasis on the place-coded neurons recorded in the hippocampus of freely moving rats. A
tentative physiological model for the hippocampal cognitive map is proposed. A review of lesion studies, in tasks as diverse as discrimination
learning, avoidance, and extinction, shows that the cognitive map notion can adequately explain much of the data.
The model is extended to humans by the assumption that spatial maps are built in one hemisphere, semantic maps in the other. The latter
provide a semantic deep structure within which discourse comprehension and production can be achieved. Evidence from the study of amnesic
patients, briefly reviewed, is consistent with this extension.
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In The hippocampus as a cognitive map (O'Keefe & Nadel 1978) we
set out to synthesize four basic pieces of information: The existence of
place-coded neurones in the hippocampus of the freely moving rat;
Vanderwolf's (1971) finding that, at least for the rat, theta activity in
the hippocampal EEG is related to some aspect of movement; our
conviction that the underlying deficits in animals with hippocampal
lesions consist of the absence of place learning and of exploration;
and the profound retrograde and anterograde global amnesia seen
after hippocampal damage in humans. The concept which enables us
to tie together these different "facts" is that of the cognitive map.
This notion was originally developed by Tolman to explain such
phenomena as latent learning and place learning in the rat. For our
purposes it was necessary to specify in considerable detail what we
meant by a cognitive map, how this map was instantiated in the
hippocampus, and what effect the loss of this mapping system would
have on an animal's behaviour.
Theories of space
The first chapter is concerned with a brief history of theories of
space, as developed primarily by philosophers. We started with the
ideas of Newton, Berkeley, Leibniz, and Kant because it was with
these thinkers that modern ideas about space began. The main
difference amongst these writers centred on questions as to whether
space was absolute or relative and whether it was an attribute of the
physical universe or a property of the mind.
What do we mean by absolute and relative space? Absolute space
is viewed as a stationary framework within which material objects
can be located but which exists independently of particular objects or
objects in general. Objects are located relative to the places of the
framework and only indirectly, via this framework, to other objects.
In contrast, relative space designates a set of relations amongst
objects or sensory inputs which in themselves are inherently nonspa-
tial. Objects are located relative to the observer's body and other
objects; relative space does not exist independently of the existence of
objects. There can be several types of relative spaces. Simple relative
spaces differ in terms of the axes to which they are referred and from
which they emanate: the body, the head, and the eye are the obvious
ones, but there may be others. An object is to my left, in the upper
left quadrant of my visual field. Higher order relative spaces locate
objects with respect to other objects in terms of their mutual relations
to the observer. Object A is to the left of object B.
The difference between absolute and relative spaces can be
illustrated in the following way. Let us imagine ourselves standing at
the edge of a billiard table on which there are only two balls: a red
and a blue. From our initial vantage point the red ball is to the left of
the blue one; as we walk around to the other side of the table, the
balls change their relative positions, first "moving" into line with
each other and then ending up on the opposite sides of each other in
relative space. The blue ball is now to the left of the red one. But with
reference to the absolute spatial framework of the table and the
room, the balls have not moved at all. Rather, it is the observer who
has changed his position from one place to another.
Newton was one of the major architects of the absolute theory of
space. He believed that the physical universe consisted of atoms set in
an absolute space. The mind can never directly apprehend this
absolute space but conjectures its existence from experience with the
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position and movement of objects relative to each other. In contrast
to Newton, neither Leibniz, Berkeley, nor Kant believed that space
was a property of the physical universe. Each thought that it was
constructed by the mind in one way or another. Berkeley, for
example, felt that the mind was incapable of knowing anything
about the physical universe as it really was but constructed ideas on
the basis of sensations. One of these constructs was space, and this
mental space was a relative one, based on the relations among
sensations. Tactile sensations were regarded as primary and Berkeley
traced many of our basic notions such as bodies and space back to
these tactile sensations. The difference between bodies and empty
space lay in the fact that the former offer resistance to motion while
the latter does not.
Kant followed Berkeley (and Hume) in the assertion that we can
have no direct knowledge of the external physical world. All that we
know is the result of the interaction of the unknowable things-
in-themselves and the structure of our minds. He also believed that
the notion of space was a feature of the mind. Unlike Berkeley,
however, he did not think it was an idea which the mind constructed
from sensations but rather that it was part of the machinery of the
mind, part of the mechanism by which the mind organized the
sensations. Furthermore, he argued that this mechanism was not
derived from sensations but was ontologically prior to them since one
could conceive of a space without objects or sensations but not vice
versa. Kant also differed from Berkeley in that he thought the spatial
framework of the mind was absolute and not relative.
This Kantian notion that the mind contains an a priori system for
organizing sensations into an absolute spatial framework is the one
that comes closest to the ideas expressed in our book. The rest of the
first chapter traces the development of the empiricist ideas of
Berkeley and the rationalist ideas of Kant down to their present role
in current psychological thought. Berkeley's most important heirs
were Poincare (1913) and Hull (1934). They both held that notions of
space and spatial behaviour derived from the organism's experience
with objects and the changes in those objects as a consequence of
movement. The ability to use several different routes to go from one
part of an environment to another was due to the development of the
displacement group (Poincare) or the habit-family hierarchy (Hull).
These were both conceived as mechanisms for associating together
movements which take the organism from the same starting position
to the same finishing position [see Gyr et al.: "Motor-Sensory Feed-
back and Geometry of Visual Space" BBS 2(1) 1979].
Hull assumed that his habit-f arnily hierarchies were learned by the
animal as a result of many experiences in which different movements
initiated in response to the same stimulus lead to the same goal.
Neither he nor Poincare ever faced up to the problem of how the
animal knew that a stimulus or a part of the environment was the
same as a previous one.
The Kantian idea of an innate spatial system that served as an
organizing framework for inherently spaceless sensations had a
rather more complicated history. One line of development involved
attempts to answer such questions as: How are objects localized
within a Kantian space (Lotze 1886, Miiller in Herrnstein & Boring
1966)? How are the separate frames of the perceptual systems
knitted together to form one continuous framework (Mach 1897)?
Concern with such questions led to a shift in emphasis away from
the central Kantian spatial framework itself towards the nature of the
peripheral sensations. An additional impetus for such a move came
from the discovery that Euclidean geometry, far from being an
inevitable guide to the nature of the physical world, was only one of
several possible geometries.
One of the most important developments arising from the Kantian
position was the nativist one. Nativists such as William James
assumed that sensations were inherently spatial. That is, the extension
of an object and the spatial relations between objects were regarded
as being provided by the sensory inputs in the same way that colour
and weight were. The most important contemporary exponent of this
position is Gibson (1950, 1966), who has identified some of the
features of visual sensations (e.g., texture gradients) which serve as
cues to depth.
We concluded from our history that both schools of thought were
correct and that there are several different ways in which the brain
represents space. As Berkeley suggested, many of these spaces are
relative, egocentric. They locate items in terms of coordinate systems
which are centred on various parts of the body and which change
with the movement of the body. In addition, however, there is one
spatial system which has the properties of the Kantian, a priori,
absolute system. This spatial system is not tied to the body but
provides the organism with a maplike representation which acts as a
framework for organizing its sensory inputs and is perceived as
remaining stationary in spite of the movements of the organism.
Some properties of the locale and taxon systems
Others have used the notion of a mapping system to explain behav-
iour, most notably Tolman (1932, 1948), but in a rather loose and
ill-defined way. We have spelt out the properties of a mapping
system in considerable detail and contrasted its use with other means
of finding one's way around an environment. We have called these
other systems taxon systems and termed the strategies based on them
route strategies. Route strategies or hypotheses can be further
divided into guidance hypotheses and orientation hypotheses and
these may be dependent on different brain structures.
A guidance hypothesis identifies an object or cue in the environ-
ment which should be approached or maintained at a certain
distance. The motor component is not specified in detail by the
hypothesis and can be any behaviour that successfully reduces the
difference between the animal and the guide. Examples of guidance
hypotheses are "go to the light," "avoid your mother-in-law," "fol-
low that car."
Orientation hypotheses specify the motor behaviour in detail.
They involve rotations within an egocentric spatial framework in
response to a cue. The axis of the framework can be centred on the
eye, the head, or the body. Examples of orientation hypotheses are
"turn right 90° [clockwise around the body axis] at the corner," "look
to the left 15°."
One of the main tenets of our theory is that much of the behaviour
of animals with hippocampal lesions is due to the normal operations
of the taxon systems. Therefore, although the main emphasis of the
book is on the locale system and place hypotheses, we found it
necessary to attribute enough properties to the guidance and orienta-
tion systems to enable us to predict the behaviour of animals
dependent on them.
Two of the most important properties of the taxon systems are that
information is stored on the basis of category inclusion and that
changes are incremental. A category inclusion system stores two
items with similar features in the same or neighbouring neural
circuits. This results in interference when the same item is associated
with two different items at different times or in different contexts. It
follows that animals relying solely on the taxon systems should be
particularly subject to interference effects. The second major prop-
erty we attributed to the taxon hypotheses is incremental storage.
That is, each activation of the information results in a small change in
the strength of its synaptic connections and successive strengthenings
or weakenings add to each other. Furthermore, we postulated that
the effect of the activation of a taxon hypothesis varied with the time
following the activation. The time course of this variation is expected
to be complex and probably varies with the particular hypothesis.
Nevertheless, this postulate predicts that the behaviour of animals
relying on a taxon hypothesis will be significantly influenced by the
intertrial interval.
In contrast, the hippocampal mapping system supports place
hypotheses which have very different properties from taxon hypo-
theses. The map of an environment is composed of a set of place
representations connected together according to rules which repre-
sent the distances and directions amongst them. As Kant suggested,
places and locale space do not exist in the physical world but are
notions constructed by the brain in order to organize sensory inputs.
A small number of stimuli (two or three) occurring with a unique
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spatial configuration when an animal is in a particular part of an
environment are sufficient to identify a place in the map. At any
given point in an environment there are usually a large number of
such sets of stimuli and therefore the identification of a place in an
environment does not depend on any particular cue or group of cues.
The distance and direction vectors which connect the places in the
map of an environment are derived from the animal's movements in
that environment. Unlike the neural connections underpinning taxon
hypotheses, maps are formed during exploration. Animals can use
maps to locate themselves in an environment, to locate items (includ-
ing rewards and punishments) in that environment, and to move
from one place to another by any available route. Finally, part of the
mapping system involves a mismatch mechanism which signals
changes from expected sensory inputs at a particular place.
Examples of locale hypotheses are "this is a dangerous environ-
ment," "there is a safe place in this dangerous environment," "go to
place A to obtain water." We postulated that place hypotheses are
different from taxon hypotheses in the following ways:
(1) Information is entered into the mapping system on an all-
or-nothing basis. When an animal attends to a cue it is entered in the
place representation corresponding to the animal's position in the
environment. On subsequent exposures to that cue in that place there
is no additional increment in the strength of that representation. Of
course, different cues in the same part of the environment can be
attended to and entered into the place representation on different
occasions, making the place representation richer but not stronger.
(2) In contrast to the taxon stores, there is little interference
between identical or similar items in the mapping systems when they
occur in different parts of an environment or in different environ-
ments, since they are stored in different place representations.
(3) Similarly, there are only minimal changes in the locale trace
strength after activation since different pathways can be used to
activate the same place representation.
(4) The place system enables the animal to act at a distance. It can
go towards or away from places which it cannot perceive if they are
both part of the same map.
Hippocampal anatomy and physiology
Our goal in the chapters on hippocampal anatomy and physiology
was twofold: to review the literature, and to select and interpret some
of the data to generate a set of "facts" on which to base a model of
hippocampal function. The "pieces and patches" (as we have called
them elsewhere, Nadel & O'Keefe 1974) which we selected are as
follows:
(1) The hippocampus is made up of three separate systems, the
fascia dentata, CAS, and CA1. Each system consists of a large matrix
of similar projection cells, the dentate granules and the CA pyramids,
together with a set of interneurones, the most prominent of which are
the basket cells of Cajal. The interneurones control the excitability of
the cell somas and probably also the dendrites of the pyramidal and
granule cells. The main flow of information amongst the three
subsystems appears to be in the direction from the fascia dentata to
CAS and thence to CA1. The projections are topographically precise,
a narrow strip of granule cells sending their axons to the dendrites of
a narrow strip of CAS pyramidal cells; the axons of these pyramids in
turn innervate a narrow strip of CA1 dendrites. These connected
strips, or lamellae, form the major anatomical unit within the
hippocampus. Some of these projections show an interesting pattern
of termination which may be important for models of hippocampal
function. The fibres do not all end at the same level of the dendrites.
Instead, there is a systematic shift in the termination such that fibres
end nearer the soma at one end of the lamellae than at the other.
(2) There are two major inputs to the hippocampus: one from the
entorhinal cortex via the perforant path and the other from the
medial septum and brainstem via the fornix. The entorhinal cortex
receives inputs from many areas of the sensory cortex and it is likely
that the entorhinal afferents to the hippocampus convey information
about stimuli and perhaps their location in egocentric space. This
projection has been studied anatomically and physiologically and has
been shown to have the same precision as the intrahippocampal
connections discussed under (1): small strips of entorhinal cells
project only to a restricted hippocampal lamella. Each entorhinal
fibre streams across the dendrites of many granule cells roughly at
right angles to their orientation, making numerous synapses en
passage in its course. With the exception of the diffuse medial septal
input, this is the usual mode of afferent termination in the hippocam-
pus.
The other major input to the hippocampus, the brainstem-medial
septum pathway, has a much more diffuse termination, ending in all
fields of the hippocampus and the dentate area. In the rat, this
pathway appears to convey information about the animal's move-
ments, in particular, about movements which change its position in
space. In animals such as the rabbit and cat, it transmits information
not only about movements, but also about arousal or attention. The
major evidence for this assertion comes from studies of the behav-
ioural and psychological correlates of theta in the hippocampal EEG,
particularly the work of Vanderwolf (1969, 1971), Whishaw, and
their colleagues (Vanderwolf, Bland, & Whishaw 1973). It is known
that lesions of the medial septum eliminate hippocampal theta and
that electrical stimulation of various parts of the brainstem elicits
hippocampal theta. Thus one can conclude that one of the major
functions of the brainstem-septal-hippocampal pathway is to impose
the theta rhythm on the hippocampus and that this rhythm carries
information about the animal's movements and, in some animals, its
intention to move (arousal).
(3) The function of the sinusoidal theta rhythm appears to be that
of a gate changing the excitability of the pyramidal cells from
moment to moment. Intracellular microelectrode studies show that
there is an intracellular rhythm inside the pyramidal cells so that the
membrane potential of the cell soma varies in the same temporal
fashion as the theta rhythm. Since the theta rhythm is largest in the
dendrites of the pyramidal and granule cells, it seems likely that
there is a theta modulation of the dendritic excitability as well. This
means that afferent inputs arriving at certain phases of the theta
rhythm will be more likely to activate the dendrites than those
arriving at other times.
The distribution of theta within the hippocampus is different for
rat and rabbit. In the rabbit, there is a progressive shift in phase as
one moves across the surface of the hippocampus. An electrode
penetrating through the rabbit hippocampus records two maxima in
the amplitude distribution, one in the basal dendrites of the CA1
pyramidal cells and the other in the apical dendrites of the dentate
granule cells. The theta recorded at the two peaks is 180° out of
phase and there is a null zone between the peaks in the stratum
radiatum of CA1 where the amplitude diminishes to zero. In the rat,
on the other hand, Winson (1976a,b,c) has shown that although , as in
the rabbit, there are two maxima in the amplitude distribution there
is no null zone between them in the CA1 stratum radiatum. Instead,
the phase difference between the CA1 theta and the dentate theta
slowly shifts as one moves the CA1 electrode close to the dentate
electrode. From this it appears that in the rat the CA1 apical
dendrites are modulated in such a way that parts of the dendrite are
at different phases of excitability from other parts.
These findings indicate that the theta mechanism locks into
synchrony large areas of the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex so
that the excitabilities of the cells have constant temporal relations
with each other. In the rat, afferent inputs arriving at a CA1 apical
dendrite patch that is in the depolarising phase of the theta cycle
would be more likely to excite, the cell than afferents arriving at a
different, less depolarised patch of dendrites.,.
These and numerous other facts about the anatomy and physiology
of the hippocampus can be combined in various ways to produce
models which will act as sorters or cross-correlaters, organizing the
afferents to the hippocampus according to the theta mechanism.
Important questions then are: What is the theta related to? What is
the principle according to which the afferents are sorted or corre-
lated in the hippocampus?
(4) Numerous studies have correlated the hippocampal EEG with
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the behaviour or psychological state of the animal. Even a superficial
glance at the literature makes it immediately obvious that there are
species differences in these correlates. In the rat, Vanderwolf et al.
(1973) have clearly shown that hippocampal theta relates to a class of
movements which includes walking, jumping, sniffing, swimming,
and head movements, and which can be roughly described as
"voluntary" behaviours. Large-amplitude irregular activity, on the
other hand, is associated with automatic behaviours such as eating,
drinking, and grooming.
The results in the rabbit and cat are slightly different. In these
animals, theta occurs not only during voluntary movements but also
during arousal or attention. Vanderwolf (1975) has shown that the
arousal-related theta has a different pharmacological basis from the
movement-related theta.
We can conclude that at least part of the basis on which the sensory
inputs to the hippocampus are sorted is some aspect of the animal's
movements. Experiments involving jumping and the initiation of
running (Vanderwolf 1969; Whishaw & Vanderwolf 1973; Morris,
Black, & O'Keefe, 1976) suggest that theta frequency may be related
to the distance through which the movement translates the animal
(or its distance receptor surfaces) relative to the environment. If this
is so, then sensory inputs are being sorted in the hippocampus
according to the distance between them in the environment.
(5) Studies of single units in the hippocampus of the freely moving
animal can be divided into two categories: those which allow or
encourage the animal to move around in space and provide it with a
generous amount of spatial information, and those which restrict the
animal's movements and limit the stimulating environment. The
latter have tended to focus on a small range of stimuli, such as
flashing lights, tones, and so on (Vinogradova 1970) or to examine
changes during a classical conditioning paradigm (Olds 1965). Stud-
ies done in our laboratory and those of Hill (1976), Branch, Olton,
and Best (1976), and Eaeck (1975) find that spatial factors play a
large part in the firing patterns of CA1 complex spike neurones.
Some fired when the rat went to, or ran past, a place in the
environment (the cell's place field) and others fired even more
vigorously when the rat sniffed in a place because of the absence of
something usually found there or the presence of something new. We
have called these units "place" and "misplace" units respectively.
The pattern of firing of a second class of hippocampal units is
closely associated with the hippocampal slow waves, in particular,
the theta waves, and has the same behavioural correlates. Ranck
(1973) has described these units and called them theta units. We have
called them displace units in accordance with our belief that their
major behavioural correlate is the animal's displacement in the
environment.
Experiments in our laboratory have been designed to identify the
factors which cause the place cell to fire in a particular part of an
environment. Hippocampal unit activity was recorded from rats
while they performed a place learning task on a T-maze set in an
environment where there were only four cues to spatial location. The
cues were controlled by rotating them and the maze from trial to trial
so that they were the only cues to the location of the goal.
The results indicated that there may be two types of place unit.
The first type has a place field which is built up from convergent
excitatory sensory inputs each of which tends to fire the cell in the
same part of the environment. Removal of some of the sensory cues,
in particular visual cues, from the environment reduces or abolishes
the firing of these cells in the place field.
The second type of place cell appears to have a place field which is
constructed, at least in part, from inhibitory influences. Removal of
some of the spatial cues causes these cells to increase their firing in
the place field. A particularly dramatic example of this increased
firing can be seen when the reward is removed and one is recording
from such a cell having a place field at or close to the goal area.
When all the spatial cues are removed this second type of place cell
fires all over the environment with an increased rate.
The place fields of these neurones appear to be due partly to
inhibitory influences on the cell when the animal is outside the field.
The misplace cells are probably a subset of these cells. We suggest
that the function of these cells is twofold: (a) to signal the animal's
position in an environment, and (b) to detect a mismatch between the
sensory inputs arriving in the hippocampus from a part of an
environment and those which would be expected on the basis of the
animal's current representation of that place in its map of that
environment.
The output of these misplace cells was postulated to be one of the
signals to the motor circuits that programme exploratory motor
patterns such as myostatial sniffing. On this view, exploration is seen
as an information-gathering behaviour which is intended first to
build and then to update cognitive maps.
In addition to the output to the exploratory motor circuits, the
mapping system makes available to other parts of the brain place
representations which can be used in the solution of problems. For
example, if an animal is hungry, the map of the environment in
which it finds itself can be consulted to see if there is a representation
of food there. If there is, then the map can be used to generate a
motor programme which will take the animal from its current
position in the map to the location containing food. A major chunk of
the hippocampus as a cognitive map is devoted to a detailed
consideration of the effects of hippocampal lesions on an animal's
behaviour and the success of the major prediction of the theory that
all of these data can be interpreted as a loss of place learning and
exploratory behaviour.
Animals bereft of their hippocampus should still be able to learn
tasks which can be solved using guidance or orientation hypotheses.
As we have outlined them aboye, guidance hypotheses involve
approach or avoidance of a specific cue by any available behaviour,
while orientation hypotheses specify a particular rotation within an
egocentric framework whose axis could centre on the body, the head,
or the eyes.
One of the things which must be kept in mind is that the same
problem can be solved by an animal using different hypotheses. For
example, an animal which successfully learns to go to the right arm
of a T-maze to obtain food could be doing so on the basis of a place
hypothesis ("go to that place as defined by its position in the room"),
an orientation hypothesis ("turn right 90° at the choice point") or a
guidance hypothesis ("approach a cue in or behind the right goal
arm; avoid a cue in or behind the left goal arm").
In a similar fashion, most tasks which psychologists assign to
animals can be solved using more than one hypothesis. Even when
two animals learn a task in the same number of trials, it is possible
that they have solved it using different hypotheses. This can only be
ascertained through the probe or transfer experiment in which the
use of different hypotheses can be tested. In our example, the ability
to rotate the start arm of the T-maze by 180° to the other side of the
crosspiece would enable us to test whether an animal was using an
orientation hypothesis (turning right) as opposed to a place or
guidance hypothesis. Similarly, two goal arms which could be
removed and interchanged would allow us to test for the use of an
intramaze guidance hypothesis.
Where they exist, probe tests provide powerful evidence in favour
of the cognitive map theory. Unfortunately, they have been used all
too rarely in experiments with lesioned animals. Consequently, for
much of our review of the lesion literature, we had to rely on a
different strategy. Before looking at the lesion results for a particular
task, we referred to the literature on normal animals and culled out
the important variables which influence performance on that task.
On the basis of this, we have made an estimate as to which
hypotheses are used by the animals for solution of that task (and,
equally importantly, which hypotheses retard solution). Where it
seems likely that place hypotheses are exclusively or primarily used
by normal animals (e.g., complex maze learning), we predict deficits
in lesioned animals. Where other hypotheses predominate or are
equally useful, there should be no deficit. Under certain circum-
stances (e.g., two-way shuttle avoidance), place hypotheses actually
conflict with the solution of the problem, and here we predict that
the lesioned rats should learn faster than normals.
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Effects of damage to the hippocampal system in animals
Our analysis of the lesion literature has led us to the following
conclusions:
(1) Exploration. Animals with damage to the hippocampal system
do not explore new environments or novel objects. Although they are
more active in open field tests they do not systematically inspect the
whole environment as does the normal rat. Instead, they adopt
stereotyped behaviour patterns, typically running around the outside
of the environment. They do not decrease their activity over time as
do normals, an indication that they have not incorporated
information about the new environment into their mapping system.
In spontaneous alternation tasks, an animal is given two
nonrewarded trials in a T-maze. Normal rats typically enter different
arms on the two trials. We think this is due primarily to the animal's
tendency to explore the less familiar parts of a novel environment.
The lesioned rats either proceed randomly on the second trial or
repeat their first choice, indicating an absence of this exploratory
learning.
(2) Discrimination learning. Lesioned animals usually learn
nonspatial discriminations as rapidly as do normals. The results on
spatial discrimination are less clear because these can usually be
learned using a place hypothesis or an orientation hypothesis. For
example, in a simple T-maze in which the right arm is always baited,
the animal can learn to go to the place in the room where the goal is
(place hypothesis) or to make a 90° right turn at the choice point
(orientation hypothesis). In such a spatial task, one would not
necessarily expect a deficit in lesioned animals. One would expect,
however, that they would have learned on the basis of a different
hypothesis from normals. This is what has been found: on open
elevated mazes normal rats used place hypotheses during initial
training, switching to other hypotheses with continued training.
Hippocampal rats, on the other hand, did not use place hypotheses at
any stage of learning.
(3) Discrimination reversal training. Animals with hippocampal
lesions show profound deficits in the reversal of spatial
discriminations. The results with nonspatial reversals are mixed: rats
and cats usually show a deficit while monkeys do not. The deficit in
spatial reversal is explained by the different properties of the place
system and the orientation system. Changes in the place system are
all-or-none, while those in the orientation system are incremental and
therefore slower. The normal animal quickly learns that there is no
food in the usual place and can look in other places; the animal with a
hippocampal lesion must continue to make the same body turn until
enough incremental changes have summated to enable it to switch to
the opposite orientation. Rats and cats fail to reverse a nonspatial
discrimination (such as a black/white discrimination) but monkeys
have no trouble doing so. The rats and cats fail, not because they
persist in responding to the incorrect cue longer than the normal
animals but because they switch into an inappropriate orientation
hypothesis ("go to the left cue") rather than going to the previously
unrewarded cue. When steps are taken to prevent these animals from
switching into persistent orientation hypotheses, or when species are
used which do not usually do so (monkeys), no deficit is seen.
(4) Maze learning. It has long been recognized that rats use
several strategies in solving maze problems. Perhaps the most
important of these is the goal-direction factor identified by Dashiell
(1930). He found that rats seem to have a sense of the general
direction of the goal and that this leads them to make more errors at
choice points where the correct alley leads away from the goal than
at choice points where it leads towards the goal.
Another factor which was identified as contributing to success in
maze learning was Hull's (1932) goal gradient, which postulated that
the effect of reinforcement was stronger as one got closer to the goal
and that the later choice points in a maze should be learned more
rapidly than the earlier ones.
According to the theory we are advancing, there are two ways that
the hippocampal cognitive map would be useful to an animal
running a maze. First, it locates the animal's position in the maze and
thus underlies place hypotheses such as "go from place A (first choice
point) to place B (second choice point)." Second, it locates the
direction of the goal from any place in the maze and is therefore
responsible for the goal-direction factor of Dashiell.
As predicted, animals with hippocampal damage are almost
always worse than normals at learning complex mazes. Moreover,
there is some evidence that they lack a goal-direction factor. For
example, in a Lashley III maze they tend to make more errors which
are sensitive to the goal direction than errors which are not. The
evidence is not particularly strong, however, since the point has not
really been carefully tested. Hippocampal rats nevertheless do
benefit to about the same extent as normals from guidances placed at
each choice point.
(5) Aversively motivated behaviour. Behaviour learned in
response to threat causes considerable difficulties for theories of
learning which posit that learning takes place as a result of drive
reduction and reinforcement. Once an animal has successfully
learned to avoid the threat, fear is reduced in the situation and it is
difficult to identify the reinforcing event. [See Eysenck: "The
Conditioning Model of Neurosis" BBS 2(2) 1979].
The cognitive map theory suggests that an important consideration
is whether the threat can be identified by the animal as a place or an
object in the environment. In general, frightened animals try to move
away from threatening places or items and towards safe places.
Under most circumstances the place system will predominate and an
animal's first hypothesis will be "seek a safe place" or "avoid this
dangerous place." Only when this is not possible do they select items
which should be avoided.
The three most common avoidance tasks used in the study of
animals with hippocampal lesions are one-way avoidance, two-way
avoidance, and so-called passive avoidance. Many one-way
avoidance tasks can be learned using either place or taxon
hypotheses. Typically, the animal is placed in one side of a two-
compartment chamber and after a short period of time the floor on
that side is electrified. A directional guidance signal (e.g., a buzzer
coming from the safe side) may or may not be turned on during this
period as a conditioned stimulus. Where such a guidance is provided,
the animal can learn to solve the task using either the guidance
hypothesis "approach the cue," or the orientation hypothesis "turn
180° and run," or the place hypotheses "go to the safe side B" or "get
out of the dangerous place A."
Most studies do not find deficits in one-way avoidance in
hippocampal animals but about one third of the studies do. With a
few exceptions, the studies conform to the expected pattern: those
using a CS fail to find a deficit while those not using a CS produce a
deficit. Two studies by Olton and Isaacson (1968, 1969) provide
further support for the exaggerated importance of the CS to the
hippocampals. In the first study, the effects of preexposure to the CS
were tested; in the second, the effects of inescapable CS-UCS
pairings prior to the avoidance training were tested. In both cases the
performance of the hippocampal, but not the normal, animals was
markedly affected by these treatments. Pre-training habituation to
the CS retarded learning while prior CS-UCS pairings markedly
improved it. [See Olton et al: "Hippocampus, Space and Memory"
BBS 2(3) 1979].
In two-way active avoidance, the animal is not removed from the
second compartment B, after it has fled there from compartment A.
Instead, it is left there for a period of time and then required to
shuttle back to the original compartment A on the next trial. Two
important differences from one-way active avoidance are (a) there is
no permanent safe place, only temporary respites from danger, and
(b) correct solution depends upon the animal's entering a recently
dangerous place. It is not surprising that this is a relatively difficult
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avoidance task for animals to learn. Nor is it surprising that
hippocampal animals, unhampered by conflicting place hypotheses,
are almost invariably quicker than normal controls to solve two-way
active avoidance tasks. They do not freeze in the situation, a natural
response for the normal animal in an inescapable place. Nor do they
hesitate to return to a dangerous place. This latter disadvantage
shows up in the learning pattern of normal animals as a reluctance to
return to one side of the box: they learn to avoid in one direction at a
much faster rate than in the other. In contrast, hippocampal animals
learn to go in both directions at about the same rate.
Passive avoidance tasks differ from active avoidance tasks in that
correct solution requires the animal to refrain from doing something.
That something might reflect a natural tendency, such as entering a
small dark compartment, or it might be a learned behaviour, such as
running down an alley to obtain reward. The animal is punished for
performing the response and the learning consists in failure to repeat
the response or an increased latency in doing so. We and others have
emphasized that the term passive is misleading since passive
immobility is not necessarily the best solution: the animal can
actively engage in an alternative behaviour.
Hippocampal animals perform relatively normally on some
passive avoidance tasks but are deficient on others. When they can
learn to avoid an object or cue, or to cease responding as in. step-down
or step-through passive avoidance, they are normal;, when a place
must be avoided, such as in a runway task, they show a deficit. The
clearest example of this is the often used approach-avoidance task.
Consider the following study by Nonneman and Isaacson (1973): cats
were first trained to approach a food dish and then shocked for doing
so. On subsequent trials the hippocampal cats showed a passive
avoidance deficit in terms of their latency to start running towards
the area (place) containing the food dish. These animals did not
touch the food (cue) more rapidly than control animals, however.
Nearly all studies which distinguish between avoidance of the
threatening place and avoidance of the threatening object show a.
similar result.
One final passive avoidance paradigm, conditioned taste aversion,
supports our contention that there is no deficit in hippoeampal
animals in avoiding items, as opposed to places. Of eight studies, six
found no deficit, as against one which did find a deficit. (See O'Keefe
& Nadel 1.978, Table A23, p. 467). In one study there were deficits
only with dorsal but not ventral hippocampal lesions.
(6) Classical conditioning and' operant tasks. There is little
evidence concerning the effect of hippoeampal lesions on classical
conditioning. What there is suggests that there is no deficit with
simple acquisition. For example, hippocampal rabbits acquire the
nictitating membrane response more rapidly than normal rabbits.
Similarly, hippocampal' animals show no difficulty in learning about
incentives.
In operant tasks, rats with hippocampal lesions learn to press the
lever and acquire food on a continuous reinforcement schedule at
least as rapidly as normal rats. This; is not unexpected since there is
little role for the locale system here. More complicated' schedules
may require the animal to use the locale system to aid vm "solving"
them. Take, for example, differential reinforcement of low rates of
lever pressing (DHL). On this schedule the animal must withold its
response for a fixed period of time before reward becomes available.
Lever presses before the interval is over reset the delay and result in
lost rewards. Since it seems unlikely that an animal such as a rat or
pigeon can tell time, the most likely means for "solving" such a
schedule is to engage in- some type of "collateral behaviour" during
the interval. One such behaviour is to actively avoid the area where
the lever is. Other collateral behaviours rely on. sequences of taxon-
based behaviours. In versions of this task in which a cue signals the
end of the delay period, the animal can use the guidance hypothesis
"approach the lever when the light is on." Hippocampal rats have
difficulty with DRL schedules when they are pretrained on
continuous reward, presumably since this strengthens the taxon-
based lever press hypothesis and makes it more difficult to find an
alternative taxon "collateral" behaviour. The provision of a cue
signalling the end of the delay interval improves the lesioned rats'
performance to the normal level.
(7) Spatial delayed response and spatial alternation. These are
both tests of spatial memory. In the delayed response task, one of two
or more positions is baited within the view of the animal, which is
then required to choose that alternative after a delay. Most delayed
response tasks would appear to be dependent on locale mechanisms
in that the animal can remember the place where reward is: as
expected, hippocampal animals do poorly on these tasks. Spatial
alternation tasks require the animal to alternate its choice from one
trial to the next. When tested in a T-maze, the animal should make a
right turn, followed by a left and then a right and so on. This task is
also usually failed by hippocampal animals. When the alternation
task is performed in an operant chamber, the results are mixed, some
studies finding deficits, others not. One obvious difference between
the operant chamber and the T-maze is that in the former an animal
can reposition itself after each trial so as to be ready for the next.
Holding this position substitutes for the memory of the last response.
This appears to be the strategy used by the lesioned animals in those
studies where they were successful.
(8) Reaction to reward change - extinction. One of the most
obvious and replicable deficiencies in animals with hippocampal
lesions is their inability to alter their behaviour when reward is
removed from the place it is usually found. This is seen most clearly
in runway tasks where the animal is taught to run from one end to
the other for reward. When the reward is withdrawn, normals
typically cease running within a small number of trials. In contrast,
hippoeampals continue to run for a great many trials, seemingly
unaware that there is no longer any food at the end of the alley.
Interestingly, deficits on extinction in operant chambers are much
smaller and not seen at all in some studies. We think that the
extinction situation is formally equivalent to the passive avoidance
task. It can be solved either by a shift in the locale system or the taxon
system. At the start box of an extended runway, the locale system
informs the rest of the brain whether or not there was reward in the
goal box on the last trial. Changes in behaviour in the start box are
almost wholly attributable to the hippocampal locale system. The
taxon systems contain the information about how often certain cues
have been associated with reward in the past. They control the
animal's response primarily to the cues of the goal box. Extinction
based on-, these systems should be a slow decremental business,
starting in the goal box and working back up the runway.
One important observation on extinction was made by Jarrard and
Isaacson (1965), who reported that extinction of running in an alley
in hippocampal lesioned rats depends on the intertrial interval. Large
deficits were observed only when spaced trials were used. As in other
tasks, it appears that the brain systems on which the lesioned animals
must rely are much more sensitive to the temporal aspects of their
activation than is the hippocampal system.
(9) Reaction to reward change - frustration. When an animal
fails to find reward where it expects it, it may become frustrated.
This frustration is assumed to be mildly aversive, to energise
behaviour, and to provide cues as to which behaviours can be
conditioned. It has been suggested by Gray (e.g., 1970) that the
hippocampus is important to frustration. We found little evidence in
the literature to support this suggestion. From studies which report
either decreased or increased frustrative reactions in hippocampal
animals in response to various treatments, we conclude that a direct
effect of hippocampal lesions is unlikely.
(10) Other-effects of hippocampal lesions. The loss of a cognitive
mapping system might have subtle effects on many apparently
nonspatial behaviours. Thus, for example, maternal behaviour might
be affected if the dam has trouble locating the place where she left
the pups or the nest. Similarly, aggression probably depends on the
animal's perception of the size of its environment and its territory
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within that environment. Thus one might expect some studies to
indicate deficits in these tasks depending on the exact nature of the
testing situation, and this is indeed what is found.
There does not appear to be any major change in eating or
drinking after hippocampal lesions, although these is evidence that
electrical or chemical stimulation of the hippocampus can result in
stimulus-elicited drinking or eating. We think these latter effects
may be indirect, resulting from the effects of the hippocampus on
other structures such as the hypothalamus [see also Toates:
"Homeostasis and Drinking" BBS 2(1) 1979].
(11) Eedocriees and the tiippocampus. There are subtle changes
in the pituitary-adrenocortical system (involving ACTH and
corticosterone in the rat) after hippocampal damage. In contrast,
other hormonal systems (e.g., gonadal) have not been implicated in
hippocampal function. There are three lines of evidence which
support the notion that the hippocampus plays a role in hormonal
function. First, uptake studies show that labelled corticosterone is
preferentially taken up by the hippocampus. Second, injections of
ACTH and corticosterone have been shown to modify hippocampal
unit activity and hippocampal BEG activity. Third, lesions and
stimulation of the hippocampus have been reported to affect both the
diurnal fluctuations of plasma corticosteroids and the dynamic
hormonal response to environmental uncertainty. The latter may
indicate that the major relationship of the corticosteroid system is
with the CA1 misplace system.
Extension of the theory to humans
One of the major goals we set ourselves in The hippocampus as a
cognitive rnap was to develop a theory which could apply to the
literature on human amnesia following damage to the hippocampal
system, as well as to the subhuman animal literature. In order to do
so, it was obvious that we would have to modify the theory to take
into account the well-.documented lateralization of the human brain
[see Corballis & Morgan: "On the Biological Basis of Human Later-
ality" BBS 1(2) 1978]. Accordingly, we postulated that the left and
right human hippocampus perform different functions, in part
because of the different information they receive from the left and
right neocortex. The right hippocampus of the human functions in a
manner similar to that of the rat, acting as a one-trial episodic
memory framework which stores items and events within a spatio-
temporal context. The left human hippocampus provides a linguistic
framework for the organization of narratives, a framework with
properties similar to those which linguists have ascribed to semantic
deep structure [see Arbib & Caplan: "Neurolinguistics Must Be
Computational" BBS 2(3) 1979].
As in the rat, the human taxon and locale systems have different
properties which stem from their different modes of storing informa-
tion. The taxon system stores items in an incremental fashion, with
each item listed with similar items. Consequently, taxon-based
memories are prone to interference between similar items and the
strength of the memory trace depends on the time elapsed since it has
been activated. Retrieval of taxon information is by category name,
or by association with other items.
In contrast, information is stored within the locale system as
specific individual episodes within a specific context. Because of this
contextual embedding there is little interference between similar
items in the store; and the multiple access to each item stored in a
maplike structure means that there is very little change in trace
strength after activation.
The major modification to the mapping system in the human
involves the inputs to the left hippocampus. In keeping with the
evidence that left temporal lesions result in amnesia for verbal
material, we postulate that the left hippocampus receives informa-
tion about linguistic entities and sets these, rather than items drawn
from the physical world, into a mapping space. This has led us to .the
notion that the left hemisphere cognitive map acts as a semantic
map, providing something like a deep structure for connected
discourse.
Work in linguistics by Chomsky (1957, 1965), Fillmore (1968,
1971), and others has suggested that in addition to the left-to-right
ordered temporal structure of surface sentences, there must exist a
deep structure which explains, among other things: (1) the fact that
semantically related words in a sentence are often not contiguous, (2)
superficially different sentences such as the active 'the boy bit the
dog' and the passive 'the dog was bitten by the boy' have the same
meaning, and (3) the same sound can have more than one meaning
depending on the context. Analysis of different linguistic theories of
deep structure suggests that they all entail the notion of a framework
which specifies the semantic relations among the various entities of
the sentence. In Chomsky's work, for example, this framework is
explicit; in other work (such as Fillmore's) the framework is implicit
and the relations among the entities are specified by a set of cases
(agent, object, goal, instrument etc.) which relate the entities to each
other [see Chomsky: "Rules and Representations" BBS, forthcom-
ing].
We have followed up a suggestion of Jackendoff (1976) that
sentences about existence or movement in physical space form a
model for all sentences and that a successful semantic analysis of such
sentences could be generalised to cover all sentences. After jacken-
doff, we sketched out a model of a semantic map which provides the
deep structure for sentences about the existence and movement of
entities in physical space. For example, the sentence "the rock fell
from the roof to the ground" is represented by two places in a map
(the roof and the ground), the existence of an entity (the rock) in one
of these places (the roof) until some unspecified time t, and the
movement of the entity from one place to another at time t. Various
transformation rules allow the full range of active sentences to be
generated from this semantic map.
Nonspatial sentences can also be represented in semantic maps.
Here, however, the mapping space does not represent entities exist-
ing and moving in physical space but in influence space, identifica-
tional space and circumstantial space. Consider for example, the
sentence "Harry gave the book to the library." Here the action is not
one of physical movement but the "movement" of the book from the
possession of Harry to the library. This movement can be represented
in a possessional or influence space in a manner exactly analogous to
movement in physical space and the transformation rules for gener-
ating surface sentences from this map are the same as those for the
physical map.
Other types of semantic spaces would map sentences about
changes in identity such as "The rock went from smooth to pitted,"
and changes in circumstances such as "The librarian went from
laughing to crying."
The human amnesic syndrome
Our understanding of the functions of the human hippocampus
comes from work on two groups of patients: those with surgical
removal -of temporal lobe structures including the hippocampus, and
those suffering from Korsakoff's syndrome, which is usually asso-
ciated with damage to the mammillary bodies and the dorsomedial
thalamus. Much of this research has concentrated on the memory
deficit which is one of the more obvious features of the syndrome.
As it does with animals, the cognitive map theory makes two sets of
predictions about changes after hippocampal damage in humans.
The first set flows from the absence of a locale system while the
second results from the intrinsic properties of the remaining taxon
system.
(1) Bereft of the hippocampal mismatch system, humans should
show a lack of curiosity, and its consequence, incidental learning.
There is not much evidence on this, but Talland (1965) reported that
his Korsakoff patients did not resume unsolved problems after
distraction nor did they show incidental learning.
(2) Patients should not show spatial mapping abilities. Here we
are referring to the locale space and not to egocentric space, which
appears to be more dependent on parietal damage. One of the
defining characteristics of Korsakoff's syndrome is disorientation in
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time and space. In more formal tests, both Korsakoff and temporal
lobe patients have severe difficulties in learning mazes. Interestingly,
some of Talland's patients could learn a peg maze when the pegs had
different colours, a finding reminiscent of the improvement in the
performance of hippocampal rats when the cues are provided at the
choice points.
(3) The hippocampus is the neural substrate for one-trial episodic
memories in which events are related to each other in a long map
extending from the past into the future. These episodic memories can
be retrieved directly by the activation of the items themselves, or
indirectly by events occurring before or after the event, or by the
spatial context in which the event occurred. Without the mapping
system there would still be considerable memory capacity. Short-
term memory should be relatively intact. Long-term taxon memories
would also be intact and could be retrieved directly or indirectly by
category name or high frequency associates. The properties of this
system would lead to a marked increase in interference amongst
stored items.
There is a disagreement as to whether short-term memory is
impaired in Korsakoff patients. For example, Baddeley and
Warrington (1970) have reported intact short-term memory while
Butters and Cermak (1974) have claimed .there was a deficit.
With reference to long-term memory, we have concluded that a
review of the literature shows that:
(a) there appears to be a selective loss in the storage of event memory;
(b) there is relatively normal storage of category memory up to and
including categories based on the semantic feature of individual items;
(c) retrieval from these taxon category stores is considerably retarded in
amnesics because of the powerful interference effects acting between items of a
similar nature;
(d) the provision of retrieval aids at the time memories are being retrieved
helps amnesics to gain access to the taxon information;
(e) the loss of event-specific memory seems to include memories formed
before the onset of the disease or the surgical intervention as well as those
formed subsequent to it.
Conclusions
It is our view that cognitive map theory effects a rapprochement
between the infrahuman and clinical research, though there remain
a number of places where the data are thin. Specific conclusions are
scattered throughout The hippocampus as a cognitive map and can
be summarized as follows:
(1) The hippocampus constructs and stores cognitive maps -
representations which capture the spatial layout of an animal's
experienced environment.
(2) These maps provide a basis for objective, nonegocentric,
spatial cognition. Other brain systems are responsible for egocentric
spaces, such as those referenced to body axes, or the eyes.
(3) Cognitive maps are useful for a variety of purposes, including
successful food and water gathering; locating mates, territories, and
safe havens; guiding navigation, migration, and so on.
(4) The known physiology and anatomy of the hippocampal
system is consonant with the mapping notion. In particular, the
existence of place-coded neurones and novelty-detectors in the
hippocampus is important. The fact that hippocampal theta activity
seems to relate to an animal's translocations in space provides a
mechanism whereby distance information is made available to the
mapping system.
(5) The consequences of damage to the hippocampus can be
understood in terms of two direct effects, and several indirect ones.
The direct effects involve the loss of novelty-detection/exploration
and of place learning. Indirect effects, such as increased persevera-
tion and susceptibility to interference, derive from the animal's
forced dependence on alternative, often maladaptive, behavioural
strategies.
(6) The spatial map/memory system also exists in humans, but the
hippocampus in the language hemisphere is concerned with seman-
tic rather than spatial mapping.
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Hippocampus, memory and raoweraent
A less than careful reading of this book may suggest to the reader that
O & N are taking a strong stand on the old and tiresome issue of
cognitive versus associationistic (particularly S-R) views of learning.
Although they do slip into this posture now and then, it is important to
understand that they mean to argue this point only in regard to the role
of the hippocampus in learning. Their distinction between taxon and
locale systems is crucial, and the strength of the book, from a
behaviour-theoretic viewpoint, is that it makes this distinction clearly.
Taxon systems are of two kinds, orientation and guidance. Orientation
involves hypotheses such as "turn to the right," or "if you see your
mother-in-law look 15° to the left." In the case of guidance systems
the form is "go to the light," or "avoid your mother-in-law." Both these
systems can function unabetted by cognitive maps and, on O & N's
hypothesis, the hippocampus. Cognitive maps operate on the locale
system: "search for what you want in your cognitive map and go to
it."
The book at its best - at least the parts that concern me most - is
about cognitive and noncognitive functioning, and its promise is that
through a critical analysis of the literature, including their own experi-
ments, the authors will present a convincing case for the hippocampus
as the seat of the locale (cognitive maps) system. From my point of
view as a learning theorist with some interest in brain function, the book
can be faulted on two grounds. The first is that, whereas the authors
rely heavily on experimental outcroppings of issues in learning theory
from the 1930s and 1940s, they appear not to have as strong a grasp
on the issues of this period as they need; they seem to rely too much
on secondary sources in evaluating the status and meaning of the
experimental evidence that arises out of the classical controversies in
learning theory. For example, they examine the evidence from latent
learning, continuity versus discontinuity in learning, and place versus
response learning as though each of these issues bore equally (or at
all) on the concept of cognitive maps.
In their argument about latent learning (p. 263) the authors accept
without citing a reference the wisdom that normal laboratory rats have
shown substantial amounts of latent learning; hippocampal animals are
not supposed to do so. They then cite a couple of recent experiments
showing no latent learning in hippocampal rats, but little if any in control
rats either. They conclude that "a proper experiment" is needed that
will not only fail to show the effect in hippocampals but will show it
strongly in normals. A little digging into the relevant older work would
have told them that the only strong latent learning ever found was in the
original California experiments using complex mazes (and the magni-
tude of the California effect has failed to replicate on at least a couple
of occasions). In simple choice situations there is often statistically
significant latent learning, but the effect is never very strong. It is
treacherous to build a theory on this kind of experimental quicksand,
even if the presence or absence of the effect in question produces a
good test of the theory - which it does not. Latent learning was about
reinforcement as a principle of learning (Hull) as opposed to perfor-
mance (Tolman). If latent or incidental learning can be demonstrated,
this does prove that learning is possible without reinforcement; it does
not prove that what is learned is a cognitive map; the learning may still
be either of the taxon or the locale variety, or both.
The issue of continuity versus discontinuity in learning is not much, if
any, better as a litmus test of the operation of locale versus taxon
systems. Continuity in learning was at first an argument between
Gestalt psychologists and associationists and the issue was the role of
insight in learning. Later, it was a kind of family argument between two
groups of S-R psychologists, Guthrians (formalized in the stimulus-
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sampling theory of Estes) and Hullians. Here, the issue was the
conceptualization of the growth of the learning curve. While Tolman
favored both cognitive maps and discontinuity in learning (in the
Gestalt fashion), there is no logic that requires such a map to be
formed in a single trial. Nor does logic dictate that associations be
formed incrementally. If continuity-discontinuity and taxon-locale are in
any sense dimensions, they appear to me as orthogonal.
The place versus response literature would seem the major place to
find empirical evidence on the basis of which to prove that the
hippocampus is the organ of a locale rather than taxon system of
functioning. Olton's work with his radial-arm maze seems a particularly
promising source of such data [see Olton et al.: BBS 2(3) 1979]. If rats
lose their ability to solve the radial-arm problem when they lose
hippocampal function (and if they don't lose much else), and if they do
not lose radial-arm-maze ability when they lose other equivalent
amounts of brain, then O & N would seem to have scored some points
for their side. The points are not yet on the board. More on this later.
The second major weakness of this book is that the evidence the
authors need in order to make their case does not yet exist. O & N
nevertheless undertake the task knowingly and fearlessly. They
declare in their preface that they will not fool around with subtleties but
will present "the boldest black-and-white case for the theory." The
hippocampus seems a favorite target for black-and-white cases; and
what it finally comes down to in almost all these cases is in one sense
or another memory and movement. There are many conceptualizations
of the relation of memory to movement. Among the older behaviour-
theoretical ones are Hull's anticipatory-goal-response theory and
Tolman's sign-significate relations theory (which does not, incidentally,
necessitate cognitive maps). Among the more recent and more
physiological views specifically related to the hippocampus are several
that O & N quickly reject, such as Olds's (1972) position, which seems
to combine Hullian and Tolmanian thinking with an emphasis on the
latter; Gray's (1977) theory of septo-hippocampal function, which also
combines elements of both classical learning-theory positions with an
emphasis on the former; and the views of Altman et al. (1973), Douglas
(1972) and Kimble (1969), which in one way or another find the
hippocampus important for "braking," inhibition and suppression in the
face of negative expectations. Clearly the hippocampus has a lot to do
with anticipations, and particularly - or at least, this is the bulk of the
evidence at hand - anticipations of negative events: punishments and
frustrations. (When the authors cite studies that show no decrease in
primary frustration in a double-alley as evidence that the hippocampus
is not involved in frustration, they miss Gray's (1977) and Glazer's
(1974) and my own point - that hippocampal function, and particularly
some portion of the slow-wave (theta) activity, has to do with anticipa-
tory frustration, with persistence and avoidance, not with the energizing
effects of primary frustration, which experiments of Henke (1974) and
others relate to the amygdala).
Of the recent explosion of learning experiments on hippocampal
function, most of which are displayed in the tables of the authors'
impressive appendix, not a small number involve passive avoidance
("don't go there," "don't do that") and DRL ("wait before you press
the lever," "take more time," "do other things to take time"). Most of
the relevant experiments on what I will call "paradoxial effects of
reward" - the partial reinforcement and magnitude of reinforcement
extinction effects, successive negative contrast, and patterned single
alternation, as examples - are conducted in simple runways or lever
boxes where taxon systems would seem to come into play more than
cognitive maps would. All these experiments showing effects of
hippocampal lesions can be accounted for by any of the extant
theories of hippocampal function, except that the cognitive maps
position would seem to have particular difficulty with the DRL results:
Why should a map be involved in timing? Fewer experiments involve
specifically the kind of arrangement in the solution of which a cognitive
map would be required. Again, the Olton radial-arm maze is an
exception, although here, too, it is easy to see how taxon rather than
locale systems might be operating. The rat does not need a cognitive
map to solve the Olton maze (and, incidentally, it does not solve the
maze in anything like a single trial). The external-cue markers for each
arm can trigger anticipations or memories leading to approach-
avoidance movements. Or, in Tolman's language, sign-behavior-
significate relationships can operate at each arm, independently. None
of this requires the function of a cognitive map.
O & N took on a tough case when they decided to defend the
proposition that the hippocampus mediates (in the positive form) "If
you want X, find X in your cognitive map and go to X," rather than "If X
is signalled and you want X go to X." A term from Scottish jurispru-
dence, appropriately enough, comes to mind: neither guilty nor not
guilty but - "not proven."
by Theodore W. Berger
Department of Psychology and Department of Psychiatry, Western Psychiatric
institute and Clinic, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260
Setectiwe activation of hippocampai neurons
O & N have written a superbly comprehensive thesis concerning the
role of the hippocampus in spatial mnemonic processes. It is
supported both by lesion-behavior data indicating that rats with hippo-
campal damage show deficits in their ability to solve maze problems
using a "place" (vs. a "cue") strategy, and by unit-recording data
showing that hippocampal neurons are selectively activated when an
animal is in a particular "place" on a maze. Different neurons respond
to different places. It is on the latter unit-recording evidence that I wish
to comment.
The authors report that hippocampal neurons respond selectively to
a "complex" of extramaze visual cues which define extraorganism
space. The cues are "complex" in the sense that a number of
individual cues are necessary to sustain a cell's firing rate, and a given
cell will respond equally well as long as some minimum is present,
regardless of which specific cues make up that minimum (e.g., any
three out of four stimuli). The argument is that the same space can be
defined by several different subsets of cues, so that hippocampal cells
meeting the above criteria are coding "space," not specific stimuli.
While this is an impressive piece of data, it falls somewhat short of
demanding a "spatial coding" interpretation. Two things should be
kept in mind: (1) the data demonstrate only that hippocampal cells can
be activated by complex cues (i.e., that the cells code "spatial
location" is an inference), and (2) that rats are food reinforced for
entering maze arms during prerecording procedures. It becomes
equally likely, then, that the data demonstrate conditioned hippocam-
pal responsiveness to correlations between food reinforcers and
multiple cues (only a subset of which need to be present to activate the
cell). Through usual conditioning procedures, a given cell becomes
responsive only to one complex cue composed of extramaze stimuli
delimited by the organism's orientation in space (i.e., visual field).
Given the amount of other evidence showing increases in hippocampal
responsiveness during learning (Olds et al. 1972; Segal 1973; Best and
Best 1976; Berger et al. 1976; Berger and Thompson 1978a,b), this
alternative interpretation is certainly reasonable.
A second point concerns further evidence by O & N that hippocam-
pal cells are responding specifically to "place." They discuss evidence
showing that hippocampal neurons are activated when an animal is in a
particular maze location - regardless of the animal's orientation within
that location. For example, one cell may fire at a midway point on a
maze arm when the animal is oriented either toward or away from the
center of the maze arm. This type of evidence would seem to counter
strongly the alternative interpretation outlined above, because the
complex of multiple cues would be so different in each case. However,
the reader must keep in mind that the data demonstrate only that
hippocampal neurons increase their firing rate in some manner at a
location on the maze arm. The authors have not demonstrated that the
temporal distribution of increased unit spikes is the same in each case.
In other words, a given cell may increase its discharge rate when
oriented in either direction on a maze arm. The pattern of increased
unit discharge, however, may be quite different when facing toward
maze-center than away from maze-center. Alternative patterns could
function to code (see Perkel and Bullock 1968) alternative sets of
multiple, complex cues acting as conditioned stimuli. That the temporal
distribution of conditioned cell firing can be a significant parameter
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during learning has been shown by previous studies (see Berger and
Thompson 1978a; Berger et al. 1979) using what O & N term the
"neuropsychological" or "paradigmatic" approach to the study of
brain-behavior relations. Differences in the pattern of cell discharge are
difficult to document under the "neuroethological" conditions used by
O &. N, as this approach does not easily permit analysis of the temporal
dimensions of brain-behavior phenomena.
A final point relates directly to the use and rationale of the "neuro-
ethological" strategy for the study of brain-behavior relations. One of
its major drawbacks has been mentioned above - its difficulty with
fine-grained temporal analyses. A second drawback is its reliance on
observational and subjective criteria for classifying brain-behavior
correlations. The arbitrariness involved in this method of analysis can
be seen in O & NTs discussion of Ranck's (1973) and O'Keefe's (1976)
studies of behavioral correlates of hippocampal neuronal activities.
Both investigators used highly similar procedures in the same species.
Ranck (1973) found that hippocampal activity correlated more with
specific behaviors than with the spatial location in which the behaviors
were emitted. O'Keefe (1976), on the other hand, reported that the
firing of hippocampal cells correlated more with an animal's location in
space than the particular behaviors emitted in that location. Confusion
deepens on reading O & N, as it becomes apparent that increased
firing of many hippocampal "place" cells depends on certain behav-
iors being performed in certain places, giving the impression that
space-behavior "interactions" of some sort are the true determining
variable for hippocampal cellular activation.
O & N have presented an impressive and interesting array of
evidence that hippocampal cells are selectively activated by some
variable - and that variable may be "place." There are a considerable
number of alternative explanations for hippocampal cellular firing
increases under their conditions, however, and a great deal separates
the electrophysiological data from a comprehensive theory of spatial
memory and cognition.
by D. Caroline Bianchard and Robert J. Bianchard
Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822
• Behawiorai anaif sis of the hippocampai syndrome
The difficulties involved in attempts to understand behavioral changes
associated with damage to specific brain sites or structures are
seldom really appreciated. On the one hand are all the imponderables
of brain anatomy and dynamics, on the other, the complexities of
behavior. Despite (or perhaps because of) the radical changes in our
views of brain constituents and their organization which have occurred
in the past two decades, there is no question but that the brain side of
this equation is better understood than the behavioral side.
The hippocampus is a dramatic illustration of this. In one sense,
hippocampal damage ought to be comparatively easy to analyze. The
behavior of the hippocampally damaged rat is so characteristic and
consistent that the experienced observer cannot conceivably run
"blind." The animal proclaims its status in its movements, before any
choice point or aversive stimulus is encountered. However, this charac-
teristic and consistent behavioral pattern has defied analysis by a
veritable army of persistent researchers over a period of several
decades.
Part of the problem is that many of the tasks and' measures of
experimental psychology are based on accident and analogy, rather
than on a systematic analysis of the situations and population pres-
sures under which animals have actually evolved. Another difficulty is
that almost all behaviors of higher animals are mutiply determined:
Variation in "passive avoidance," for example, may stem from so
many sources that a change in any single passive avoidance task is
basically uninterpretable.
Faced with these problems, most investigators tend to form some
sort of fairly low-level and general hypothesis - that hippocampal
damage interferes with perseveration or freezing, for example - and to
test this hypothesis by demonstrating this deficit in a variety of tasks.
O & N's hypothesis that the hippocampus forms the neural substrate
for the formation of spatial maps is clearly not one of these low-level
notions. It is elegant and detailed, and has occasioned one of the most
thorough and satisfying literature analyses ever to emerge from studies
of a single brain structure. A reviewer usually likes everything except
the part that he himself is most familiar with. In this case, we are most
impressed by the O & N treatment of areas with which we are very
familiar: exploration (Ch. 6) and aversively motivated behavior (Ch. 8).
These chapters are outstanding in their scholarly and analytic treat-
ment of behavior, quite aside from possible insights into hippocampal
functioning.
Faced with such splendor, it seems pretty churlish to remain
skeptical. We are, though. There are just too many points at which the
spatial-map hypothesis alone cannot account for behavioral changes
accompanying hippocampal damage.
For example, in a recent series of experiments (Bianchard et al.
1977) we found that normal rats show a fairly systematic pattern of grid
grasping to minimize the pain of shock. Hippocampally damaged rats
grasp the grids in similar fashion, but hold this grasp and its associated
immobile posture only about half as long as normals. Similarly, these
rats perform more poorly than normals when forced to balance on a
narrow ledge: they fidget around and fall off. When placed on a larger
platform in which active immobility is not required for balance, or on a
wire in which active rather than immobile balancing is typical, hippo-
campal rats were virtually identical to controls.
There is no reason to suppose that spatial mapping has anything
much to do with performance in these tasks. Since the apparatus items
were on the same table and about the same distance above the table,
there is also no reason to suppose that spatial maps would be different
in the three tests even if such maps were involved in performance on
the tests. Yet hippocampal damage produced a clear deficit in one test
and no difference in the others. Moreover, the ledge test appeared to
rely on exactly the same sort of active immobility which hippocampal
rats seem incapable of maintaining in so many other situations. If
spatial mapping problems were not a factor in the ledge-platform-wire
test comparisons, it seems unparsimonious to interpret the acknowl-
edged difficulties of these animals in freezing in aversive conditioning
tasks as a reflection of loss of spatial mapping ability.
We are not seriously proposing that an inability to "hold still" can
account for all the differences between normal rats and rats with
hippocampal lesions. In fact, this particular deficit is not a function of
damage to the hippocampus proper. In an as-yet-unpublished study,
Haakon Sundberg and ourselves found that exactly the same motor
pattern is found in rats with lesions restricted to the entorhinal cortex.
However, this deficit is also seen with hippocampal damage, and it may
have a profound effect on attention to specific objects as well as on
the formation of "maps," since such attention is obviously impaired by
a deficit in active immobility.
Regardless of one's specific perspective, this book has performed
an invaluable service in bringing together the scattered hippocampal
literature. It also sets a new standard for critical and scholarly analysis
of hypotheses, and will lead to a more sophisticated experimental
approach to behavior changes following brain manipulations.
by T. V. P. Bliss
Division of Neurophysiology and Neuropharmacology, National Institute for Medical
Research, London NW7 1AA, England
O'Keefe & Nadel's three-stage model for hippocampal
representation of space
I have given my general impressions of this remarkable book else-
where (Nature, in press). Here I want to consider some of the problems
attending the authors' neural model of how the cognitive map is
generated.
From a physiological point of view, the main evidence for O & N's
theory is that there exist place units in the hippocampus. It is not clear
whether similar place units exist elsewhere in the brain - obviously, the
theory would be seriously weakened if they did. Assuming that such
cells are peculiar to the hippocampus, one can ask what special
features of the anatomy and physiology of hippocampal neurons allow
the construction of an enduring neural representation of space. This is
496 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1979), 2
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00064244
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:54:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/O'Keefe & Nadel: Hippocampus as cognitive map
the problem which O & N tackle, albeit with uncharacteristic brevity, at
the end of Chapter 4. Their model contains three stages. In the first,
sensory information from stimuli in the environment is assumed to
converge on granule cells of the dentate gyrus via perforant path fibres
originating in entorhinal cortex. The details of what goes on in the
dentate are not critical to the model's primary job of endowing
pyramidal cells with the observed properties of place units; in fact the
model would work (insofar as it does work) if the entorhinal cortex
projected to CA3 pyramidal cells directly. This having been said, the
system of rigidly wired collateral connections favoured by the authors
(Fig. 28) is highly implausible, making huge demands on developmental
mechanisms, and is in any case unnecessary. A system of random
connections within the constraints of an overall lamellar projection
would also serve the required purpose of yielding a population of
granule cells responding only to complex configurations of stimuli.
In the second stage of the model, the axons (mossy fibres) of
granule cells project, via en passant synapses, to CA3 pyramidal cells.
For economy it would clearly be desirable to restrict the number of
pyramidal cells responding to activity in a given mossy fibre, and to
achieve this the authors ingeniously exploit the fact that theta waves
travel across the hippocampus during voluntary movement, imposing
rhythmical changes in the excitability of pyramidal cells. Consequently,
at a given moment in the exploration of an unfamiliar environment, the
mossy fibres carrying information about environmental stimuli will find
only a proportion of CAS pyramids, among the total receiving such
activity, in the appropriate phase of theta to fire. At this point it will help
if I give a simplified example of how, as I understand it, the model
operates.
Suppose the controlled environment contains three stimuli, A, B, and
C (light at 10 o'clock, buzzer at 2 o'clock, cage at 6 o'clock, for
example). In the authors' model of the dentate, each pair of stimuli
activates a specific granule cell; let us say that AB, AC, and BC fire
granule cells G1, G2, and G3 respectively. The three granule cells in
turn fire those three pyramidal cells, C1, C2, and C3, which the theta
gating mechanism selects from the population of target cells of G1, G2,
and G3. Note that at this stage, during initial exploration of an
unfamiliar environment, the pyramidal cells have the same fields as the
corresponding granule cells; in particular, if any one of the three stimuli
defining the animal's place in its environment is removed, only one
granule cell and one pyramidal cell will remain active. In order to
transform the three pyramidal cells into true place units with the
property of continuing to respond in the absence of any one of the „
three stimuli, the three pyramidal cells must become linked together sp
that if one fires, all fire. Once this essential requirement is made
explicit, it can be seen to be identical to the "collateral effect"
proposed by Marr (1971) in his model of the* hippocampus as a simple
memorizing device, a paper which, unaccountably, is not mentioned by
O & N. There are two immediate consequences of this requirement.
First, the anatomical substrate must exist; probably the longitudinal
associational pathway would serve in this respect. Second, there must
be the appropriate type of modifiable synapse in the collateral/asso-
ciational fibres. It seems inescapable that Hebb synapses are required;
only thus can connections between those cells, and only those cells,
which have fired together be strengthened. Here we touch on a major
weakness of O & N's treatment - their failure to exploit or even
adequately describe the one property of hippocampal synapses which
on the face of it uniquely suits them for use in a memory device, and
that is their ability to sustain long-term potentiation of synaptic efficacy,
of a duration and magnitude found up to now nowhere else in the brain.
There is the difficulty, however, that in the several hippocampal
pathways known to support long-term potentiation, the evidence
suggests (if not quite conclusively) that activity in the afferent pathway
alone is sufficient to induce potentiation. In other words, these are
probably not Hebb synapses.
The third stage of the model - located in CA1 - deals with two other
types of unit, assumed to be driven by inputs (presumably Schaffer
collaterals) from the assembly of interconnected place units. The first
of these is a more complex type of place unit with the property that its
place field widens progressively as the stimuli defining place in the
controlled environment are withdrawn (this is in contrast to the simpler
type of place unit in CA3, whose place field remains constant until the
cell ceases to respond at all); the second type is the misplace unit,
which fires when an expected stimulus is absent from a familiar
environment. It is not a difficult matter - though the authors, like Bishop
Berkeley in an earlier context, "excuse themselves on this one" - to
construct neural models to mimic these behaviours, using direct
axo-axonic inhibition for the former, and sensory afferents from
entorhinal cortex converging via inhibitory interneurones on CA1
pyramids for the latter. But such models have little in common with
conventional interpretations of hippocampal anatomy. Altogether, this
last stage is the least satisfactory part of the model.
Two final points. The cognitive map is represented by sets of
pyramidal cells the composition of which depends on (1) the phase of
theta activity which existed at the start of exploration, and (2) the route
followed during exploration. The map should be independent of both.
The first problem could be overcome by assigning modifiable (prefer-
ably Hebb) synapses to mossy fibres. The second is less trivial and I
see no simple solution, though a solution certainly exists as places can
be recognized when approached by a route different from that
followed during initial exploration.
by Jan Bures
Institute of Physiology, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 142 20 Prague
4 - Krc, Czechoslovakia
The "neuroethological rewoiution" in unit stydies
In their remarkable book O & N have gathered an impressive amount of
evidence supporting their view that the hippocampus is the brain
structure responsible for cognitive spatial mapping. This important
proposition is substantiated by philosophical, psychological, physio-
logical and clinical arguments and espoused in an eloquent, essayistic
manner which shows the authors' scientific and emotional commitment
to this idea. Although sceptical readers will probably still have doubts
about cognitive maps in general, and their hippocampal implementa-
tion in particular, the firm position of the authors is an important
landmark in hippocampal research, which will certainly stimulate think-
ing and experiments in this direction. Not being a hippocampus
specialist, I shall limit my comments to a methodological issue which
seems to be crucial for the electrophysiological evidence for cognitive
mapping.
O & N ascribe great significance to the observation that some
hippocampal neurons fire more frequently when the animal is in a
particular place of the experimental environment, while the activity of
others is independent of the animal's location. This is, of course, a
reasonable classification in view of the authors' cognitive mapping
hypothesis. One would expect the authors to use conventional analyti-
cal methods to prove this point. Surprisingly, this is not the case. The
discussion of these experiments (pp. 190-217) is introduced by a
somewhat ironic criticism of the "neuropsychological" approach to
behavioral unit studies. The authors decry the experimental paradigms
which examine the incidence of various types of unit responses in a
nerve center during performance of a particular task.
"Thus, we learn that in nucleus X 31 per cent of the units responded
only to the 2 KHz tone, 19 per cent to the flashing light, 12 per cent
to both, and 38 per cent to neither. This may be like concluding that
there is a remarkable uniformity amongst computers, caryatids,
chrysanthemums, and coprophagists, since they are all polysyllabic,
begin with a hard C sound, and denote entities which fall at the same
rate in a vacuum" (p. 191).
They feel that the neuropsychological approach does not ask the
correct questions and that its progress is too slow because of too
much concern for unimportant details. They suggest that "during the
exploratory phases of research into the function of a structure it is
necessary to use a more information-rich methodology, the neuroetho-
logical one" (p. 192).
While one may agree that progress of the "neuropsychological" unit
studies is not very fast, the superiority of the information-rich approach
proposed by O & N is questionable. The basic principles of the
neuroethological methodology are quite simple. 1. Unit activity should
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be studied in "as naturalistic a setting as possible," preferably "in the
animal's natural habitat" (p. 194). 2. Each unit should be studied as an
individual with the aim "to describe the full range of its behavior in as
many different situations as possible" (p. 194).
Anyone familiar with unit activity recording in freely moving animals
and with the analysis of such records will be impressed by the
immensity of the task implied by the above principles. It is difficult
enough to distinguish unit responses to a well-defined isolated stimulus
from nonspecific activity changes due to interfering stimuli, homeo-
static disturbances, or the simple nonstationary nature of the spike
generating process. With an unrestricted stimulus field and unlimited
behavior on the part of the animal it would be almost impossible to
define the independent variable (a combination of cutaneous, pro-
prioceptive, vestibular, auditory, visual, olfactory, and viscera! signals)
and to correlate it with the unit activity. Rigorous correlation of
recorded behavior (frame by frame photography, telerecording) and
electrical activity might be one solution but would require developing
new analytical methods. In all such studies unit reactions must satisfy
certain statistical criteria, taking into account the signal-to-noise ratio,
variability, trends, and so on. The authors' position in this respect is
peculiar: In the footnote on page 195 they refuse to apply statistical
methods to their findings and claim that the reactions studied are so
clear that they do not "require averaging or other computer manipula-
tion for their demonstration."
Such an attitude contrasts with the efforts of a generation of
referees who have insisted on statistical documentation of even the
most obvious findings. It is also an anachronism in the computer age
which provides easily accessible means for statistical analysis of the
type of data obtained by O & N. If the hippocampal responses are so
clearcut, it should be easy to demonstrate their existence by appro-
priate statistical methods. Statistics would serve in this case as an
objective evaluation of the data, providing an accurately defined
acceptance threshold which could be applied by anyone who wished
to replicate the experiments. Without specifying statistical criteria, unit
classification becomes a voluntaristic affair, a matter of art or faith
rather than of science. Without elementary quantitative treatment it is
not clear how many times the rat returned to location A before a given
unit was classified as a place unit. What was the distribution of unit
responses during these returns? Were there no signs of habituation
during repeated returns to the same location? etc. etc.
Do results of the "neuroethological" analysis of hippocampal unit
activity stand up to the authors' expectations? The reader is surprised
to find out that the yield of the information-rich approach is rather
meager. Only two classes of units were distinguished in the hippocam-
pus: the place units (with the subclass of misplace units) and displace
units. The impugned "neuropsychological approach" testing the
preordained hypothesis that the hippocampal units are affected by the
animal's location in the environment would obviously not fare worse.
On the contrary, it would also provide data about the relative incidence
of these classes (information considered unimportant or even mislead-
ing by the authors) and would allow a systematic, preferably paramet-
ric, examination of space representation in such units. An obvious
"neuropsychological" paradigm would be to place the animal in a
transparent transport cage and to move it repeatedly from one location
to the other until computer analysis of unit activity revealed (or failed to
reveal) the predicted changes of firing rate. If active rather than
passive movement is required, the rat can be trained in a closed (e.g.,
circular or rectangular) runway and the unit activity can be correlated
with the animal's location in various parts of the apparatus. There are
hundreds of similar experiments which can test the spatial hypothesis
step by step using the classical theory of experimental planning,
changing one parameter at a time, or perhaps a few parameters
simultaneously, piecing together a coherent picture of the putative
mechanisms underlying the cognitive mapping hypothesis.
The unit studies by O & N are an important contribution to the
paradigms for electrophysiological investigation of behavior. The
authors pioneer the use of the animal's location in space as a complex
stimulus and develop techniques permitting electrophysiological testing
of their hypothesis. Their arguments for hippocampa! mapping should
be more affirmative, however, leaning on intuitive demonstration of the
predicted unit activity changes by conventional methods rather than on
discursive analysis of the mistakes made by others.
by Robert J . Douglas
Psychology Department, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash. 98105
The hippocampus and Its apparent migration
to the parietal lobe
In presenting every scrap of evidence, every conceivable twist of
interpretation that can be marshalled to support their theory, O & N
have produced what may be the best brain and behavior book yet
written. The naive reader might not realize, however, that the authors
employ an adversary technique that leaves no room for the "other side
of the story." That is, there are selective omissions of evidence and
theories that might weaken the authors' arguments. The reader might
also fail to realize that the evidence can be interpreted in other ways,
and that it would be well to look into these before jumping on the
spatial bandwagon.
One example of selective omission is the failure to mention studies
showing the crucial importance of the vestibular system ("inertial
navigation") to the locale system (e.g., Douglas 1966a,b; Beritoff
1965; Barlow 1970; Douglas et al. 1974). A probable reason is that the
authors want the reader to see an important connection between
"place units" in the hippocampus and the behavior of hippocampec-
tomized rats. Place units fire in response to a pattern formed by two or
three visual extramaze or environmental cues. Clearly it would be
"neat" if hippocampal lesions had a particularly bad effect on behavior
based on such cues. Alas, some of the behavior most vulnerable to
hippocampal damage has been intensively studied and found to be
iif?related to visual or other extramaze cues. This has been shown to
be true, for example, of both spontaneous alternation (Douglas 1966a)
and complex maze learning (Watson 1901).
Watson trained rats in a complex spatial maze and found his rats to
behave as if they had never learned the problem when he rotated the
maze by 90° in the room. O & N cite this observation in support of their
idea that maze learning is based on visual extramaze cues. They
neglect to tell us that Watson also dragged the maze to the far end of a
long room, thereby completely changing the "scenery" as viewed by
the rat. This had no effect whatever on maze performance. We are
also not informed that Watson found similar behavior in normal and in
blinded rats. These results, and many others of a like nature, fall
somewhat short of proving that visual extramaze cues are crucially
important in maze learning.
The reader is also not informed about the behavior of people with
damage to the vestibular system or such vestibular-related regions as
cerebellum, striatum, or parietal lobe. As Barlow (1970) describes,
these patients are perfectly able to orient egocentrically to stimuli that
are currently in view or in the immediate vicinity. But they cannot grasp
the spatial relations between different "scenes." They routinely get lost
going to or from the bathroom, for example, but immediately recognize
the place they want when they stumble upon it. The defect sounds like
that imagined by the authors to occur in hippocampectomized rats.
The authors cite but do not discuss the work of Semmes et al. (1955,
1963) on map-following in people with parietal damage. The subjects
in these studies had no apparent defect in egocentric orientation but
were unable to follow either visual or touch maps. A map-following
defect has also been reported in people with Parkinsonism (and thus
presumed striatal damage; Bowen et al. 1972). To be sure, parietal
lesions do sometimes produce a (usually transitory) defect in egocen-
tric orientation, but a conclusion that parietal lesions produce only
egocentric deficits is not, in my opinion, warranted by the evidence.
The book contains many instances of highly strained explanations
for the defects of hippocampally damaged rats in various tasks. Rather
than listing them, however, I will go to the heart of the problem. That is,
there are numerous examples where hippocampal lesions produce the
typical "hippocampal syndrome" deficit without spatial abilities or the
locale system being involved in any discernible way. For purposes of
argument let us assume that the taxon and locale systems exist and
that hippocampal lesions abolish the latter but not the former. It would
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then seem to follow that when normal and hippocampectomized rats
are both forced to employ the taxon system, the lesioned animals
would not be expected to have a deficit. Indeed, one could argue to the
contrary that it would be the normal rats that might be defective if they
persisted in trying to use the irrelevant locale system. A perfect
example of such a situation is the reversal of a black-white discrimina-
tion problem. This cannot be solved by the locale system because a
given alley is sometimes white and sometimes black.
It is therefore not surprising that hippocampal lesions generally have
no effect on the rate of original learning, but it is most difficult to explain
why the lesioned animals should be so defective in learning the
reversal. The explanation is that the hippocampals have difficulty in
suppressing an irrelevant turning habit. Since the normals are also
using the taxon system, there seems to be no logical reason why they
should not have the same difficulty. Indeed, one suspects that the
authors could have more comfortably explained an improvement in
reversal learning after hippocampal lesions as being due to the
normals having one more erroneous hypothesis to test and eliminate.
The Olton group has repeatedly found that hippocampal system
damage prevents rats from learning to avoid reentering the same
location during a radial maze session. The defect, attributed to a loss
of spatial memory, has been viewed as powerful support for the spatial
model. Recently, however, Olton et al. (1979) have found similar results
in a completely nonspatial version of this task, in which rats were
trained to avoid specific alleys that were spatially interchanged. Thus,
the radial maze literature, once a cornerstone of the spatial model, has
become a stumbling block.
In most complex mazes the animal can "guess" which way to turn at
many choice points by knowing the location or direction of the goal,
and it has been proven that rats do indeed employ such information.
The spatial model is supported by the fact that rats with hippocampal
lesions are defective in learning such spatial mazes. The problem,
however, is that the lesion appears to produce an even greater deficit
in nonspatial linear mazes (Winocur and Breckenridge 1973). In linear
mazes there are no choice points at which the correct answer can be
guessed by knowing goal location or direction. O & N correctly
attribute the defect to an inability to suppress interference (a trait of the
taxon system). But the normals are also presumably using this system,
and they also display behavior indicative of interference. The normals,
however, manage to suppress interference more quickly.
We are repeatedly informed that the dull-witted taxon system is
unable to overcome, suppress, block, withhold, and so forth. On the
other hand, possession of the locale system and the hippocampus
allows the animal to do these things. This could be mistaken for an
inexplicit version of an inhibition idea. Inhibition also arrives by the back
door in the convoluted discussion of exploration which, we are told,
does not occur in hippocampectomized subjects. The authors grant
the obvious, that the lesioned animalsTun around and sniff and look as
if they were exploring. This is, however, not "really" exploration
because the activity does not decline over time. Thus, the lack of an
inhibitory process, habituation, is misleadingly described as a lack of
the thing that is inhibited. One suspects that the authors are trying to
make "misplace units" appear to be highly relevant. In Pavlovian terms
these would be called "disinhibition units," since they fire in response
to stimulus change. But in most studies of exploration (activity) the rat
is plopped down in an open field that remains unchanged.
Finally, the authors attempt to cope with the verbal memory deficit in
hippocampally damaged humans by postulating a spatial origin for the
deep semantic structure of language. This is truly a stroke of genius
even if the defect does not appear to be a semantic one. Milner's
bilaterally hippocampectomized patient H.M. manages to converse
normally and has great difficulty in remembering nonsense syllables.
Further, one could also argue for the ultimate spatial origin of the
temporal sense and make virtually all mental processes "spatial." The
problem is that the color red becomes meaningless in an all-red
universe.
In summary, there is abundant evidence (barely touched upon here)
that hippocampal lesions produce the same sort of deficit in spatial
and nonspatial tasks. There are also many cases where the lesioned
animals appear to have learned spatial locations, though the authors
claim that in such instances the animals are "really" learning some-
thing else. They fairly point out, however, that in most cases this
remains to be experimentally verified. The authors claim that theta
waves are crucial to the locale system, and yet Winson (1978)
abolished theta waves by medial septal lesions and found this to have
no significant effect on the learning of a task expressly designed to
demonstrate spatial memory. There are alternative theories that can
also ingeniously explain many facts and that do not make a fundamen-
tal distinction between spatial and nonspatial stimuli (e.g., Olton's
"working memory," Warrington's "recognition," and Weiskrantz's
"interference" ideas). The internal inhibition model, not to be confused
with "response" inhibition, can also account for the anatomy, physiol-
ogy, and pharmacology of the hippocampus, as well as for the lesion
data (Kimble 1968, Douglas 1967, 1972, 1975). The problem for the
reader is that these alternative models have not yet been elaborated in
the form of well-written 500-page books. O & N are hardly to blame for
this. They have done their job superbly, leaving it for others to do
theirs.
I believe that there is considerable merit to the O & N model when
employed on a less ambitious scale. Rats are barely removed from the
nocturnal common ancestor of placental mammals. The hippocampus
evolved into its present form in the brains of primitive mammals that
investigated their environment by locomotion and direct contact. Of
necessity they developed movement-related spatial maps, and it is
probably no coincidence that hippocampal theta waves are usually
associated with movements in space in rats but with attention in
primates. One would predict that movement-related theta would also
occur prominently in shrews and other primitive insectivores. Hippo-
campal mechanisms were probably first elaborated or expressed in a
geographic or absolute spatial context. Many other abilities may well
have evolved from the primordial spatial sense, dragging the hippo-
campus with them, so to speak. But there comes a point at which the
descendant becomes so divergent from the ancestor as to warrant
separate classification. A comprehensive model would thus ideally
postulate underlying functions that can be expressed indifferently in
spatial or nonspatial contexts.
by Roger M. Downs
Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pa.
16802 '
On the nature of cognitiwe maps
In the preface to their book, O & N liken theories to maps and the
construction of theory to a voyage of discovery. These are apt
metaphors. I derive as much pleasure from reading this book as I do
from poring over a map. The likeness between this book and, say, a
Portuguese or Dutch mappa mundi is uncanny. The clear division
between the known world and the terrae incognitae, the sea monsters
and sirens that lurk and beckon from beyond the safety of the known
world, the unparalleled draftmanship, the understated sense of design,
the rococo flourishes of the elaborate cartouche; all of these find their
counterparts in The hippocampus as a cognitive map. But the book is
more than just a source of pleasure; it offers the fascination of a global
view of a landscape that had previously been glimpsed only in
fragments. O & N speak of assembling "pieces and patches," of
"synthesizing the facts"; one can only applaud the end result.
As a piece of scholarship, it is a tour de force. This is not a book for
the fainthearted who like a muted, homogenized discourse, well-
hedged with evasive qualifications. Instead, it presents a panoramic
survey, the results of which are stated boldly and persuasively. As a
participant in a year-long interdisciplinary seminar on space, I can
appreciate the achievement of the first chapter, which disentangles the
philosophical conceptions of space and which renders coherent the
inchoate psychological conceptions. It is reassuring to read a literature
review which is both critical and constructive. Overshadowing all of
these strengths is the feeling that someone is trying to say something
important, that O & N have caught hold of some of the evanescent
ideas that have been "in the air" of late. In the process, they have
forced us to take stock of some of our less-articulated beliefs. Let me
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try to take stock from the point of view of a geographer interested in
cognitive mapping.
A key point is O & N's attempt to find a physiological-anatomical
locus for the cognitive map. I say a locus because there are significant
implications that follow from the search for any locus: these implica-
tions transcend the choice of the hippocampus, a particular choice
which is beyond my competence to discuss.
Within the group of environmental psychologists and geographers,
there has been a tacit agreement not to ask, Where is a cognitive
map? We have devoted attention to how cognitive mapping takes
place, what a cognitive map looks like, and why it exists. The
functionalist answer to this last question has taken us perilously close
to the "where" question, but apart from a few tentative forays, we
have remained content to view the cognitive map as a hypothetical
construct, a classic form of intervening variable. There were what
seemed to be good reasons for this position: a lack of expertise in
physiology, a dualist approach to the mind-body problem, some
muttered asides about reductionism. All of these served to hide what is
an obvious question.
Where do we stand now that O & N have destroyed the convenient
fiction that we do not need to ask about the locus of cognitive maps?
That we had unnecessarily restricted ourselves is clear from the
richness of O & N's argument. That we are in a position to consider
some penetrating questions is equally clear from a discussion of but
one of the issues that emerges from even a limited reading of The
hippocampus as a cognitive map.
We must return to the perennial problem of the meaning of the term,
map. I agree with O & N that Tolman was using map as a metaphor, in
exactly the same way as he used telephone switchboard. O & N state
that the locale system is analogous to a map of physical space. But
even they seem hesitant in places - how are we to interpret their uses
of "map-like representations" and "map-like structures?" At least they
have more courage than many of the writers in the avian migration and
homing literature who are quite happy to write about a compass and
yet insist on cloaking map in quotation marks.
The status of map depends upon a characterization of the nature of
the mapping process. From a cartographic viewpoint, a mapping is the
transformation of an object set (physical space) into an image set (the
cognitive map) via a function. Of vital concern are the set definitions
and the properties of mapping function. The set definition establishes
relations (distance, direction, etc.) between places; the mapping
function specifies which relations will be maintained or preserved in the
image set.
O & N offer a physiological interpretation of this process which
suggests that the mapping function is Euclidean and three-
dimensional. In this way, neural space is directly analogous to physical
space. It is true that cartographers treat physical space as being
locally Euclidean, arguing that the differential curvature of the two
surfaces (the earth and the sheet of paper) is irrelevant at the large
scale. The current model achieves that same effect by suggesting a
three-dimensional character. But nowhere do O & N show why the
image space must be (or is) Euclidean and three-dimensional. I
suspect that it is - but the nature of the mapping function is unspeci-
fied. Without question, it is a homomorphic transformation: but how is
this generalization achieved? It will have rules for scaling distance
relations: but how does it transform distance-as-effort, which is non-
linearly related to physical distance, into a Euclidean metric? Moreover,
since all maps are models, judgments which relate neural and physical
space using criteria such as veridicality, accuracy, and distortion must
be made with care. We can only know (map) physical space as a
model, albeit a model in which we have greater confidence.
There is an unresolved question about the number of maps of
physical space that are contained within the hippocampus. One
possible interpretation of the physiological model is that it is literally a
microcosm and that any map is a "slice" through the microcosm. If this
is not the case, then what does it mean to say that the system
contains a map for each environment experienced? The idea of a
mental atlas poses problems. How is the appropriate map selected?
Can places appear in two or more maps? Is change of scale made
possible by a series of maps or by some "enlarger-reducer" mecham-
ism?
In focusing on the nature of maps, I have not left myself space to list
all of the points at which I find myself in agreement with O & N. Their
constant concern with the relation between research design strategies
and the role of cognitive mapping as a flexible, hypothesis-generating
function is worth pursuing. And so is their separation of the taxon and
the locale system: this strikes at the heart of the conventional belief
that route mapping and spatial mapping are but stages in a single
learning process.
Given my interests, this is the most provocative book that I have
read in years. Given my geographical background, a discipline whose
"language" is said to be that of the map, it does wonders to read the
casual thought buried in a footnote to page 401. That language could
have developed as a means of transfering information about the
spatial aspects of the environment is as refreshing a thought as the
book is as a whole.
by Paul Ellen
Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Ga. 30303
The hippocampus and operant behawior
O & N's book comes as a welcome relief to those of us working in the
area of brain-behavior interactions. The last few years have seen a
spate of symposium proceedings and collections having to do with the
functional significance of one or other of the various structures
comprising the limbic system. In all these volumes there are contribu-
tions describing anatomical, electrophysiological, or behavioral find-
ings, or some interdisciplinary combination of the three. Nowhere in
them, however, does one find a systematic attempt to integrate the
various reports. As a result, the reader is generally left with a
hodgepodge of unrelated findings, many bearing only tangentially upon
the purported thrust of the symposium. As a result our undertanding of
the functional role of various brain structures is generally not
advanced, and the most that could be claimed for such endeavors is
that they provided the various contributors to the book with an
opportunity to do some travelling. With the publication of the O & N
book, we have for the first time a coherent attempt to relate the
anatomical, physiological, and behavioral data derived from studies of
the hippocampus into a comprehensive, integrated theoretical frame-
work.
O & N, in a bold stroke, assert that the hippocampus is the cognitive
or spatial mapping system of the brain. Although the concept of a
cognitive mapping mechanism is not new, having originally been
suggested by E. C. Tolman (1948) more than thirty years ago, it
remained for O & N to breathe new life into it. They have accomplished
this by linking the concept of a cognitive map to two different domains
of data. By doing so, they were able to give the concept of a cognitive
map a genuine theoretical status. On the one hand, the concept was
linked to a variety of data at the behavioral level, while on the other, it
was linked to findings on the anatomical and physiological level.
Tolman's use of the concept was ill defined since he succeeded only in
linking it to behavioral findings. However, the dual linkage to data in
different empirical domains makes the notion of a cognitive mapping
mechanism theoretically significant, since it allows it to be something
other than merely a circular response-inferred construct which is used
to explain the very same data from which it is inferred. For once the
concept of a cognitive map is tied to more than one set of empirical
referents, giving it more properties than the very data that it relates to.
O & N have elegantly demonstrated that theoretical development is still
possible within psychology and that one does not need to engage in
naive reductionism to theorize about brain-behavior relations.
From my perspective as a psychologist, the chapters dealing with
the history of concepts of spatiality, and the review of the behavioral
effects of hippocampal lesions (chapters 5-11) were the most fasci-
nating and rewarding. In the lesion review, O & N make a valiant
attempt to subsume the myriad findings following hippocampal lesions
into their theory that the hippocampus functions as a substrate of a
cognitive mapping mechanism which enables animals not only to
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localize themselves in space but also to find their way from any place in
the environment to a goal location. In the absence of hippocampus,
animals are forced to rely on hypotheses derived from taxon systems
such as "go to the light" or "turn left or right." The success of these
guidance or orientation hypotheses would depend upon the require-
ments of the particular task. In contrast, normal animals can rely on
locale systems which give rise to place hypotheses and maps of the
environment. Such maps enable animals to choose the shorter of two
routes to food or to short-circuit many of the alleys in a maze. In
general, O &. N are successful in applying their theory to the lesion
literature. Clearly, the findings of deficits following hippocampal lesions
on various maze and discrimination tasks are consistent with expecta-
tions derived from the theory. Particularly ingenious is their explanation
for the facilitated avoidance behavior of hippocampal animals in a
shuttle avoidance task. Since place hypotheses are abolished by the
lesion, the hippocampal animal is not confronted with conficting place
hypotheses and hence the two-way avoidance task is not particularly
difficult for it. For the normal animal, in contrast, running to a place
which was previously identified with danger is particularly difficult.
O & N begin to strain their theory when they attempt to account for
results of hippocampal lesions on operant behaviors. In operant
situations animals are confined to a relatively small chamber, so it is
difficult to entertain the notion that place hypotheses are important
mediating factors in the bar-pressing performance. Of particular inter-
est, too, is the fact that in the hippocampal literature, the results of the
behavioral effects of hippocampal lesions on operant tasks have been
the most controversial. For example, while Isaacson and his asso-
ciates (Clark & Isaacson 1965; Schmaltz & Isaacson 1966a,b, 1968)
have uniformly reported an overresponding by hippocampal animals on
DRL (differential reinforcement of low rates) schedules, Ellen and his
associates (1964, 1970, 1973) have shown that such an impairment
actually requires the confluence of two separate factors to produce the
effect. Not only must there be large hippocampal lesions, but also
there must be a history of extensive CRF (continuous reinforcement)
pretraining. O & N argue that the overresponding results from the
failure of the hippocampal animals to avoid the place where the lever is
and a consequent failure to engage in collateral behaviors which could
mediate the required delay on the schedule. The assumption underly-
ing this argument is that since responses to the lever sometimes lead
to reinforcement and sometimes not, the animal is in a conflict
situation. The normal animal has more hypotheses (place) than simply
guidance ones available and can utilize these in forming collateral
chains which mediate the required delay. The hippocampal animal in
contrast can only resort to taxon-type hypotheses and these tend to
keep it close to the lever. This treatment of the hippocampal effects on
DRL behavior suffers when confronted with the fact that it isn't merely
the fact of the hippocampal lesion per se which produces the overre-
sponding, but rather there must also be a prior history of CRF
pretraining. The fact that a hippocampal lesion by itself is insufficient to
produce the behavioral deficit in the task seriously limits the generality
of the O & N model with respect to this class of behavior. What this
means is that response rate on DRL schedules is not reflective of the
hypotheses generated by either the taxon or locale systems.
Perhaps even more important in this context is the fact that
extensive CRF pretraining is a necessary condition for the behavioral
effects of the hippocampal lesion to be manifest. O & N attribute this to
a simple strengthening of an orientation hypothesis mediating lever
pressing which occurs to a greater degree in hippocampal animals
than in normals. Thus, this finding would mean that the difficulty in
giving up the previously acquired CRF response pattern would simply
be a reflection of the operation of the taxon system rather than the
locale system and hence not indicative of any other impairment. This
kind of argument reflects a fundamental problem with the book.
Throughout, O & N assume that hippocampus is a unitary structure "in
the sense that it has an integrated function" (p. 231). Thus, all other
possible functions of hippocampus are subsumed under or considered
to be subsets of the basic cognitive mapping function. This tactic was
deliberately chosen by the authors; yet one questions its wisdom. Will it
not set the stage for interminable controversy as to whether hippocam-
pus has one or many functions? Will it not provide the bases for
numerous attempts by others to demonstrate that hippocampus
indeed has more functions than that simply subsumed under cognitive
mapping? In this sense, it may be that O & N have inadvertently set up
a straw man which can only function to deflect more serious evaluative
attempts at assessing their theory.
Finally, I should like to comment on one other aspect of the theory
as presented. O & N emphasize the role of locomotor behavior in the
generation of a cognitive map. Exploratory behavior results when there
is a mismatch between the representations in the map and the
environment as perceived by the animal. Exploratory behavior provides
new inputs to the map, which is then updated to conform to the
perceived environment. Movement-generated theta rhythm sorts the
various sensory inputs to the hippocampus according to distances
between places in space. A major role is thus imputed to locomotory
behavior in the mapping of space. O & N cite extensive literature
indicating a decrease in exploratory behavior subsequent to hippo-
campal damage. Locomotor exploratory behavior is considered to be
a fundamental information-processing mechanism whereby the animal
acquires spatial information. To what extent can an animal learn about
places in the absence of locomotion? To the extent that cognitive map
formation is possible in the absence of locomotion, a serious blow
would have been dealt to the mechanism postulated by O & N to
account for how the cognitive map gets formed. In particular, the
significance of the theta rhythm in the process would be severely
weakened. Early work by Gleitman (1955) and McNamara, Long, and
Wike (1956) demonstrated that place learning was possible in the
absence of locomotion. Merely transporting animals over paths in little
cars without allowing locomotory activity allowed animals to learn
either the locus of food or the locus of shock termination. Similarly,
Beritoff (1965) and Ungher and Sirian (1971) showed that blindfolded
animals could learn the spatial locus of food simply by being passively
transported to the food place. In short, cognitive maps could be
formed in the absence of exploratory behavior. To the extent that
locomotion does not occur, it can hardly be alleged that movement-
induced theta is performing the function of representing spatial
distances that O & N attribute to it.
Despite these comments, my reaction to The hippocampus as a
cognitive map is still one of unabashed admiration. It is a scholarly
achievement the likes of which we have not seen in years in this field. It
will be a source of new ideas, constant stimulation, and fruitful inquiry
for years to come.
by Jeffrey A. Graf
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UD,
England1
Spatial mapping only a special case
of hippocampal function
When O'Keefe and Dostrovsky (1971) first proposed the hypothesis
that the hippocampus might act as a spatial mapping system, it was
based on observations of the behavior of a handful of hippocampal
neurons from which they had recorded in the freely moving rat. If the
hypothesis proves to be correct, this was scientific insight of a high
order; if it does not, The hippocampus as a cognitive map is a
beautifully constructed mansion with many pleasing chambers, but one
nonetheless constructed of cards.
Recordings made from single neurons in conscious animals have
been invaluable in the analysis of sensory systems. But one may
legitimately doubt whether this approach will prove as fruitful when it is
applied to structures which process information at points far removed
from input or output. The classical technique, pioneered by Hubel and
Wiesel (1962) in the visual system, is to search for the common
properties of the set of stimuli able to activate a neuron. It is this
technique that O'Keefe and his colleagues have applied to the hippo-
campus, albeit with important extensions in the kinds of stimuli
presented to the animal. Now, it is possible to deduce in this way what
information is available to a neuron; and, in the sensory systems, that is
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the most important thing we need to know. But it is not possible to
deduce what the neuron does with the information it receives. An
analogy may make this clear. In a railway station a great many people
have a copy of the timetable, but a porter, a train driver, and the station
chief make very different uses of it; we would learn very little about their
several functions by asking them whether they possessed a timetable.
In the same way, I am sceptical of the claim that single-unit studies of
the hippocampus can tell us very much by themselves about what this
organ does.
This general doubt is reinforced by an odd feature of the data
reported in such studies: experimenters seem to discover hippocampal
units which respond to those particular environmental regularities that
they have built into their experiments, whatever these happen to be.
Thus, Vinogradova (Vinogradova and Brazhnik 1978) in Moscow,
keeps her animals immobile, presents to them stimuli which are either
novel or are repeated until they become familiar, and allows very little
other variation in experimental procedure: she finds hippocampal units
that are responsive to novelty or familiarity. O'Keefe (O'Keefe and
Black 1978), in London, gives his animals spatially extended environ-
ments to explore, with stimuli that either remain fixed in their spatial
positions or are moved around: he finds "place," "misplace," and
"displace" units. And M. W. Brown (personal communication 1979), in
the Department of Anatomy at Bristol, gives monkeys a complex
learning task with contextual cues that tell them which of two alterna-
tive responses is to be made to a main cue: he finds units that are
responsive to context. I deduce from this pattern of findings, not that
experimenters notice only what they expect to see (though this may
play a part), but that the hippocampus is an organ that is able to store
(probably temporarily) many different kinds of environmental regularity,
depending on those that the animal encounters. If this is so, it is a
chimera to seek for the particular environmental feature to which
hippocampal units are always responsive: there is none. If there is, it
can have nothing essentially to do with space, for in neither Vinograd-
ova's nor in Brown's experiments was the critical feature spatial.
It is much to O & N's credit that, though single-unit experiments
provided the impetus for their theory, they recognize that such experi-
ments must be supplemented by data of other kinds; and, indeed,
much of their book consists in a valiant attempt to reinterpret the vast
bulk of findings from lesion studies in a manner that is congenial to their
theory. The reasoning that has gone into this attempt is often ingenious
in the extreme; and future research will need to take into account both
the many specific suggestions that O & N derive from their theory, and
their damaging criticisms of alternative accounts of the same data.
Nonetheless, their reinterpretation of the results of lesion experiments
is, in the end, a failure. There are too many points at which the account
that they offer is lame, far-fetched, and lacking in direct evidence. To
document this criticism in detail would require a review of the evidence
as long as their own (Gray and McNaughton, in preparation); here
there is space for only one general and two specific points.
The general point concerns the post hoc quality of many of the
arguments offered by O & N. This quality is a direct consequence of
the strategy of explanation they adopt. They propose a theory about
what the hippocampus does, and this is admirably developed from
general principles, themselves derived from a thorough initial analysis
of the concept of space. This is physiological psychology at its best.
But, for the most part, it is not this theory that is used to explain the
effects of hippocampal lesions. Instead, these effects are attributed to
the properties of parts of the brain that remain intact after such lesions,
that is, to the so-called taxon system. But the properties attributed to
this system are not derived from general principles: they consist of just
those properties that are able to account for the known consequences
of hippocampal lesions (the discussion in the accompanying precis of
the role of intertrial interval is an example of this mode of argument).
This retrospective, rather than predictive, character of the discussion
of the lesion data robs it of almost all conviction.
For my specific points I shall refer to two experiments on the effects
of hippocampal lesions, neither of which can easily be explained by the
spatial theory.
According to this theory, in a task in which normal animals are
unable to use place hypotheses, hippocampal animals should not differ
from them. Webster and Voneida (1964) trained cats on a tactile
discrimination. Vision was totally occluded, the animal having to
palpate raised patterns at the bottom of a tube into which it inserted a
paw. Pairs of patterns were presented simultaneously, with position
(left or right) randomised. Pushing the correct pattern was rewarded
with food, pushing the incorrect one was not. I should be interested to
know what spatial element O & N can detect in this task. Hippocampal
cats were not impaired in the learning of this discrimination; but they
are not normally impaired in simultaneous discriminations of any kind.
However, they were severely impaired during reversal learning and
extinction. Neither of these findings fits easily with the spatial theory;
but they fit perfectly with the inhibition theory that spatial theory has
attempted to replace.
The second experiment (Rawlins, Feldon, and Gray, in press)
investigated the partial reinforcement extinction effect in the straight
alley. The results refute two predictions made by O & N.
In their book (p. 347) they state that the partial reinforcement effect
should be "superimposed upon the deficit in extinction shown by
continuously rewarded hippocampal animals." Hippocampectomy,
however, completely abolished the partial reinforcement effect, and
this was due equally to a rise in resistance to extinction in continuously
rewarded animals and to a fall in resistance to extinction in partially
rewarded animals. The second of these changes is particularly difficult
for O & N to explain, since they suppose "taxon" hypotheses to be
inherently more persistent than the "place" hypotheses of which
hippocampal animals have been deprived. On the other hand, the
findings reported by Rawlins et al. (in press) are in agreement with a
theory of hippocampal function (Gray et al. 1978) for which O & N have
found "little evidence" (their precis).
The second prediction made by O & N and refuted by the findings of
Rawlins et al. (in press) concerns the locus in the alley at which the
effects of hippocampal lesions should be most pronounced. As O & N
state in their precis, "the extinction situation is formally equivalent to
the passive avoidance task." According to Black, Nadel, and O'Keefe
(1977) the spatial theory predicts that, in a passive avoidance task in
the straight alley, the effects of hippocampal lesions should be greater
the further the animal is from the goal (in which the shock occurs). The
same should therefore be true in an experiment on extinction. But in the
experiment by Rawlings et al. (in press), both the rise in resistance to
extinction in continuously rewarded animals and the fall in resistance to
extinction in partially rewarded animals, caused by hippocampal
lesions, were as clearly marked in the goal as in the start and run
sections of the alley.
There are many more detailed objections of this kind that one could
make to O & N's theory; given its wide scope, it would be astonishing if
there were not. To put these objections does not diminish the
substance and importance of their achievement. The hippocampus as
a cognitive map is packed with ideas which, through the authors'
articles and conference papers, have transformed discussions of both
hippocampal function and spatial behaviour during the last decade;
and these ideas will undoubtedly influence research and theory for
many years to come. But to some degree their work has already been
absorbed and transcended by more recent developments.
Consider, for example, the demonstration by O'Keefe, Nadel,
Keightley, and Kill (1975) that fornix lesions abolish place learning in
rats. This, along with Helen Mahut's earlier work with monkeys, was
important in showing that spatially complex tasks are particularly
susceptible to impairment in hippocampal animals. O & N, in my view,
misinterpreted this finding as indicating that spatial analysis was the
critical ingredient in these tasks, just as they misinterpreted the
single-unit experiments on which I have commented earlier. It has now
been shown by OSton et al. (1979) that, although hippocampal deficits
are indeed massive in spatially complex tasks, this is due to other
features of those tasks than their spatial characteristics. This is not the
place to consider what those other features might be; Olton's own
conclusions are in certain respects in good agreement both with the
view of the single-unit data advanced above and with several other
approaches to the mystery of hippocampal function (see Gray et al.
1978, and Rawlins 1979). These approaches have in common that
they postulate a role for the hippocampus in determining the correct
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response under conditions of uncertainty, ambiguity, or interference. In
such a view spatially complex tasks are merely a subset (albeit a very
important one) of a wider class of tasks in which the sources of
interference are particularly great. It is along these general lines that a
comprehensive theory of hippocampal function is likely to be created.
The emphasis on space per se, in contrast, is difficult to integrate with
data from tasks of other kinds (Webster and Voneida's [1964], for
example), and it runs into insurmountable difficulties as a general
account of hippocampal function.
Note
1. Address 1979-80: Laboratoire de Physiologie, Faculte de Medecine Pitie-
Salpetriere, 75634 Paris Cedex 13, France.
by Ernes t Greene
Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif.
90007
On panspatlal theories of brain and behawlor
The hippocampus as a cognitive map is a masterfully written and
thoroughly enjoyable book which will have a substantial impact on
physiological psychology. The breadth of scholarship demonstrated by
these authors is impressive, as is their dexterity in handling procedural
details which are often lost in the review process. However, the
crowning achievement of the book is in their parody of theoretical
excess.
Beginning with a theoretical viewpoint which is inherently defensible,
they have contrived extensions and distortions of logic to produce a
delightfully obtuse and ridiculous model of hippocampal function. The
humor is dry (very British, of course!), and at no point do the authors
resort to slapstick or pun. They do play one or two practical jokes on
their doltish colleagues who use the lesion method. In chapter 5 they
say that an overview of these studies shows that they provide precious
little information about the functions served by the hippocampus, but
then they devote eight of the fifteen chapters of the book to an
evaluation of the complex behavioral results reported by these studies.
One can also imagine the apoplectic and impotent outrage of these
hapless souls when they discover that their evaluation of the behavioral
changes in hippocampal animals (their ideas about what the changes
mean) have been neatly segregated from the data - with the latter
being thoroughly cited while the theoretical concepts are presented
elsewhere and without citation. Somewhat ashamedly I must admit to a
chuckle, and a twinge of pity for those poor devils who were the butt of
the joke. In defense of the authors of the book, however, I believe they
did have a clear and decent purpose for doing the literature review in
this way - to present the fruits of their lighthearted and whimsical
caricature from being confused with serious ideas about how the
hippocampus functions.
It would be difficult or impossible for me to give examples which
adequately capture the parody in this book, since much of it derives
from pushing a theoretical concept to an illogical extreme. In other
cases it comes from the straight-faced presentation of an argument
which is directly opposite of that which was given in a previous
paragraph. For example, in discussing the steep avoidance gradient of
hippocampally lesioned rats (ch. 8), the authors propose that without
the spatial map provided by the hippocampus the animals are not able
to judge their location in the alleyway, and are able to inhibit their
behavior only when they have been physically confronted with the
taxon cue (i.e., the conditional stimulus). Presumably the cue is not
able to act at a distance because the organ which maps space and
time (the hippocampus) is missing. This proposal follows directly on
the heels of a discussion of discrimination learning (ch. 7), where the
authors cite data showing that hippocampal rats have no problem
running down an alley to encounter the taxon cues used in the
discrimination task (requiring expectations extending over time and
space).
In chapter 11 we learn that loss of the spatial map produces some
abnormalities in sexual behavior (problems of knowing where?). We
also learn that the hippocampus mediates hormonal responses when
the animal is no longer given a reward for its actions. This is one of the
many situations in which the hippocampus serves to detect novel
match or mismatch (i.e., the nonreward is new because it did not occur
at the right place, but a different reward would also be new if it
occurred at the right place, but might also be new if it occurred at the
wrong place, or for that matter a nonreward or a reward would be
judged as new if it did not occur at the right time, or if it occurred at the
wrong place at the wrong time . . .). It seems clear that detection of any
new event will require the contribution of the hippocampus, and this
may also be true for nonevents if the spatiotemporal relationships are
not quite right.
Perhaps the most interesting wordplay comes in the discussion of
the role of the two brain systems in language. The cognitive map is
mediated by the hippocampus, and is responsible for judging events in
space and time, and for providing all situational contexts (since these
are, after all, extensions of events in space and time), and for providing
hormonal responses to mild (but not strong) fear, since mild fear is
usually "situational" or place-defined (p. 360). The taxon system
handles other behavioral situations, producing behavior in animals
which is excessive, persistent, and stereotyped. In humans, however,
the taxon system mediates grammar, transformational processes,
syntactic structure and lexicon (p. 401). The hippocampal cognitive
map provides for the person's deep semantic comprehension of
language. This model should predict that humans with hippocampal
damage would suffer from aphasia. Indeed, careful questioning of
these patients will show that they have no knowledge of Kant's analytic
a priori or synthetic a posteriori relationships and events (ch. 1), or for
that matter of the quintessential role of Leibniz's monads in determining
our destiny. The hippocampally damaged patient seems to converse
normally about his life prior to surgery using taxon-mediated automa-
tonlike speech, but clearly he has no deep semantic comprehension of
what is being said, and therefore is both amnesic and aphasic in the
most profound sense.
I look forward with eagerness to a sequel to this book. Having dealt
so effectively with the hippocampus, the authors are likely to elaborate
further on the taxon systems - possibly resulting in the discovery of the
"antitaxon" (which is, of course, everything the taxon might be, but
isn't!). Given the general agility and breadth of these authors, they may
choose to elaborate upon the cortex, or deal with the hypothalamic
and brain stem systems mediating drives. I, for one, would choose the
latter, and would be especially interested in showing that the diverse
human urges, lusts, and passions are juxtaposed in the brain like the
many delightful places over the surface of the body which may be
licked, stroked, and suckled.
by H=Hecaen
Unite de Recherches Neuropsychologiques et Neurolinguistiques, I.N.S.E.R.M.,
75014 Paris, France
Cortical areas inwoiwed in spatial function
Although one cannot readily discard the arguments set forth against
the cognitive map theory of hippocampal function, I would by no means
intervene in a debate among hippocampal specialists concerning the
validity and weight of the experimental results. I would merely like to
point out that the spatial cognitive map theory constitutes a useful
model for the study of certain spatial disorders.
It is in fact tempting to draw parallels between the experimental
animal results and the deficits in spatial learning observed by Milner
(1965) in cases of right hippocampal ablation in humans. Though many
of these patients had no apparent spatial deficits, they were grossly
impaired in maze-learning tasks irrespective of the modality tested.
Also, the interpretation of spatial disorientation in man must obviously
take into account the role played by the posterior parietal region in the
spatial function of primates.
Studies by Hyvarinen and Poranen (1974) and by Mountcastle and
his associates (1975, 1976, 1978) have demonstrated the existence of
certain properties in the cells of areas 5 and 7 of the primate cortex.
Essentially, there appears to be a system at the level of area 5 which
constitutes "a continually freshened image of spatial relations, of the
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position and movement of the body, head and eyes in relation to each
other and to immediately surrounding space" (Mountcastle 1978).
Loosely associated with this system is a command apparatus situated
at the level of area 7 [see Kupfermann & Weiss: "The Command
Neuron Concept" BBS 1(1) 1978]. It would seem that this apparatus,
which is sensitive to motivational factors, is responsible for the
regulation of visual and manual processes in personal space as
"described by the reach of arm and hand, and particularly for the
direction of visual attention into the world around us" (ibid.). Robinson
et al. (1978) and Robinson and Goldberg (1978) have recently
provided another interpretation for the activity of these posterior
parietal cells. These authors reject the role of the posterior parietal
region in the regulation of movement and propose that this area should
be considered the neurophysiologic substrate for visual attention only.
Finally, it should be noted that the ablation of these regions in primates
has produced deficits in "reaching" or in "allocentric" orientation.
A particular type of spatial disorientation has been termed "the loss
of topographic memory" in view of the mnestic character of the
disorder; it is more frequently associated with other deficits of spatial
function produced by right posterior parietal lesions. However, cases
have recently been reported in which the loss of topographic memory
was virtually unaccompanied by any other deficit.
Such was the case in one of our patients, who exhibited a loss of
topographic memory with no other spatial deficit along with a serious
impairment of maze task learning. This patient suffered from a vascular
lesion in the right occipital region as revealed by the computerized
tomographic scan; note that the hippocampus is supplied by the
posterior cerebral artery.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the mnestic character of
some of the spatial deficits produced by lesions in the posterior right
hemisphere may be due to the disruption of connections between
those cortical structures and areas of the limbic system. The impor-
tance of afferent and efferent connections between the posterior
parietal regions, the cingulate gyrus and the retrosplenial cortex has
recently been demonstrated in monkeys (fviesulam et al. 1977; Roesen
and Van Hoesen 1977).
These findings make it possible to venture a unitary interpretation of
spatial function in human orientation. Like Mountcastle (1978), we
would envisage a neuronal assembly at the level of the inferior parietal
lobe which furnishes the coordinates of the body image in its immedi-
ate surround and is related to visuomotor coordination [see Gyr et al.
"Motor-Sensory Feedback and Geometry of Visual Space" BBS 2(1)
1979]. The more distant visual world - what is beyond manual reach -
becomes organized on the basis of these coordinates as the individual
moves from place to place. Subsequently, and in virtue of some other
neural substrate (such as the hippocampus) the individual establishes
a spatial map based on multisensory cues. Those stimuli which,
through experience, have acquired significance as spatial landmarks,
serve as continual signals to the individual as he follows a familiar
itinerary; also providing signals are those stimuli that are contrary
indices for the particular itinerary chosen. In this way, the individual can
orient himself.
Parieto-occipital lesions disturb awareness of the body's position in
space. As a function of the specific lesion site within these areas, the
deficit produced may affect either the manipulo-spatial domain alone
or more distant, extrapersonal space which, as described here, is not
simply visually appreciated but is, in fact, inferred from the data
available in pericorporal space. Lesions which isolate these areas
either from their contralateral sensory afferents or from their connec-
tions with motivational systems will result in attentional disturbances
with respect to the contralateral half of the body and/or space. The
mnestic character of many of these spatial deficits, meanwhile, is
probably best understood as the result of lesions involving structures
which are specifically concerned with learning, like the hippocampus,
or which compromise the connections between these structures and
the posterior parieto-occipital region.
Although clinical and experimental findings may be fruitfully reflected
in this analysis, one must not forget that spatial deficits are, if not
exclusively at least principally, the result of right hemisphere lesions.
The existence of functional hemispheric specialization in humans
requires certain additional considerations. In conjunction with the
apparition of language, and because the latter requires special neural
substrates, the necessary tissue developed predominantly in the left
hemisphere in areas which are not found in subhuman primates (i.e.,
the supramarginal gyrus and the angular gyrus). Consequently, the
mechanisms for spatial integration and holistic perception of the
environment had to be subsumed by tissue which was predominantly
available only in the right hemisphere.
by Richard Hirsh and Joe! Krajden
Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 1B1
Hippocampai function: Iogics Iogics and more logic
The hippocampus as a cognitive map will be an important and
controversial book. It employs thoroughly cognitive theories to explain
phenomena in the area of the physiology of learning and memory. This
field has long been dominated by simple associative or connectionistic
approaches, despite the fact that many, if not most, nonphysiological
psychologists have found such approaches to be seriously deficient in
accounting for most behavior.
Moreover, the approach of the authors is more neurological than
that of more conventional work. O & N succeed in being truly
comprehensive. The behavioral correlates of hippocampai EEG and
unit activity are integrated with the effects of lesions of that structure
upon behavior. More importantly, the authors make use of morphologi-
cal and physiological knowledge in an intelligent and inventive manner
to explain how the hippocampus carries out the psychological func-
tions that they ascribe to it. All too often theory in physiological
psychology is nothing more than the attribution of some psychologi-
cally defined process to some morphologically or pharmacologically
defined entity, with little attention to whether that entity is capable of
carrying out the assigned function. The authors have provided an
example that should be followed whenever the appropriate data is
available.
The authors' thesis also carries very important implications for
purely behavioral theories of learning. As the late Abe Black realized,
explaining the behavior of normal animals in cognitive terms and that of
animals with lesions in associative terms implies that both types of
systems are presented in the brain. To date most of the controversy in
the psychology of learning has been whether one or the other type of
theory was correct.
To a student of hippocampai function, The hippocampus as a
cognitive map is a very perplexing book. From one viewpoint the ideas
and arguments that it presents about hippocampai function are power-
ful, and in my estimation right. Viewed from another aspect they are
wrong and almost trivial.
Brain processes may be characterized both in terms of the logical
operations comprising them and in terms of the information being
processed. These two kinds of characterizations are more or less
independent in that one usually has little to say about the other. We
couldn't agree with O & N more when they assert that the hippocam-
pus carries out logical operations necessary for the production and
use of cognitive maps. However, we think they are totally wrong when
they assert that the hippocampus processes only spatial or geographic
information.
The initial segment of the book compares the logic of taxon systems
to that employed by the system of which the hippocampus is a part.
Characterizing the learning systems typified by S-R theories as cate-
gory inclusion logic and styling them as taxonomic is precisely on
target. No restriction is placed upon the kind of information to which
this logic may be applied. They may deal with both spatial and
nonspatial problems. The formal properties of the taxon system are
then contrasted with that of the locale or mapping system. This is the
first misstep in that it implies that nontaxonomic logic is to be found
only in systems dealing with geographic information. Such an assertion
is false, as attested to by the applicability of analytical geometry to all
kinds of problems, spatial and otherwise. Such tunnel vision probably
accounts for the omission of dimensionality as a key formal property of
mapping systems. Maps are dimensional in the sense that a relation
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between a given point and two others can only obtain if a certain
relation between the latter two obtains. Dimensions are quite different
from inclusion categories. The latter identify a set of items having
common elements and disregard the diversity, whereas the former are
a means of systematically characterizing variation. This, incidentally, is
the crux of the argument between Kant and the British Empiricists.
In a subsequent section of the book it is claimed that hippocampal
dysfunction does not affect nonspatial problems and all reported
effects of such dysfunction are attributed to the animal's not knowing
where it is or where it wants to go. This assertion is also false. Quite
early reports describe deficiencies on the part of hippocampally
ablated animals in reversing nonspatial discriminations (Douglas &
Pribram 1966; Silveira & Kimble 1968; Teitlebaum 1964; Webster &
Voneida 1964) as do subsequent studies (Becker et al. 1979). There
are data indicating that hippocampal dysfunction results in deficits in
acquiring and performing nonspatial sequences (Caul et al. 1969).
Moreover, hippocampally ablated animals, unlike normal animals, are
not capable of transposition following the learning of a size discrimina-
tion. All of these effects can be accounted for by disruption of the
logical operations underlying the nontaxonomic system. Close analysis
of the explanation offered by O & N reveals that they rest on the formal
properties of the locale system rather than the processing of its part of
spatial information.
To a certain extent the authors implicitly recognize the importance of
the formal properties of the mapping system. In order to account for
the amnesic effects of hippocampal lesions in humans they postulate
that the hippocampus of the left hemisphere carries out the same
logical operations in the linguistic realm that the one in the right
hemisphere performs upon spatial information.
Admiration for the authors' methods in handling neurobiological data
does not preclude demurral from their conclusions and inferences. We
are inclined to regard the presence of theta waves as indicating that
the hippocampus is not working very hard, on the ground that such
highly syncrhronized activity in hippocampal cortex is probably func-
tionally analogous to alpha activity in neocortex.
Secondly, it is fair to describe the authors' interpretation of their unit
activity studies as one holding that hippocampal neurons detect the
present location of the animal. Such an interpretation is not completely
suited to explaining the effects of hippocampal dysfunctions in terms of
disrupted mapping processes. Cognitive maps guide behavior insofar
as they describe the relation between the present location of the
animal and that of the incentive, or, if you will, the place it wants to be.
To date O & N have not addressed the question of unit representation
of destination. Moreover, their methods during unit studies focus on
whether or not firing occurs in a given place, leaving quite open the
question of how the relationship between the animal's location and
destination is encoded.
To date the main effect of The hippocampus as a cognitive map has
been to engender a howling controversy over whether or not the realm
in which the hippocampus operates is exclusively spatial. Our fervent
wish is that ultimately this tumult will be regarded as a waste of time.
The book has a great many things to say about the formal properties
of the system in which the hippocampus participates. The proper role
of the book is to stimulate interest in the logical operations carried out
by the hippocampal system that endow it with such formal properties.
by J . Eric Holmes
Department of Neurology, University of Southern California, School of Medicine,
Los Angeles, Calif. 90033
Wawes and ceilss maps and memories3 space and time
My old hippocampus went: " 'Thetive'!
This theory's most innovative.
With Nadel and O'Keefe
One finds easy belief -
It's some kind of a map connotative!"
O & N's accompanying precis gives an inadequate picture of their
massive opus. Ranging, as it does, from the philosophy of Kant
through the anatomical controversy over efferent pathways, the
neuropsychology of the theta (RSA) rhythm to an extensive discussion
of lesion data and lesion philosophy, human pathology and the
syntactic structure theory of Chomsky, it provides an abundance of
openings for the commentator. I will use the theta rhythm, the experi-
mental technique and the human lesions for my locale points.
"It must mean something!" Watching the sinusoidal theta rhythm
rolling out of the EEG machine for the first time, one cannot escape the
conviction that it contains a special message, albeit yet undeciphered.
This conviction is heightened by the knowledge that the hippocampus
has been associated with memory. In 1954, Green and Arduini
suggested alerting and arousal and Adey (1960) suggested memory
and learning. I thought it "indicates a readiness to act" (Holmes and
Adey 1960). The biggest controversy seemed to be over the impersis-
tence of theta in Grastyan's cats trained in approach behavior (Gras-
tyan et al. 1959). Vanderwolf and Heron (1964) advanced the theory
that the rhythm was related to "voluntary" movements. That it might be
just a humming noise the brain makes when it is turned on was a
hypothesis none of us cared to consider.
O'Keefe, Nadel, Ranck and the others, however, have demon-
strated the comforting fact that there are hippocampal cells that fire
bursts of spikes at the theta frequency. Surely if cells are firing
rhythmically the rhythm "really does" mean something! "And thus
there is a prima facie reason to believe that these slow waves are
providing information about underlying neural events" (O'Keefe and
Nadel, p. 143).
Some of the controversies about the theta rhythm have been
resolved by assuming that there are two different theta rhythms and
that it may be associated with different behaviors in different species
(O'Keefe and Nadel, p. 219). The waves in the cat (the neurophysi-
ologist's traditional animal) are quite different from the waves in the rat
(the experimental psychologist's traditional S). Both of these animals
differ from the rabbit, the animal in which the phenomenon was first
reported, and still the most reliable theta generator (Winson 1972).
"Nonmovement" theta occurs in most*species during REM sleep.
Because of the association of the hippocampal rhythms with learning
and memory, this has led to the interesting proposal (Pearlman 1979)
that REM sleep is necessary for memory. I wish O & N had commented
on this.
The strange catatonic, species-specific behavior of the rabbit - the
tonic immobility or animal hypnosis response - is accompanied by low
frequency theta (Harper 1971). No one has yet investigated the
species-specific immobility of the pointer dog. I predict the hippocam-
pus will be found to be in theta.
Unmentioned by O & N is another complication, the rare occurrence
of anything resembling a theta wave in monkeys and men. Although
Crowne et al. (1972) have shown that a theta rhythm can be leeched
out of the monkey's hippocampal EEG with a computer search, even
they would agree that it is not an obvious occurrence. Does this mean
the monkey (and by analogy, man) does less cognitive mapping?
O & N identify the theta rhythm with the recording, or the reading of
recordings, from the hippocampal "map." "Theta activity is necessary
for the original construction of maps, for their subsequent modification
when there is a mismatch between the map of a situation and the
present sensory array, and, finally when the map is being used in the
predictive mode" (O'Keefe and Nadel, p. 190). They suggest a circuit
for recording place-labeling stimuli which would be "scanned" by the
theta wave. Cells would then fire and - and something would happen.
Like most such speculations, the proposal fades off into "activate . . .
circuits in the brain stem" (O'Keefe and Nadel, p. 229). This does
sound like Adey's (1967) "these wave patterns . . . underlie the initial
deposition of information in cerebral tissue, and . . . subsequent
recall." It is not quite as dramatic as Landfield's (1976) suggestion that
the hippocampus cells form a hologram and the theta rhythm is a laser
beam!
Is the map literally a physical representation of the rat's environ-
ment? Probably not. "CA1 place units recorded next to each other
sometimes represent neighbouring parts of an environment, as often
they do not" (O'Keefe and Nadel, p. 223). Unfortunately for us, we can
deal only with mental images that have some familiarity. No one could
have suggested that the hippocampus was a hologram until holograms
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were invented. Maps have been around a long time, but this does not
mean that the hippocampus looks like something out of Rand McNally.
At best the theory suggests that these "place cells" are elements in a
circuit of cells that fire when specific "place labeling" inputs occur.
Should there not be "map cells" in the visual, olfactory, and auditory
sensory areas?
The experimental basis of the theory is given on pages 190 to 217,
with a summary following. One might be tempted to accuse the authors
of publishing their 543-page monograph prematurely. The amount of
excitement generated among hippocampologists by their theory more
than justifies the book, however. The authors proceed to reexamine a
great number of old and new ideas about the brain in a most
productive fashion. The chapter on physiology alone contains at least
a hundred sentences, any one of which could be easily expanded into
a viable proposal for a Ph.D. thesis.
When a cell increases its firing, the investigator puts his head down
where the rat is (figuratively) and tries to guess what the cell is
"seeing." Results depend on the ability of the scientist and the rat
brain cell to "see" the same things. O & N are imaginative, but Ranck
(1973), looking at the same kinds of cell records, categorizes them
quite differently. The very use of "see" in the example above betrays
the bias built into our language. Wouldn't a real rat psychologist be
more likely to say the hippocampal cell "smells" the input?
I find it startling that an olfactory animal like the rat would have
"place cells" that would not fire just because the lights were turned off.
Where are the odor identification cells? Surely the complexity of the
rat's olfactory world must equal the complexity of our own world of
color vision.
I am not arguing with the data, only with the interpretation. A rat brain
cell cannot be credited with recording a location unless O & N can also
"see" the location. And it seems reasonable to me to expect the
categories "seen" by hippocampal cells to be quite different from
those "seen" by psychologists. It is just because a cognitive map
seems so incredible a thing for the cells of the hippocampus to be that
it may be an inspired correct guess.
One of the problems in studying the relation of hippocampal
electrical activity to memory or learning was the controversy over
lesion effects. In hippocampal man, the memory loss was devastating.
In hippocampal animals it wasn't so obvious; many did as well, or
better than, the controls. O & N make a nice attempt to cram these
studies into a cognitive map of some sort. They succeed by assuming,
as most of us are forced to do, that there are several different kinds of
memory, possibly located in different places. The authors do a fine job
of illuminating some aspects of the human amnesic syndrome, but they
slight the dimension of time.
It would seem probable that a neuronal circuit exists that would
register events as related in temporal sequence as well as in spatial
and in linguistic sequences. How are memories recognized as "older"
or as "recent?" The intact brain is able to recognize something as
"familiar" and then ask "where?" and "when?"
The authors point out that recent studies indicate that amnesics
have a loss of "o ld" memories as well as recent ones (O'Keefe and
Nadel, p. 434), but the retrograde effect, especially in trauma patients,
is often very impressive. Can we account for the apparently complete
loss of memories of a period of years and their gradual, partial
recovery? Penfield and Mathieson (1974) have suggested that more
recent memories require the anterior hippocampus, old memories the
posterior. The farther back into the temporal lobe the lesion extends,
the farther back in time goes the retrograde amnesia. This hypothesis
is so incredible that someone ought to subject it to experimental test.
Things are mapped in four dimensions, not just three. Is the temporal
axis innate or learned? Does the retrograde amnesia effect tell us
something about the nature of the brain, or something about the nature
of time itself? There is a myth among clinicians that patients with
temporal lobe epilepsy have frequent attacks of deja vu. I have
encountered one patient with deja vu of such intensity that he believed
himself gifted with prophetic dreams. But questioning of epileptics, has,
in general, not indicated that they are more subject to this phenomena
than the rest of us.
We need another monograph on the philosophical, psychological
and neurophysiological nature of time. Perhaps O & N can be
persuaded to write it, once they iron a few kinks out of their theory of
space.
by James A- Morel
Department of Anatomy, State University of New York Upstate Medical Center,
Syracuse, N.Y. 13210
Lost maps and memories
The experimental results of O & N and others make an impressive case
for the spatial functions of the hippocampus. The cognitive map theory
presented here is an innovative development of the implications of
these results. It is rich both in new ideas and old ideas seen from a new
vantage. It presents a much needed fresh and promising approach to
the function of the hippocampus. It also at times vastly overreaches.
While I admire this imaginative work, I must contest the interpretation
that is made of the human amnestic syndrome.
The attempt to accommodate the allegation that hippocampal
lesions produce amnesia is exceptionally inventive but totally implau-
sible. Among other things, it requires us to place Chomsky's semantic
deep structure in the hippocampus. This extravagance is unnecessary.
The amnestic syndrome is not derived from the theory of cognitive
maps; the theory does not predict the symptoms, it adapts to them.
The authors embrace the current orthodoxy that blames the failure
to find amnesia in animals with hippocampal lesions on a misunder-
standing of the syndrome and the failure to use appropriate tasks.
They argue that the amnestic syndrome is a consequence of the loss
of the locale system situated in the hippocampus. The difficulty in
finding comparable deficits in animals with hippocampal lesions is the
result of using memory tasks that engage the undisturbed taxon
system. But there is at least one experiment not discussed by the
authors in which the amnestic syndrome was convincingly demon-
strated in monkeys, and with a taxon task. Scoville, who had produced
the amnesia in humans by removing the ventromedial quadrant of the
temporal lobe, performed exactly the same surgery in the same way in
monkeys (Correll and Scoville 1965). The animals had been trained
preoperatively on delayed match-to-sample, a task that Correll and
Scoville thought would be a sensitive measure of amnesia. The lesion
had a devastating effect on performance. The animals showed no
retention (retrograde amnesia) and had enormous difficulty relearning,
some never rereaching criterion at zero delay (prograde amnesia). It
should be emphasized that the lesion, including the surgical procedure,
was the same as that performed on the famous amnestic patient,
H. M., and by the same surgeon. This direct replication of the human
amnestic syndrome is generally ignored because of one embarrassing
outcome of the experiment: a group in which the hippocampus alone
was removed performed flawlessly.
According to O & N's classification, delayed match-to-sample
should be served by the taxon system and therefore should not be
disrupted by removing the hippocampus. This is the finding of Mishkin
and Oubre (1976) as well as Correll and Scoville. Amnesia, according
to O & N, results from loss of the locale system in the hippocampus.
However, the surgery of the human amnesties was not limited to the
hippocampus; they had the same lesions as Correll and Scoville's
monkeys, including the entire ventromedial quadrant of the temporal
lobe. There is no justification for assuming that the retention and
acquisition deficit displayed by these monkeys is not the result of the
same processes as the human retention and acquisition deficit called
amnesia. The monkeys must learn and remember this task however it
is classified. The absence of a deficit with hippocampal damage is
strong evidence that the hippocampus has little to do with the amnestic
syndrome in monkeys or humans.
What then is the source of this deficit? Mishkin and his colleagues
are investigating the possibility that amnesia occurs only with combined
damage to hippocampus and amygdala. I have presented evidence
that it is produced by damage to the surrounding white matter (Horel
1978). The Correll and Scoville data support the latter argument. I
performed a rank order correlation between performance at match
and Correll and Scoville's estimate of amount of damage to hippocam-
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pus, amygdala and temporal stem (white matter of temporal cortex).
The deficit correlated by far the best with damage to the temporal
stem. This is consistent with the finding that lesions to the source of
this white matter in the temporal cortex produce severe deficits on this
task (Dean 1974, Mishkin and Oubre 1976) but lesions restricted to
hippocampus or amygdala do not (Correll and Scoville 1965). Thus, it
is probable that the severe amnesia produced in monkeys by medial
temporal lesions is the consequence of damage to this white matter
and this same white matter must also have been damaged in the cases
of human amnesia (Horel 1978).
The cognitive map theory can stand alone without the amnestic
syndrome. The authors have presented a convincing argument
concerning the need for such maps to find our way among objects and
places. The association of these maps with the hippocampus is good
but not as convincing. A few troublesome features remain. One of
these is the prediction that hippocampal lesions produce deficits on
delayed response. I disagree. There are a number of studies showing
no deficits on delayed response when the lesion is restricted to the
hippocampus (Mishkin 1954, Orbach, Milner and Rasmussen 1960,
Mahut and Cordeau 1963, Mahut 1971). An interesting point that bears
on the above argument is that in the Orbach et al. study the authors
predicted from their experience with human amnesties that there would
be no deficit on delayed response with medial temporal lesions, and
the results confirmed their prediction.
Another awkward problem derives from placing the source of
exploratory behavior in the hippocampus. While it may be true that
removing the hippocampus by itself decreases exploration, removing it
along with the rest of the temporal lobe has quite the opposite effect.
After a bilateral temporal lobectomy, monkeys exhibit an extreme
compulsion to explore and react to every object in their environment
(Kluver and Bucy 1939). Whatever the reason for this, it certainly
cannot be said that these monkeys have lost their motivation to
explore with the loss of their hippocampus.
the part of lesioned animals. However, the fact is that the change from
a continuous reinforcement schedule to one in which reinforcements
are intermittent produces a great increase in the rate of responding.
This hugely increased response rate interferes with the decrease in
responding essential to efficient performance. Further evidence that it
is the change from continuous to intermittent reinforcement which
causes the impaired performance comes from studies showing a much
reduced effect in lesioned animals that never experience continuous
reinforcement but begin their operant careers on the DRL schedule.
Perhaps the strength of the book, namely its remarkably wide review
of research, is also its weakness. In an attempt to evaluate or interpret
almost every type of study, there are some weaker sections. These are
areas in which neither of the authors has undertaken research. It is
impossible in science today to be expert in all areas of brain behavior,
even for any two people. Therefore, there are sections in which more
critical comment or evaluation would have been useful.
In regard to the theory itself, I have strong reservations about it.
Basically, I think it is improper to try to formulate a theory of the mental
or behavioral role of any brain structure. In essence, the role of any
structure depends on the state of the systems with which it is in
contact. Its behavioral contribution can only be evaluated in regard to
the function of other brain systems and their interactions.
The creation of such a larger theory is well beyond our capabilities
at this time. In addition, I believe that there is no such thing as an
invariant consequence of restricted forebrain damage. The behavioral
effects of lesions are always dictated by the genetic makeup of the
animals as well as their pre- and postoperative treatments or experi-
ences. While we often pay lip service to these factors, too often we
ignore them in our theories and data analysis.
While my personal objections to the basic theory (and others like it)
may seem to indicate rather fundamental objections, I strongly recom-
mend the book. Nowhere else is this information available in one place
or the writing so well done. Overall, it is a worthy book.
by Robert L. Isaacson
Department of Psychology, Center for Neurobehavioral Sciences, State University
of New York at Binghampton, Binghampton, N. Y. 13901
Hippocampai lesions and Intermittent reinforcement
It has been said that there is, in most large books, a better, smaller
book trying to get out. In this case it is the "bigness" of the book that
provides its greatest contribution. The kernel is, of course, the spatial
map theory of hippocampal function. This theory has been well known
for several years and the most important data, those from chronic
single cell studies, reported in many publications. Therefore, the small
book hidden in the big one is already out. The big book, however,
contains a great deal of additional facts and information. So much,
indeed, that the book is really a "must" for the people with research or
scholarly interest in the hippocampus.
Before all else, the authors are to be complimented on creating a
very readable book. Their prose is excellent. The early sections on
older philosophies of space are exceptionally well done. Another
singular contribution is in the quantity and depth of the review of the
literature in the field. Clearly, countless hours were spent reading,
evaluating, and thinking about the data in many types of research
reports. As a thoughtful compendium of research, it is unexcelled.
As noted, the general sense of the cognitive map theory has been
known for quite a few years. In the book the authors attempt to extend
the theory to encompass a wide variety of data that at first, or even
second, third, or fourth, glance don't seem to be related to cognitive or
spatial maps. This is usually done in an elegant and creative fashion.
Yet these examples of theory building, renovation, or elaboration are
sometimes less than satisfying. One example would be the common
deficit found in animals with hippocampal lesions when changed from
continuous reinforcement schedules to ones in which the animal has to
wait 20 seconds between bar presses in order to obtain a reinforce-
ment (DRL-20). This change was thought to be due to the intact
animal's moving away from the area of the lever in order to prevent
responding. I have not observed differences in such collateral acts on
by Ray Jackendoff
Linguistics Program, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. 02254
What is a cognitive map?
I find two of O & N's major claims convincing: first, that humans and
other animals must have some innate notion of absolute space which
they use to help orient themselves and find their way around; second,
that the hippocampus is an important factor in long-term memory.
However, the major argument of the book, that the hippocampus is
specifically devoted to the encoding of "cognitive maps" that repre-
sent information about absolute space, seems to me to be seriously
confused in several respects. These arise mostly in connection with
Chapter 14, "An extension of the theory to humans." I will start with
specifics and work my way to more general issues.
1. O & N's use of linguistic terminology, though in itself not really
damaging to their argument, reveals some misconceptions about
linguistic theory that are disturbingly common among nonlinguists. The
error lies in their term "semantic deep structure," which conflates two
distinct levels of linguistic structure: deep structure and semantic
representation. The former term denotes the level of syntactic form
that is described by phrase structure rules and that serves as input to
the transformational rules. In the theory presented by Chomsky (1965),
deep structure was also claimed to be the level of syntactic form to
which the rules deriving semantic representation apply. In the late
sixties, two divergent alternatives developed. One school of thought,
"generative semantics" (e.g., Lakoff 1971), went on to claim that deep
syntactic structure was isomorphic to semantic representation;
according to this view, the term "semantic deep structure" is legiti-
mate. However, other linguists (Chomsky 1972, Jackendoff 1972,
Bresnan 1978) argue that there are aspects of semantic representa-
tion that cannot be enlighteningly derived from syntactic deep struc-
ture, and that information from surface structure also plays a role in the
determination of meaning. Hence deep structure and semantic repre-
sentation are indubitably distinct.
O & N's "semantic deep structure" is clearly meant to be what a
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linguist of this latter persuasion would call "semantic representation"
or "semantic structure." This terminological distinction is not just a
quibble, for it has repercussions on how one interprets linguistic data,
as will be seen directly.
2. Having spent my career discovering how difficult it is to find a
mapping of any theoretical interest between semantic representation
and syntactic structure, I found O & N's proposals for converting
cognitive maps to language (pp. 403-409) more than a little cavalier.
Most responsible linguists could not countenance a theory which
derived O & N's examples (15-20) from a single underlying structure:
the examples are too structurally diverse to be related by any
sufficiently constrained set of transformations.
15. The rock fell from the roof to the ground.
16. The rock was on the roof and (then) it fell to the ground.
17. The rock was on the ground where it had fallen from the roof.
18. The roof had a rock (on it) and (then) the rock fell to the
ground.
19. The ground has a rock (on it) which fell from the roof.
20. The roof had something fall from it on to the ground and that
was the rock.
Furthermore, a linguist would have to be seriously concerned with why
such relatively simple transforms of example 15 as To the ground, the
rock fell from the roof, and The roof, the rock fell from to the ground
are not grammatical realizations of the same information. In short, O &
N's claim (p. 403) that "A variety of sentences can be generated from
our simple spatial semantic map by a set of transformation rules"
requires a great deal more rigorous justification than they provide.
To be sure, examples 15-20 all convey approximately equivalent
information, and one would like to account for that. There are two
possibilities, both of which, for the sake of constraining linguistic
theory, must assume that the sentences have distinct syntactic and
semantic structures. The first possibility is that the sentences are
related by inference rules of the usual logical sort; the second is that
the inferences are mediated by the construction of something like a
cognitive map of the event being described. The latter seems more
plausible to me because of the existence of numerous lexical pairs like
above/below, to the left of/to the right of, and inside/around, and
because of inferences about betweenness. (See the treatment in
Jackendoff 1976, pp. 96-98, 116-118.) Thus, in the end I find the idea
of a cognitive map appealing - but its connection to language must be
far less direct than O & N would have us believe.
3. O & N's schematic cognitive maps (pp. 402, 407) are based on a
mistaken assumption which I regret having perpetrated in Jackendoff
(1976): that the canonical semantic structure for sentences describing
motion invariably includes the endpoints of the motion, which I called
the source and goal. Jackendoff (1978), in exploring the semantic
resources of English further, shows that motion sentences are better
characterized in terms of motion along a path. A path may be intrinsic
to a verb of motion, as in The flag waved, or it may be expressed by a
prepositional phrase. A source-goal pattern such as from here to there
is only one type of path; there are at least two others, which may be
called directions (e.g., toward the mountain) and routes {along the
river). These different types of paths make different use of the
landmark named by the object of the preposition. In a source-goal
pattern the landmark is an endpoint; in a direction it fixes the orienta-
tion, but the path need not reach to it; in a route the path bears some
other spatial relation to the landmark. This enrichment of the descrip-
tion of motion sentences cannot be accommodated into O & N's
cognitive maps, which do little more than spell out the endpoints of a
motion event. The proper corresponding enrichment of the theory of
cognitive maps is not entirely obvious.
What ought to be attractive to O & N in this revised account of
motion sentences is that it attributes existence to paths independently
of whether motion actually takes place along them. For example,
something can simply be oriented along a path rather than traveling on
it, as in The sign points toward New York. Thus spatial organization as
revealed by language is not tied to specific events or motor
commands; it seems more to involve location and orientation with
respect to landmarks. This accords well with O & N's infrahuman
evidence.
On the other hand, we are left in the dark as to what a cognitive map
might be like. O &. N emphasize (p. 78) that "The cognitive map is not a
picture or image which 'looks like' what it represents; rather, it is an
information structure from which map-like images can be recon-
structed and from which behavior can be generated." The problem is,
what kind of informational structures should one propose to capture
the meaning of along, around, through, back, and the rest of the
semantically interesting words used in the description of paths? Miller
and Johnson-Laird (1976) give it a serious try, but are themselves
dissatisfied in the end. With the demise of the rudimentary maps O & N
propose, they leave us with no specific proposal beyond the claim that
organisms use landmarks to help them find their way around.
4. We now turn to O & N's most crucial claims, concerning the
function of the hippocampus. O & N claim that locale (hippocampal)
memory is encoded in terms of Euclidean, "absolute" space, while the
taxon (nonhippocampal) system is encoded in terms of egocentric,
"relative" space. Such a distinction in spatial representation is difficult
to justify. In particular, linguistic evidence suggests that there is no
clearcut distinction between absolute and relative space. Some paths,
such as from New York to Chicago, are more or less absolute; others,
such as toward the church, have an absolute endpoint but a direction
dependent on the position of the thing in motion; others, such as
leftward, depend on the orientation of the thing in motion; others, such
as from here, depend on the position of the speaker. Grammatically
these are treated as entirely uniform. Whether they are "relative" or
"absolute" depends both on the choice of preposition and the choice
of landmark. If there were a drastic difference between relative and
absolute location, one might well expect them to be represented
distinctly in language.
O & N also claim that locale memory is long-term and taxon memory
is not. But this distinction and the absolute-relative distinction are
incompatible. Surely one can have long-term memory of a route - such
as the one O & N quote on p. 80 - that is specified at least partially in
terms of one's orientation and one's subjective impressions of
distance traveled. If so, either the locale system may contain egocent-
ric, relative spatial memories, or else the taxon system may contain
long-term memories stored in a form which may be interwoven with the
locale system.
O & N further claim (p. 384, among other places) that taxon memory
involves categorization by feature similarity, the abstraction of cate-
gory prototypes, and the absence of spatiotemporal context informa-
tion. The locale system, on the other hand, is devoted to spatiotempo-
ral context; O & N leave unclear how this system encodes categorial
information, if at all. Again, it is hard to make sense of this distinction,
given the other distinctions. For one thing, how does information about
spatiotemporal context reach long-term memory if not through short-
term memory? Moreover, how can category prototypes and the
category memberships of at least some individuals not be stored in
long-term memory? Even the distinction between categorization and
cognitive mapping is dubious: O & N, describing my theory of verb
meanings in Jackendoff (1976), mention the semantic generalization
from spatial to categorial change, demonstrated by sentences like The
coach changed from a handsome young man into a pumpkin. If the
content of such a sentence, which deals with category membership, is
to be encoded by a cognitive map in locale memory, what does it mean
to claim that the taxon system is the one concerned with categoriza-
tion?
Finally, O & N claim that in humans the right hippocampus is devoted
to nonverbal spatial functions, while the left is specialized for "seman-
tic memory," that is, memory of narratives and the like. Their evidence
for the distinction is derived primarily from experiments with recall of
word lists and such. But memory for word lists hardly constitutes
semantic memory. In fact, it is not even clear what semantic memory
might be. Fodor (1975), Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976), and Jacken-
doff (in preparation), argue - and most work in artificial intelligence
assumes - that the information conveyed by language is not encoded
in a form specific to linguistic information. In order for people to be able
to talk about what they see, and to be able to carry out orders, there
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must be a level of conceptual structure that is modality independent;
and there is good reason to believe that the semantic structure of
language is not distinct from this level. Furthermore, much linguistic
information we receive is inextricably mixed with nonlinguistic informa-
tion, for example, in sentences such as That man over there [pointing]
is a spy; He's always waving his arms around like this [demonstrating];
The fish was this [demonstrating] long. Thus, it does not appear
possible to isolate an aspect of memory that might justifiably be called
"semantic." in order to account for O & N's evidence of hippocampal
lateralization, one must probably appeal to language-specific functions
such as phonological, morphological, or lexical structure.
In short, O & N's claims concerning the functions of the locale and
taxon systems are either muddled or inconsistent or both. Since, as
shown above, the same is true of their claims about cognitive maps,
the main thesis of the book is largely incoherent. In the absence of a
clear theory, the masses of experimental evidence are hard to evalu-
ate. Hence I found the book a disappointment, in spite of my general
sympathy with its approach. My guess is that we need far better formal
theories of the information that the brain processes before real
progress can be made on cognition.
by Leonard E. Jarrard
Department of Psychology, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va. 24450
Considerations in ewalyating the cognitlwe mapping
theory of hippocampal function
O & N have written an important book that deserves to be read and
studied by both students and investigators in the field. In an area where
there are few theories attempting to integrate the results of brain and
behavior studies, the book is unique. With a relatively small number of
central concepts, the authors are able to apply the theory to research
findings as diverse as single unit recordings, hippocampal theta, the
lesion literature, and findings from the clinic; the scope of the research
findings subsumed within the theory is truly surprising.
Any attempt to organize research results as diverse as those found
in the hippocampal literature is bound to encounter conflicting results,
and the theorizing by O & N is no exception. In no area are
discrepancies more often found than in the lesion literature (the area to
which the present commentary is addressed). There are a number of
reasons why this is the case, and it is understandable why the authors
do not insist that all results agree with the theory. In addition to
problems associated with subtle differences in testing procedures
when similar behaviors are being studied, the "hippocampal lesion"
has varied from small lesions aimed at discrete regions of hippocam-
pus, to extensive damage to the hippocampal formation, and damage
to fimbria and/or fornix. Since the hippocampus consists of several
neuroanatomically and neurophysiologicaliy distinct regions, and these
are often differentially involved in the lesions, it is not surprising that
conflicting results are often reported. Considering the amount of
"noise" in the lesion data, it is remarkable that the authors have been
able to obtain as much support for the theory as is presented.
However, one criticism of the book is that the authors fail to deal
adequately with results from a number of carefully designed experi-
ments that do not agree with the theory.
The neural model described on pages 217 to 230 of the book
represents an attempt to incorporate what is known about the anatomy
and physiology of the hippocampus into a model of how the structure
acts as a spatial map. Specific functions are proposed for the three
main systems (fascia dentata, CA3, and CA1), but it is stated that the
model can be modified or rejected as new information becomes
available. There now exists a considerable amount of data on the
behavioral effects of selective damage to hippocampal cell fields
and/or fiber tracts. Especially relevant are the effects on behavior
found following damage to the CA1 pyramidal cell field. On the basis of
unit-recording studies demonstrating a preponderance of place units
and mismatch cells in the CA1 cell field, O & N propose that the cells
are involved in cognitive mapping and novelty-detection/exploration.
The available lesion data only partially support this hypothesis. As
predicted by the theory, rats are more active in a novel open field
following removal of the majority of the CA1 cells (Jarrard 1976,
Myhrer 1975). However, performance of CA1 animals on complex
spatial tasks is not necessarily impaired but rather depends on whether
the task was learned before or after the operations. Specifically,
postoperative performance on an 8-arm radial maze is unaffected if
the task is learned before the operations, but impaired if the maze is
learned postoperatively (Jarrard 1978a, b). Acquisition of a Y-maze
spatial task is normal in both CA1 and complete hippocampally
damaged rats, but both groups are impaired in reversal learning
(Jarrard 1976). In other tasks, such as two-way active avoidance,
passive avoidance, and operant tasks, performance of rats with CA1
lesions is like that of controls (Jarrard 1976, Jarrard & Becker 1977).
These results do implicate the CA1 cells as being important in
exploration and in the acquisition of spatial tasks, but CA1 cells are
apparently not necessary for correct performance of a spatial task if it
is learned before the operations. Since the CA1 cells are seen by O &
N as being important in both the construction and storage of cognitive
maps, the data only partially support the theory. As suggested by the
authors, it may be that the CAS cells are more involved than CA1 cells
in mapping, but it is still surprising that interrupting the hippocampal
circuit by damaging CA1 cells has little effect on retention of complex
place learning.
The usefulness of the theory in thinking about lesion experiments, as
well as some limitations, can perhaps best be pointed out by analyzing
the results of several experiments. In one study rats were trained
preoperatively in a Y-maze spatial alternation task, operations were
carried out, and rats with extensive damage to hippocampus and
controls were (a) retrained postoperatively, (b) tested with delays
between trials, and (c) tested with and without interpolated activity
during delays (Jarrard 1975). Rats with hippocampal lesions were
impaired in postoperative testing (as predicted by the theory when the
locale system is damaged) but they were able to relearn the task with
savings (by using a taxon system?). The theory predicts that perfor-
mance of animals relying on a taxon hypothesis will be significantly
influenced by intertrial interval and by interference. Performance of
both hippocampals and controls was impaired at longer delays but to
an equal extent; however, hippocampals were more affected by the
interference condition. In a second experimental procedure, animals
were trained on a radial-arm maze to choose a limited subset of arms
(Jarrard 1978b, Olton & Papas, in press). In our study rats learned
before the operations to choose four arms that were consistently
baited on an 8-arm maze and the animals were then retrained
postoperatively using the same procedure. Although the immediate
postoperative performance of hippocampals would suggest they were
"lost in space," with subsequent training they did learn to choose only
the baited arms. Hippocampals were still impaired, though, since they
continued to reenter previously baited arms that had already been
chosen on that trial (and thus no longer contained food). These results
have been variously interpreted as evidence that hippocampal lesions
result in increased susceptibility to interference (Jarrard 1978b) and a
working memory impairment (Olton & Papas, in press). The spatial
mapping theory would probably say that hippocampals were forced to
employ a less efficient taxon hypothesis, and as a result experienced
more interference between correct arms. Thus, it appears that the
mapping theory predicts most of the results of experiments like the
above but it does make one wonder if it is possible to design an
experiment that would be a critical test of the theory.
The usefulness of a particular theory must be judged with respect to
its value in integrating known facts and generating further experiments.
Not only does the O & N theory integrate a diverse literature, but it
makes definite predictions that can be tested. In this regard, the
cognitive mapping theory would seem to be an especially promising
one.
by Raymond P. Kesner
Department of Psychology, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
[hippocampus and memorf
O & N attempt in their book to integrate the vast literature on
hippocampal function and incorporate the extant data within a single
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theoretical framework. The introduction to their theory, which is boldly
stated in the title of the book, The hippocampus as a cognitive map,
includes an excellent discussion of the philosophical foundations of
space. The anatomy and electrophysiological properties of the hippo-
campus are presented in a scholarly fashion. The effects of hippocam-
pal lesions on behavior and correlates of hippocampal electrical
activity have been satisfactorily integrated within the proposed theoret-
ical framework. The extension of the theory to human data, however, is
somewhat weak and the electrical stimulation chapter is poorly
presented.
Since it is impossible to review every aspect of the book, I will restrict
my comments primarily to the proposed role of the hippocampus in the
encoding, storage, and retrieval of spatial information. There have
been over the years a number of theoretical approaches associated
with an analysis of the hippocampus and mnemonic function. The
emphasis has been to assign to the hippocampus the role of mediating
specific processes associated with information processing, including
attention (Douglas and Pribram 1966), encoding (Butters and Cermak
1975), consolidation or transfer from short- to long-term memory
(Milner 1968a), and retrieval (Warrington and Weiskrantz 1973) of
information. O & N, however, present a new approach indicative of a
changing emphasis, with an interest in the structural representation of
memory. They suggest that the hippocampus encodes and contains
the memory representation of absolute space. Their approach
assumes that memory has a multidimensional structure with many
neural systems contributing specific components or attributes to the
total memory representation. They propose that the encoding of a
cognitive map occurs within a "locale system" which is characterized
by the storage of absolute spatial attributes of specific events within
the hippocampus, i.e., the hippocampus encodes specific stimuli
representing places or relations between places independent of the
subject's own body schema. The encoding of all other attributes of an
event becomes the property of a "taxon system" and presumably
occurs in other parts of the central nervous system. The "taxon
system" would include the storage of relative spatial attributes, which
depend upon accurate assessment of one's body orientation in space.
The consequence of this division is that the "locale system" is quite
specific, with a primary emphasis upon the encoding of spatial
attributes of specific environmental contexts. It appears to be some-
what akin to Tulving's notion of episodic memory (Tulving 1972),
except that there is little emphasis on the encoding of time and the
authors assume low rather than high interference between similar
events. The "taxon system," on the other hand, appears to be
nonspecific, vague, and based primarily on remaining capabilities of
hippocampally lesioned subjects. It appears to be somewhat akin to
one's knowledge of the world (Tulving's notion of semantic memory).
There are two major issues with respect to the "locale system" that I
would like to discuss further. First, there is the question of whether one
can assign the encoding of space to only one neural region, namely the
hippocampus.
There are other neural regions that contribute to the encoding of
space like frontal cortex, caudate, parietal cortex, and the superior
colliculus-pulvinar-visual cortex system. O & N do suggest that the
parietal cortex encodes space, but only relative space. Unfortunately,
others have suggested that the parietal cortex encodes absolute
space with relative space delegated to the frontal cortex or superior
colliculus-pulvinar-visual cortex system (Dick 1976; Butters, Soeldner,
and Fedio 1972; Critchley 1953; Pohl 1973; Semmes et al. 1963). The
interrelations among the hippocampus, frontal, parietal, and visual
cortex are unclear, but the exclusive emphasis upon the hippocampus
as the only region associated with memory representation of space
(i.e., cognitive mapping) might lead to a relatively simplified view of the
neural circuitry mediating the encoding of space. It would be helpful if
the authors had spelled out more precisely the contribution of these
other neural regions.
Second, there is the question whether the hippocampus encodes
only one attribute of a specific event, namely the spatial attribute. O &
N stress almost exclusively the involvement of the hippocampus with
the encoding of absolute space. In the chapter on human memory, they
do allude to the possibility that the hippocampus might also encode
time, but they don't elaborate on this further.
O & N maintain an overall interest in space primarily because of their
strong interest in the lesion and electrophysiological data, which was
collected within an S-R learning framework. Since this learning frame-
work has little concern for the constructs of memory and time, it is not
surprising that O & N do not discuss extensively the possibility that the
hippocampus also encodes time. As a consequence, the electrical
brain stimulation and human literature, which is based on an informa-
tion processing framework with a special emphasis upon time, does
not match well with the exclusive notion of hippocampus and space. I
have recently presented data in support of the hypothesis that the
hippocampus encodes attributes associated with both time and space
(Kesner 1980).
Extending O & N's theory to include the encoding in memory of both
time and space should lead to a more integrated theory of hippocam-
pal function.
by John W. Moore
Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass. 01003
The hippocampus and informational salience
My predisposition toward The hippocampus as a cognitive map was
decidedly negative. Earlier publications by the authors contained
statements that seemed simply outrageous (e.g., the hippocampus is
not involved in processing temporal information; Black, Nadel, &
O'Keefe 1977), or that suggested self-serving blind spots toward
contrary evidence (see Solomon 1980). In addition, the crucial distinc-
tions between cues and places were hard to understand or accept, a
fault corrected with the publication of Black et al. (1977). Moreover, I
had been trained to distrust the notion of cognitive maps. Rereading
Tolman did not erase this distrust but instead reinforced my belief that,
while such notions may have had heuristic value at one time in the
history of psychology, they were no longer to be taken seriously. In this
I was quite wrong, of course, as cognitive psychologists and others
have devoted a good deal of thought and effort in recent years to
precisely this class of problems, i.e., how spatial information is
represented mentally.
O & N have not undertaken a flippant attack on comfortable modes
of thinking but rather, it seems to me, a commendable effort to bridge
the gulf between present-day cognitive and physiological psycholo-
gies. Furthermore, the book corrects the extravagances of earlier
treatments of the theory by being not only thorough and scholarly, but
temperate and generally plausible as well. By way of specifics, while I
found the last two chapters, dealing with extensions of the theory to
human language and amnesia, unconvincing (although I applaud the
attempt), the lesion literature from a variety of animal paradigms is
treated fairly and intelligently. Unavoidably, some relevant recent works
could not be included. I doubt if the electrophysiological evidence will
fail to hold up, as others have already noted the existence of place and
misplace units, for example.
The heart of cognitive map theory is a brilliant stroke. It is the
assumption that the taxon system is more subject to interference than
is the locale system. This argument neatly reconciles the theory with
the literature that suggests that hippocampally damaged animals are
more interference-prone than normals. Hippocampally damaged
animals are simply unable to employ the more efficient and less
interference-prone locale system available to normals. Those who
would challenge the theory should direct their attack here, because it is
here that the theory will stand or fall.
Nevertheless, I remain dubious of any theory of brain and behavior
that places so much reliance on cognitive psychology. By cognitive
psychology I mean the notion that behavior is "under the control" of
mental entities such as images, hypotheses, memories, or cognitive
maps. Behaviorism assumes that internal and external stimuli control
behavior. Cognitive theories assume that stimuli evoke mental repre-
sentations. These, in turn, control behavior. If behavior is caused by
mental representations and not by observable events, the structure of
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the mind tends to become the object of analysis. Is this appropriate or
desirable?
The Zeitgeist sides with the authors - the mind is back and
physiological psychologists and behaviorists are advised to adjust
accordingly. My adjustments have been to gravitate toward theoretical
models that portray mental entities within a system of mathematical
statements linking behavior to stimuli. Such models may be wrong, but
they are less likely to be misunderstood or misrepresented than purely
verbal statements such as a cognitive map theory. At a recent
workshop on the role of the hippocampus in learning and memory
convened at Williams College this past summer,1 I presented the
outlines of a model based on the assumption that the hippocampus is
responsible for reducing the salience of elements in an attentional-
associative network consisting not only of points in space, but cues
and responses as well. By reducing the salience of these elements
under precisely specified circumstances, the hippocampus partici-
pates in the ongoing development of cognitive maps that contain not
only information about where things are located, but also about what
follows what.
While alternative interpretations of hippocampal function proceed
down the pipeline, The hippocampus as a cognitive map should
maintain its influence in the field for many years to come. Too much
original data, thinking, and toil went into it for it to be dismissed lightly.
In addition, it has already provoked enough thought and research so
as to ensure its place as a milestone.
Note
I. Workshop on the Role of the Hippocampus in Learning and Memory,
Williams College, Williamstown, Mass., June 25-26, 1979, J. W. Moore and
P. R. Solomon, organizers. The authors of The hippocampus as a cognitive map
participated in this workshop.
by Arthur J. Nonneman
Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky. 40506
Time: a fourth dimension for the hippocampal
cognitive map
Somewhat more than a year ago I first saw an advertisement from
Oxford University Press announcing a forthcoming volume by John
O'Keefe and Lynn Nadel which promised to propose, once again, that
the mammalian hippocampus serves as the essential physiological
substrate for cognitive-mapping functions. My initial reaction to the ad
was much the same as that of one of my graduate students, who, upon
seeing this volume on my desk, remarked, "They certainly have gotten
a lot of mileage out of that idea." Indeed they have. But their current
treatment of the topic, in the form of this book, is far more complete,
more thoughtful, and more persuasive than any of their previous
presentations, it is just possible that they are essentially correct. In any
event, as a result of having read this book, I have been persuaded to
rethink my own notions about hippocampal function. Until now, my
thinking on' the subject has been lodged somewhere between the
"Palisades of Persistence" and the "Channel of Attention," as the
authors characterize the perseveration and attention hypotheses
respectively (p. vii).
As in most attempts to substantiate new theoretical formulations, the
authors are guilty of some excess. For example, their claim in the
accompanying precis for "the success of the major prediction of the
theory that all [italics mine] of these [hippocampal lesion] data can be
interpreted as a loss of place learning and exploratory behavior" is
clearly an overstatement. The theory, in its present form, cannot easily
handle all of the extant data. The authors themselves, in the preface
(p. ix), plead guilty of a deliberate "chiaroscuro painting of the data"
as a necessary first step in developing the theory.
One area in which the authors admit that the supporting data are thin
is the human clinical realm. The changes in emphasis in this section
(i.e., event-specific memory) and the stretching of the cognitive-map
concept to include "semantic maps" in the left hippocampus are likely
to elicit from some readers charges of special pleading. In fact, when
one of the authors presented a preliminary attempt to explain the
human amnestic syndrome on the basis of cognitive-map theory
(Nadel 1977), a member of the audience commented on the "incredi-
ble chutzpah" of the presentor. But it is exactly this extension
(refinement?) of cognitive-map theory that offers the possibility that a
unitary explanation of hippocampal function may be possible after all.
At the same time, it points up the most serious weakness of the current
theory and provides direction for further development and refinement.
In terms of refinement, it is imperative that the characteristics of a
semantic map be specified in the same explicit manner as spatial maps
were characterized in the early chapters of this book. Merely talking
about semantic maps and implying that they are basically the same as
spatial maps except for the nature of their inputs is not sufficient. In
addition, although the book suggests at several points that the
hippocampus provides the essential substrate for storage of informa-
tion in a spatiotemporal context, the temporal aspect of the locale
system receives little attention except in the treatment of event-specific
human memory. I see this as a general problem with the current
formulation that is not restricted to the particular issue of human clinical
effects. For example, in a recent BBS target article, Olton, Becker and
Handelmann (1979) present data which clearly indicate the importance
of a temporal factor in the functioning of rat hippocampus. This
temporal factor has little or no relation to the temporal changes
involved in intertrial or interstimulus interval manipulations. As O & N
suggest, any effects of manipulating these aspects of time can be
readily dealt with on the basis of taxon systems. Rather, the critical
temporal factor, as I conceptualize it, provides a fourth dimension to
the Euclidean cognitive map around which this book is built. It provides
for the coding of discrete events in both time and Euclidean space.
Thus, ! would take exception to the authors' suggestion that different
cues encountered on different occasions in the same part of the
environment will necessarily make the place representation richer but
not stronger. According to my view, such cues encountered on
separate occasions could be entered into different "places" in a
cognitive map with four dimensions.
In concluding, I acknowledge the fact that O & N have been thinking
about this problem for a considerably longer time and at considerably
more depth than I have. Therefore, there may be a serious logical flaw
in the suggestion I have just made. If so, I am afraid there is a serious
problem in expanding the cognitive-map theory to account for hippo-
campal function in a unitary fashion. Also, if there is a basic flaw in my
logic, then I have to admit that I really do not understand what the
authors mean when they refer to the "spatial-temporal context" of
context-specific event memories. On the other hand, if my view has
merit, then perhaps the next edition of this book will begin with a
chapter retitled, "Remembrance of events past: a history of theories of
time and space."
by Bawid S. Olton
Department of Psychology, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 21218
Inner and outer space: the neuroanatomical bases of
spatialif organized behaviors
Space has been a lot like the weather; many have talked about it, but
few have done anything about it. This state of affairs is rapidly
changing, and the book by O & N should make a major contribution to
the development of our thinking about the organization of spatial
behaviors and their underlying neuroanatomical systems.
The usefulness of the cognitive mapping theory of hippocampal
function depends on the ability to take the conceptual distinctions
(route or map, taxon system or locale system) and apply them to
particular experimental procedures. I have difficulty doing this in some
instances. For example, consider the following experimental proce-
dure, one which has commonly been used with rats in mazes. The
apparatus is a maze, as illustrated in Figure 1. The four arms are
labelled north, east, south, and west, respectively. In the initial training
procedure, illustrated by the top diagram of Figure 1, a rat is placed in
the south arm and given a choice between the east arm and the west
arm (the north arm is closed). Food is provided at the end of the east
arm. The rat learns to turn right at the choice point and enter the east
arm. After it consistently makes this response on every trial, it is given a
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Figure 1 (Olton). An illustration of the initial discrimination (top diagram)
and subsequent transfer tests (middle and bottom diagrams)
discussed in the text.
"place-response" transfer test (Olton 1979, Restle 1957), illustrated
by the middle diagram of Figure 1. The maze remains in the same
location in the room but the rat is placed in the north arm to begin a
trial; it is again given a choice between the east and west arms (the
south arm being closed). If on this transfer test it turns right at the
choice point and goes to the west arm, it is said to have used a
"response strategy" to learn the original discrimination because in the
transfer test it makes thesame response (turn right) as in the first but
goes to a different place (west arm). If in the transfer test the rat turns
left at the choice point and goes to the east arm, it is said to have used
a "place strategy" to learn the original discrimination because in the
transfer test it goes to the same place (east arm) as in the first but
makes a different response (turn left) at the choice point.
Presumably a response strategy is an example of the route/taxon
system. But is a place strategy an example of the map/locale system?
In particular, I'd like to distinguish between a "direction strategy" and a
"location strategy," both of which might appear as a place strategy in
the place-response transfer test just described. The difference
between a direction strategy and a location strategy is similar to that
between a line and a point. A direction strategy specifies only the
direction of movement (i.e., towards the window on the east wall, away
from the Sight bulb on the west wall, etc.), while a location strategy
specifies a particular point in the room (i.e., 2 meters from the window
on the east wall, 1 meter from the stool behind the start arm, etc.). The
relative importance of these two strategies can be evaluated in another
transfer test, illustrated by the bottom diagram of Figure 1. Here the
maze has been moved to the right so that the west arm ends at the
same place in the room (point Y) where the east arm ended during
initial training. If the rat learned the original discrimination using a
direction strategy, then in the transfer test it should turn in the same
direction (towards the east wall) at the choice point and go to a
different location in the room (point Z). If the rat learned the original
discrimination using a location strategy, then in the transfer test it
should go to the same location in the room (point Y) and turn in a
different direction (towards the west wall) at the choice point. These
results should be found when the rat is started from the north arm and
from the south arm, eliminating the use of a response strategy.
As I understand the O & N theory, a location strategy requires the
map/locale system. But does the direction strategy? Let's assume that
the answer is "no," and that the direction strategy is an example of
orientation, which is a function of the route/taxon system. If this is the
case, then a rat might exhibit a place strategy on a place-response
transfer test using either the route/taxon system (direction strategy) or
the map/locale system (location strategy). To my knowledge, virtually
all maze procedures that can be solved by a location strategy can also
be solved by a direction strategy; only one published experiment has
used the appropriate transfer tests to distinguish between these two
alternatives (Blodgett, McCutchan, and Mathews 1949). If such is the
case, then the data are not available to determine for any given task
whether the animals used the route/taxon system or the map/locale
system, and there is no basis for predicting the way in which the
hippocampus participates in these test procedures. Alternatively, of
course, the answer to the question raised at the beginning of this
paragraph might be "yes," that the direction strategy is an example of
the map/locale system. In that case, how does one distinguish
between the use of a direction strategy as I have defined it and of an
orientation strategy as O & N use the term?
Many other people are certain to be interested in understanding the
practical applications of the cognitive map theory and the ways in
which experiments can be designed to test its validity. O & N can help a
great deal by taking a number of laboratory tasks, indicating whether
they require the route/taxon system or the map/locale system, and
the criteria that were used to make this distinction.
I also have a few questions about specific aspects of the theory. Do
the authors consider the route/taxon system and the map/locale
system to be mutually exclusive, all-or-none systems, or do these
systems represent the endpoints of a continuum? If the former is the
case, then at any given time the animal (and his brain) is using either
one system or the other but not both, and experimental procedures are
placed into one of two categories. If the latter is the case, then an
animal might be using some aspects of the route/taxon system
simultaneously with some aspects of the map/locale system, tasks
should vary in the extent to which they engage the two systems, and
experimental procedures are arranged along two dimensions.
Why is the route/taxon system considered so different from the
map/locale system? Some of the distinctions are not intuitively
obvious. For example, some people (Nadel, 1979b; Suzuki, Augerinos,
and Black, in press) have suggested that the radial arm maze task
(Olton and Samuelson 1976) is an example of a map/locale system.
But there is substantial interference found during performance of that
task (see review in Olton 1978; Olton, Becker, and Handelmann 1979),
an outcome which according to O & N is characteristic of the
route/taxon system, not the map/locale system. What were the
criteria the authors used to determine what properties should be given
to the route/taxon system and to the map/locale system?-*
I understand why the theory predicts that hippocampal lesions
should interfere with performance in tasks that require the map/locale
system. Yet O & N suggest that lesions will interfere with performance
in tasks that require the route/taxon system, which presumably is not a
hippocampal function. Does the hippocampus then have two functions,
one in route/taxon tasks and a second in map/locale tasks? Further-
more, how is a comparison of the performance of animals with
hippocampal lesions in route/taxon tasks and in map/locale tasks
relevant to the predictions of the theory?
The authors are aware that hippocampal lesions come in many
different forms, sizes, and locations, and that both the magnitude and
the duration of the behavioral changes observed following these
lesions vary considerably. Do they have any comments about the
relevance of these variables to the predictions of their theory?
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by Stewen Pinker
Center for Cognitive Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Mass. 02139
Mental mapss mental images^ and intuitions about
space
When the subject of cognitive maps is brought up, talk of mental
images seldom follows far behind. Many people use the terms as
synonyms, and O & N at times seem to identify one with the other (e.g.,
pp. 385, 419), at other times keep them distinct (pp. 30, 390). Our
knowledge about the properties of images has been increasing at a
rapid rate (see Kosslyn et al. 1979: this issue of BBS; and Shepard
1978, for recent reviews), and it is now possible to relate the imagery
system to the various cognitive mapping systems in a fairly precise
way. I argue here that (1) visual images are distinct from O & N's
cognitive maps and in fact cut across their locale/taxon (map/non-
map) distinction; (2) the imagery system interfaces with other repre-
sentations that are more closely tied to the maps that O & N describe;
and (3) identifying mental representations of space with visual images
may have engendered the traditional philosophical views about spatial
representations that O & N eschew.
Visual images are indeed "maplike" in that they preserve interval
information about all interpoint distances in the imagined scene (see
Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser 1978, and Pinker & Kosslyn, in press, for
evidence to this effect, superseding that cited by O & N). People can
not only scan mentally along the shortest straight path linking an
arbitrary pair of imagined objects, but when an object is mentally
"moved" to a new location, people can scan directly to and from that
new location (Pinker & Kosslyn 1978; see also Pinker 1979). These
facts are consistent with "picture theories" of imagery (e.g., Kosslyn et
al. 1979: this issue of BBS) in which images are treated as "filled-in"
regions of an internal spatial array. As such, these findings take
imagery out of the domain of the "taxon" system, which is character-
ized by inflexible routes linking locations and by an absence of a spatial
medium in which location information can be represented.
Nonetheless, images are not true maps in O & N's sense either,
since they seem to correspond to a glimpse of a scene from a
particular vantage point. Pinker and Finke (in press) review evidence
suggesting that images preserve viewer-specific perspective effects
such as changes of projective size with distance, changes of projective
shape with orientation, alignment and concealment relations of objects
at different distances, and so on. Thus images occur in egocentric and
not in absolute or unitary spatial frameworks, and do not qualify as
maps in O & N's locale system. When we consider as well the evidence
that images occur in the primary or secondary visual cortex (Hebb
1968; Finke & Kosslyn, in press; Finke & Schmidt 1977), we are forced
to conclude that visual imagery constitutes a representational system
that is distinct from O & N's hippocampal mapping system.
Still, we seem to have no trouble forming images that correspond to
the layout of some portion of the world as we know it. How, then, might
the imagery system tie in with the mapping system? Kosslyn et al.
(1979: this issue of BBS) have proposed that images are constructed
from information stored in long-term memory in a more abstract format
(specifically, as lists of coordinates of points to be "filled in" in the
spatial array), a theory that is consonant with some of O & N's
suggestions. Pinker and Kosslyn (in press) and Pinker (1979) also
argue that this "deep" level of image representation preserves the
intrinsic, three-dimensional (3D), perspective-independent shape of an
object, and is involved in 3D mental transformations of objects (see
Shepard & Metzler 1971; Pinker & Finke, in press; Pinker & Kosslyn
1978, in press) and in the recognition of 3D shapes (see Marr &
Nishihara 1978). Since, as O & N argue, object recognition is intimately
wedded to the use of cognitive maps, it does not seem implausible that
this "deep" or "intrinsic 3D shape" level of representation is also what
feeds into the hippocampal mapping system. This would give us at
least three types of internal representations of space: (1) O & N's
putative hippocampal mapping system: an abstract spatial framework
whose locations may contain labels indexing the objects that occupy
the corresponding locations in the world; (2) an "intrinsic 3D shape"
level of representation, storing the information necessary to recognize
objects by their 3D shape; and (3) the visual imagery system (or more
precisely, the "surface array" used to display images; see Kosslyn et
al. 1979: this issue of BBS), depicting the visual perspective appear-
ance of an object or scene from a given vantage point.
A final observation: O & N note that many brilliant thinkers have
insisted that the mental representation of space is relative and /or
piecemeal. When I read the quotations to this effect that O & N cite in
their historical introduction, I was struck by how apt they were as
descriptions of visual images, especially in light of the research I cited
characterizing images as perspective views of scenes. Thus we have
Spencer writing that "every conception of space which can be formed
by a single mental act is limited to such portion of space as we can
have experience of at one time," and James noting that "most of us
are obliged to turn around and drop the thought of space in front of us
when we think of that behind"; Poincare seems to make a related
observation. Given that creative and talented people are notorious for
their claims of experiencing or "thinking in" visual imagery (McKellar
1965, Shepard 1978), it seems plausible that these writers were
describing their visual images but drawing conclusions about the entire
human ability to represent space mentally. O & N wisely reject these
conclusions, for as they have shown most effectively, the mental
representation of space is a many-splendored thing.
by James B. Rancks Jr.
Department of Physiology, Downstate Medical Center, Brooklyn, N. Y. 11203
On O'Keefe, Nadel, space and brain
I read an early version of the manuscript of The hippocampus as a
cognitive map in 1972. I read an almost final version in June 1977. The
following is a letter I sent to O'Keefe and Nadel then.
Dear John/Lynn:
I have just finished reading your book, and it has been a thrilling
experience. The book is a major and excellent work in many
respects. The two basic ideas-the existence of spatial maps, and
their manifestations in the hippocampus-are of tremendous impor-
tance. While the spatial map idea is not new, your extensive
development of it makes it yours. The idea that they are in the
hippocampus is brilliant. Others-Greene, Mahut, Olton-had
suggested spatial functions for the hippocampus, your version of it is
distinctive and the degree to which you develop it is untouched. All
ideas have antecedents, but you have made a major stride beyond
anything before.
I am not about to say that your ideas are true, but I suspect "the
truth" is probably something very much like that. What you say is
probably closer to the way it is than anything else, and it gives us a
powerful conceptual entry with which to work.
The scholarship is overwhelming. I have taken particular care with
the anatomy, physiology, and single unit data (chapters 3 and 4) with
which I am in a position to judge the scholarship and it is almost
always an excellent presentation accurately stated. . . .
The scope of the book is remarkable. No one else would even
think of trying to cover all the ground you do. Few people will be able
to find the whole thing comprehensible, for few have that much
scope, and you do not try to write any section for the reader naive in
any part. I think, however, you do a good job of making it compre-
hensible to someone who just knows a little about any part. I felt I
understood everything you said. I doubt if there is anyone who can
read the whole thing critically.
Some of the parts I liked best were discussions of approaches,
especially that for lesions. The book is just filled with wise little
comments. . . . The book by Hutt and Hutt (1970) says many of the
same things you say. It is one of my favorite books.
It has been personally exciting for me to see the ideas, the data
and the book develop - and to understand it better myself. I am
proud to have contributed some of the data. . . .
I am obviously much more enthusiastic about the book now than I
was about the 1972 one (which I liked very much). I think this is
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because the book is now much better, the data is stronger - and I
have grown wiser.
My own thinking is expressed in the grant proposal I sent each of
you. Much of it takes off from or revolves around your thinking. It is
your style to be much more speculative than I feel comfortable with.
However, I am impressed that almost all your speculation is testable.
Even when it gets pretty wild - as in the cellular model - it is testable
and not just a flight of fancy.
One of the greatest contributions of your book may be to show
that cognitive concepts can be handled concretely in organic terms
and in terms of cellular mechanisms.
. . . I think Pat Wall deserves tremendous credit for sticking by
you while you worked out your unorthodox ideas in unorthodox
ways. I am sending him a copy of this letter as a statement of thanks
and appreciation that he stuck by you. . . .
After being as complimentary as this, I feel I can criticize as fussily
and vigorously as I like.
As I have argued elsewhere, one cannot properly argue that
because one finds a particular behavioral correlate of a cell, the
function of that cell is to produce that behavior. The receptive field of a
neuron in the lateral geniculate is, roughly, a spot of light or an annulus
of light, but the function of the lateral geniculate is not to respond to or
to sense spots or annuli of light. The "function" of a part of brain is the
transformation which occurs in it, that is, the changes in behavioral
correlates between inputs and outputs. The data on firing of single
neurons and place in neurons of Ammon's horn gives us a hunch that
space has something to do with the function of the hippocampus
(indeed, this finding was what got O & N thinking of spatial maps in the
first place), but is not evidence for spatial maps. We must know the
behavioral correlates of entorhinal cortex and dentate before we can
start to argue the function of the hippocampus from single cell data.
The work of Berger and Thompson (1978a), Deadwyler et al. (1979)
and Segal (1973) seems to indicate that under some circumstances
hippocampal cells fire under conditions which are not clearly spatial;
however, these workers should try to look for spatial features.
It is remarkable that the firing of hippocampal neurons has been
reported to be related to so many different things. This may be
because the neurons really do change the relationship of their firing to
behavior (i.e., "learning" occurs), or it may be because the real
relation of the firing of the cell to behavior is something more
fundamental than anything that has been described yet, and we are
only looking at a particular manifestation of it in each case.
by Larry R. Squire
Veterans Administration Hospital, San Diego, California, 92161, and the Depart-
ment of Psychiatry, University of California School of Medicine, La Jolla, Calif.
92093
The hippocampus^ space3 and hyroan amnesia
This comprehensive book develops the argument that the hippocam-
pus stores information about the spatial environment. Although it was
derived originally from lesion and unit recording studies in rats, the
argument has been developed in considerable detail so that it might
extend as well to human brain function. The book contains excellent
reviews of hippocampal anatomy and physiology and a complete,
best-ever presentation of the voluminous animal lesion literature. This
note focuses on the spatial hypothesis itself, and considers how well it
fits the known facts of human hippocampal function.
Information about hippocampal function in man comes primarily from
the study of patients who have sustained bilateral or unilateral resec-
tions of the medial temporal lobe, including hippocampus (Corsi 1972,
Milner 1972). In addition, transient temporal lobe dysfunction seems to
result from ECT, electro-convulsive therapy (Inglis 1970, Squire &
Slater 1978a), so that the neuropsychoiogical effects of ECT may also
provide useful information about hippocampal function. Patients with
diencephalic damage (e.g., patients with Korsakoff syndrome [Talland
1965] and case N.A. [Squire & Moore 1979]) are often included in
discussions of hippocampal function because their neuropsychoiogical
findings resemble in some respects the findings following medial
temporal damage and ECT. Nevertheless, the relevance of these
patients to problems of hippocampal function must be regarded as
tenuous, and they will be considered here only for purposes of
comparison.
The hippocampus as the substrate of specifically spatial
functions. The hypothesis supposes that the hippocampus is
concerned primarily with spatial information. Yet patients with unilateral
or bilateral hippocampal damage and patients receiving ECT consist-
ently exhibit amnesia. The amnesia is global in the case of bilateral
hippocampal damage and bilateral ECT, and material-specific (i.e.,
affecting primarily verbal or nonverbal material) in the case of
unilateral hippocampal damage or unilateral ECT. It seems doubtful
that this memory defect can be considered spatial in any interesting
way, since the defect includes memory loss for material that is not
spatial in the ordinary sense. Thus, patients with right temporal lobe
resections have material-specific defects in image-mediated verbal
learning (Jones-Gotman & Milner 1978) and facial recognition (Milner
1968b), and the severity of these defects correlates with the extent of
hippocampal removal. It is difficult to see what is spatial about visual
images or faces. In order to apply the spatial hypothesis to these
findings, one could perhaps make the concept of space more abstract
so that it somehow encompasses faces, image-mediated learning, and
the variety of things that amnesics cannot remember; but at this level of
abstraction, it would be difficult to distinguish a spatial hypothesis from
a memory hypothesis.
The fact that the well-studied, globally amnesic patient H.M. has a
defect in maze learning (Milner 1965) has been cited as support for the
spatial hypothesis. While it cannot be disputed that maze learning
requires spatial abilities, this defect is easier to understand as an
example of global amnesia. Thus amnesic patients do have difficulty
learning mazes, finding their way around, and reproducing floor plans
of their houses. But they also have difficulty remembering a variety of
other things, including temporal information, tactual impressions,
colors, sounds, and odors. The defect is not peculiarly spatial.
Whereas patients like H.M. and N.A. can perform normally on a
variety of perceptual and other cognitive tests, it could be argued that
they have a spatial impairment superimposed on amnesia. To identify
it, however, would require something different from asking patients to
learn mazes or reconstruct floor plans. That is, since amnesic patients
have difficulty retaining almost any kind of information across a delay,
most spatial tests would not permit a spatial defect to be distinguished
from a memory defect. Amnesic patients do, however, have normal
immediate memory (e.g., for digits and for block tapping sequences
[Corsi 1972]). A spatial defect might therefore be searched for by
administering a spatial task that could be performed entirely within the
span of immediate memory.
The hippocampus as a storage site of information. The
spatial hypothesis also proposes that information about the world is
stored in the hippocampus. For man, this notion has been elaborated
to the effect that the left hippocampus stores linguistic information
about the world, and the right hippocampus stores spatial-temporal
information. These ideas lead necessarily to the prediction that left or
right hippocampal removal in man should destroy some kinds of
information about events or places that have been learned previously.
In recent years this possibility has been tested using objective tests
of remote incidents, asking about famous events, faces, or former
television programs. Case H.M., who, became amnesic in 1953, was
profoundly impaired in his ability to name famous faces that came into
the news in the 1950s or 1960s, yet he scored as well as or better than
normal for faces that came into the news during the 1920s, 1930s, or
1940s (Marslen-Wilson &. Teuber 1975). Case N.A., who became
amnesic in 1960, was profoundly impaired in his ability to provide
details about famous events or former television programs that
occurred in the 1960s or 1970s, but scored as well as normal for the
1950s (Squire & Slater 1978b). Finally, the retrograde amnesia asso-
ciated with ECT is typically graded, such that events that occurred a
few years prior to ECT are forgotten, and events that occurred many
years prior to ECT are not affected (Squire, Slater & Chace 1975;
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Squire & Cohen 1979). Taken together, the evidence from three
different types of amnesic patients indicates that detectable loss from
the premorbid period does not occur, except for the few years just
prior to the onset of amnesia.
Even if one questions that the critical structure in human bitemporal
amnesia is the hippocampus itself (Mishkin 1978, Horel 1978), it is still
the case that damage to the hippocampus in man is not associated
with a detectable loss of information from the premorbid period; nor is
hippocampal damage associated with any known defects of a spatial
nature that are not associated with a detectable loss of information
nature that are not readily explained as a more general memory
problem.
The hippocampus and the formation of memory. Analysis of
bitemporal amnesia and the amnesia associated with ECT has led to
some specific ideas about the organization of memory processes and
about how the hippocampus might be involved in them (Wickelgren
1979, Squire 1980, Squire & Schlapfer 1980). First, the finding that
hippocampal damage produces a sharp discontinuity between premor-
bid and postmorbid memory (Marslen-Wilson & Teuber 1978)
suggests that the hippocampus is involved in new and recent memo-
ries, not old ones, and that memory storage occurs elsewhere in the
brain. Second, the finding that ECT produces a gradient of retrograde
amnesia selectively affecting memories formed in recent years (Squire,
Slater & Chace 1975, Squire & Cohen 1979) indicates that memory
gradually becomes resistant to disruption for a period of years after
learning. The change that occurs as time passes could provide a basis
for the formation of schemata and for the gradual reorganization of
memory (Bartlett 1932, Norman & Rumelhart 1975).
The fact that the retrograde amnesia is transient (Squire, Slater &
Chace 1975, Squire, Slater & Miller 1980) suggests that, while resis-
tance is developing, the hippocampus might be required for effective
retrieval of memory. By this view, as time passes after learning,
resistance develops, forgetting occurs, the structure of memory is
changed, and retrieval of information gradually comes no longer to
require the hippocampus. The hippocampus might provide input to
cortex necessary for restructuring to occur, or could protect memory
from interference that would ordinarily disrupt this process. It is also
possible, though perhaps less parsimonious, that information is stored
initially in the hippocampus and then gradually reconstituted elsewhere
in a form that is resistant to disruption.
The hypothesis that the hippocampus has spatial functions might be
made relevant to this fundamental idea that the hippocampus must
relate in an orderly way to other brain regions that store memory. Such
a relationship would presumably require spatial information about
where memories are located. Although the available data do not permit
us to be very specific about this relationship, they do suggest that the
hippocampus provides an organizing mechanism that allows memories
to become resistant to disruption, restructured, and thereby enduring.
This function of the hippocampus may also permit the effective retrieval
of memories while the gradual process of restructuring is under way.
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The anatomf of a cognitiwe map
Only someone with the wit and philosophical insights of Bertrand
Russell could provide an incisive critique of O & N's ambitious and
interesting attempt to resolve an important aspect of the mind-body
controversy. I certainly cannot, though I think it unfortunate to conclude
sweepingly that the hippocampus constitutes a built-in neural memory
system providing an objective spatial framework (Euclidean in nature)
within which the items and events of an organism's experience are
located and interrelated, without considering the development of
Descartes's ideas before launching into Newton and Kant. But this is
quibbling. The main issue raised by the book is whether philosophy and
neurobiology can be successfully integrated, and I am not convinced
that they can be. As the chapters on the anatomy and physiology of
the hippocampus make clear, it is not even possible at this time to
explain place units in terms of known anatomical circuitry. While it may
be true that different units in Ammon's horn preferentially fire when a
rat is in a specific part of its environment, there is no evidence that the
units are wired together in a way that provides a topographically
ordered map in the usual sense of the word.
The authors present a structural model of the "cognitive map" that
is based on what was known about the anatomical and physiological
properties of the hippocampus in 1976. It is obvious, however, that our
current understanding of the anatomical organization of the hippocam-
pus contributes virtually nothing to an understanding of the structural
and functional architecture of a cognitive map. In the final analysis,
however, this has little bearing on the hypotheses advanced by O&N,
which are primarily physiological in nature, and may or may not provide
an adequate framework in which to interpret the effects of hippocam-
pal lesions. Nevertheless, since they provide an anatomical model for
the cognitive map, the major conclusions of their synthesis of the
literature deserve comment.
First, it is clear that for a cognitive map to function properly, specific
information from each sensory system must reach the hippocampus.
The authors point out that pathways from each primary sensory
cortical field reach the hippocampus in the monkey. However, they fail
to note that: (1) sensory information that eventually reaches the
hippocampus appears to be "polysensory" in nature, since the path-
ways converge on single cells in association cortical regions first; and
(2) despite several attempts, similar pathways have not been demon-
strated in rodents. In fact, the major connections of the hippocampus
in the rat are with the cingulate gyms, the anterior thalamic nuclei, and
the hypothalamus, which are most commonly associated with homeo-
static functions.
Second, the authors view hippocampal circuitry in terms of a series
of narrow lamellae, stacked together like a roll of coins, along its
longitudinal axis. This is certainly true for the mossy fiber projection of
the dentate gyrus upon Ammon's horn, but it is now clear that other
intrinsic connections provide for rather widespread divergence. This is
particularly true for the bilateral projection from field CA4 to the dentate
gyrus, but is also evident in the projection from field CA3 to CA1f and in
the perforant path from the entorhinal region to the dentate gyrus and
Ammon's horn. The anatomical evidence now suggests that while the
hippocampus has a broadly lamellar organization, its subdivisions are
richly interconnected along the longitudinal axis by both associational
and commissural connections.
And third, the authors assume that the pyramidal cells in a given field
constitute a "large matrix of logically similar cells." Recent evidence
based on the use of retrograde transport methods makes this seem
unlikely since, for example, only a fraction of the cells in field CA3
project to the septum, or to the hippocampus on the other side.
Despite such caveats, this unique book is sure to stimulate interest
in the most enigmatic part of the brain as its insights are digested in the
years to come. It contains a thorough and insightful review of the
literature, and presents clearly a hypothesis which is sure to stimulate a
great deal of fruitful research.
by Garth X Thomas
Center for Brain Research, University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y. 14642
Cognition, memory, and the hippocampus
On first reading the O&N book I found it interesting and provocative. It
represents a substantial forward step toward realizing that the behav-
ior of organisms is not directly caused by stimuli (environmental
energies that fire receptor cells). The S-R approach has been around a
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long time. It made a major contribution-to exorcise mentalistic anim-
isms from our understanding of brain-behavior relations-but its view of
neural function as related to behavior was inadequate. An opposing
view, now of importance in behavioral neurobiology, regards the
causes of behavior as hypothetical (at the moment) constructions that
are "built" by the brain from information derived from multiple-inputs
and which are integrated over time by memorylike capacities that
cover a range of milliseconds to years. The point of view is old,
especially in the more rationalistic and mentalistic psychologies: the
organism responds, not in terms of stimuli but in terms of "cognitions"
(perceptions and knowledge about the environment). The book by
O&N represents an ambitious effort to spell out in neural terms what in
mentalistic psychology is called cognition.
Incidentally, one can appeal to the concept of a cognition without
positing an animistic "ghost in the machine"—to use Koestler's
phrase. O&N propose no such "explanation" of organisms' capacity
for responding in terms of spatial properties of the environment.
Ordinarily a "cognition" is postulated when the organism is first
exposed to relevant stimuli (information-gathering phase), and then the
cognition is called on to account for the transfer of ways and means,
short-cuts, and detours that the organism is able to display when
allowed to perform in a situation where it can use the information
acquired in the earlier phase (the "latent-learning" paradigm). For
example, fvienze! (1978) observed that the chimp who was carried
around and allowed to watch where the experimenter hid bits of food
was able to find those bits of food later with a higher frequency than
the uniformed chimps. Furthermore, the informed chimp went about its
search in an efficient way that did not involve backtracking the specific
route over which it had been carried during the acquisition phase. O&N
would say that its brain had a "cognitive map" of the environment, built
up during "exploratory" exposure (the acquisition phase, in this case),
and furthermore, that the ability to construct such a map depended on
the hippocampus.
At this stage of "the story," this reader began to balk. In the first
place, many of the invertebrates, lower vertebrates, and birds often
have a remarkable behavioral capacity to find their way around their
spatial environments. To postulate from their behavior that they have a
"cognitive map" might be very fruitful at the behavioral level. Yet they
have no unequivocal hippocampal formation in their central nervous
systems (alleged homologies-maybe!)
A second mildly negative reaction arose from the introduction
dealing with the spatial concepts of philosophers and scientists of long
ago. Establishing continuity with past thinkers who were working with
inadequate information might be the scholarly thing to do, but, it seems
to me, for the authors to imply that rats are little Kantians with a
"category" of absolute space helps us little in understanding brain and
behavior.
A more useful line of introductory speculation, which could be
bolstered with some empirical fact, would, I submit, focus on the
general biological problem that all locomotive animals had to "solve"
the problem of guidance (more or less efficiently) as they moved
around their environments, accumulating calories and doing other
things necessary for them to pass through the "natural-selection filter"
so as to contribute their unique samples of genes back to the gene
pool.
One requirement is that the "information processor" (brain) must
function quickly. An organism, to survive, does not have time to build a
cognitive map by the slow accumulation of S-R associations by trial
and error (Hull's "habit-family hierarchy"). To cope adequately, its
cognitive map must, in a sense, comprise a spatial constancy (like the
perceptual constancies) that can be constructed from multiple inputs
during a brief "acquisition phase." For example, the cognitive map
must represent the two billiard balls (mentioned by O&N) as constant in
space. When viewed first from the "north," the blue one is right of the
white one. When viewed later from the "south," the blue one is left of
the white one. Obviously, use of only egocentric cues will not achieve
constancy. (I would say "intraorganismic" because I don't think rats
have egos.) The cognitive map must be built by taking into account not
only information about present and recent locations of the observer,
but also other spatial information available to sense organs such as the
table and the spatial frame of the room.
In general, as with the perceptual constancies, the spatial constancy
must be achieved quickly, even though it is sometimes crude. Orga-
nisms (including people) do get lost. Spatial behavior improves as
familiarity with a given environment increases.
A third criticism that can be raised against the notion that the
hippocampus is the substrate for cognitive maps comes mostly from
work with contingently reinforced alternation. I would argue that the
ability of organisms to alternate successfully depends on a very simple
cognitive map (the location of only two significant places in the
environment needs specification), and it depends crucially upon a
time-binding (memory) characteristic of brain (the organism must
"remember" where it was fed last!). Many years ago Jacobson and
Nissen (1937) reported that the frontal lobes of primates were
necessary for delayed alternation. Subsequent research has narrowed
down the critical brain structure to the projection field of the mediodor-
sal thalamsc nucleus (the "banks and depths of the sulcus principalis").
Similar observations have been made in rats (Wikmark, Divac, & Weiss
1973; Thomas & Brito, in preparation). My own research also indicates
that the whole hippocampal formation is not involved (Thomas 1978).
Lesions transecting the postcommissural fornix are without effect on
spatial delayed alternation, but lesions in posterodorsal septum (pre-
commissural fornix?) have a devastating effect on alternation behav-
ior.
Clearly, more than (and not all of ) the hippocampus is involved in
constructing a spatial cognitive map. Part of the hippocampal forma-
tion may well be a necessary brain substrate, but I don't think there is
yet enough data to say that it is sufficient.
Similar arguments can be directed against the "map interpretation"
of the unit-recording studies that O&N find crucial. Important circuits for
spatial behavior (and, by inference, the map) are located partially in the
hippocampus, so it is to be expected that place-specific units will be
located there. However, if other parts of the brain are significant in
mediating spatial cognitive maps, then it seems likely that one would
find place-specific units in those parts of the brain also.
Another weakness that I see in the theory concerns how to account
for the plasticity that apparently characterizes the cognitive map.
Research in my laboratory has repeatedly found a rather marked
recovery of function after critical brain lesions. The recovered function
is fragile and more easily disrupted than in normal rats by increasing
the difficulty of the problem (lengthening the intertrial intervals), or by
injecting irrelevant information into the hypothetical cognitive-map
circuits (intertrial rotation; Thomas 1978). The apparent recovery also
occurs in rats after lesions in medial frontal cortex, but the recovery is
perhaps slower. Normal animals can "recover" from the random
choices produced by sudden increases in intertrial intervals from about
5 sec. to 90 sec, but rats with posterodorsal septal lesions cannot
recover when faced with the same kind of jump in intertrial interval from
5 to 90 sec. (Thomas & Brito, in preparation). It is my belief that the
construction of a cognitive map by the brain does indeed involve the
hippocampal formation, but the phenomenon of the "recovery of
function" strongly suggests crucial involvement of other brain struc-
tures.
A substantial part of the book by O&N concerns a detailed and
critical survey of much of the hippocampus-behavior literature, which
the authors reinterpret in terms of their own hippocampus-cognitive
map hypothesis. One can only agree with their frequent statement:
Most of the cited data are not critical. Earlier experiments were often
aimed at other hypotheses, and O&N's post hoc interpretations are, at
best, speculative or suggestive.
A weakness of the theory presented in the book stems from its
treatment of the time-binding (memory) capability of the brain required
for an organism to build a spatial cognitive map (or any "cognition," for
that matter). The problem does not go unremarked by O&N, but it
perhaps needs more emphasis. The time-binding characteristic of
brain function in its integration of the information necessary to build a
cognition is still vaguely understood in neuroscience. We tend to
postulate an animistic factor (a memory) suggested by an introspective
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view of the "human condition." The time-binding characteristic would
seem to be a critical consideration in the brain-construction of all
cognitions, and it needs more attention.
O&N's extension of their theory of hippocampal function as a
cognitive map to the human condition to explain the amnestic symp-
toms seen after hippocampal damage strikes me as very speculative.
However, in my case at least, any attempted rebuttal or comment
would be equally speculative, and thus not a very nutritious object of
attention, to paraphrase William James.
To sum up cryptically, the book is interesting, scholarly, and
provocative. Many experiments are suggested (probably the primary
benefit from hypotheses) but the particular theory advanced in it seems
premature to me.
by Richard F. Thompson, Paul R. Solomon1 and Donald J.
WeSsz
Department of Psychobiology, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, Calif. 92717
"Model systems" wersus "neyroethological" approach
to hippocampal function
O&N's book is an extensive, scholarly effort and an important contribu-
tion to the study of hippocampal function in behavior. We were
particularly impressed with their detailed and current review of the
anatomical literature. Their theoretical position - that the hippocampus
functions as a "spatial-cognitive" map of the organism's environ-
ment - is creative and provides a very good model against which to
compare other general theories of hippocampal function.
In their book, O&N emphasize a "spatial map" function for the
hippocampus as opposed to a "cognitive map" function. The more
general notion that the hippocampus is involved in the more complex or
cognitive aspects of information processing, which was independently
suggested by O'Keefe and Nadel (1974) and by Hirsh (1974), seems
to us to be of considerable value. The much more restricted spatial
map hypothesis does, however, have the advantage of being directly
testable. We have recently done so in an electrophysiological study
where we were able to train hippocampal units in a temporal single-
alternation paradigm (rabbit nictitating membrane [NMJ conditioning)
under conditions where there are no conceivable differential spatial-
contextual cues (Hoehler & Thompson 1980), a result contradictory to
O&N's more restricted spatial map hypothesis.
A related problem involves the apparent dichotomy O&N establish
between spatial and temporal information processing in the hippocam-
pus. According to their theory, the hippocampus is involved in the
coding of spatial but not temporal relationships (see O'Keefe & Nadel
1978, p. 95). Although this point appears to be crucial to their theory, it
also poses difficulties. Thus, it assumes that time and space are
independent dimensions of the learning situation. As Moore (1980) has
pointed out, there is likely to be a temporal component to all "spatial"
tasks. Perhaps more to the point is the evidence, stemming from work
in the rabbit NM classical conditioning preparation, which indicates that
the hippocampus is involved in the processing of temporal information.
As indicated elsewhere (Solomon 1980), learning in this preparation is
primarily temporal in nature. Nevertheless, data from electrophysiologi-
cal (e.g., Berger & Thompson 1978a) and lesion (see Moore 1980,
Solomon 1980) studies indicate profound hippocampal involvement in
learning in this preparation.
Another point of dispute we have with O&N's book is their less than
comprehensive and sometimes cavalier treatment of data on the
activity of hippocampal neurons in the context of learning, especially
where the data do not appear to agree with their theory. This is
particularly evident in their very critical and limited review of the
pioneering studies of Olds, Segal and associates (Olds et al. 1972,
Segal 1973).
Still another point of disagreement concerns O&N's characterization
of neuropsychological versus neuroethological research strategies in
the study of neural activity in the intact, behaving animal. They
categorize our approach as "neuropsychologica!" and their own as
"neuroethological" and, not surprisingly, favor theirs. We would prefer
to term our approach a "model systems" or "paradigmatic" strategy.
The basic issue here has to do with the kinds of phenomena one
wishes to explore and one's view of how the nervous system functions.
O&N's interest is in the "function" of the hippocampus; ours is in brain
substrates of learning and memory. Our model system approach
involves selection of a "prototypic" behavioral system having the
properties of associative learning that is well defined and characterized
and that exhibits robust learning. The model systems approach has
been employed very successfully for neural analysis of simple forms of
behavioral plasticity like habituation, where reflexes of the neurally
isolated spinal cord and reflex pathways in simpler invertebrates can
be shown to exhibit the behavioral properties of habituation (Kandel
1976, Thompson & Glanzman 1976).
For the study of associative learning, we selected the preparation
developed by Gormezano (Gormezano et al. 1962) - classical condi-
tioning of the rabbit NM response to a tone conditioned stimulus (CS)
using a corneal airpuff unconditioned stimulus (UCS) - as a simple and
discrete model of mammalian learning. The rabbit NM system has a
number of advantages for analysis of brain substrates of learning,
which we have detailed elsewhere (Thompson et al. 1976; see also
Disterhoft, Kwan, & Lo 1977). In the course of the project, we
discovered a rather remarkable form of neuronal plasticity in the
hippocampus - in classical conditioning, neuronal activity in the hippo-
campus grows very rapidly to form a "temporal model" of the actual
amplitude-time course of the behavioral response being learned (Berg-
er, Alger, & Thompson 1976, Berger & Thompson 1978a, Berry &
Thompson 1978, Thompson et al. 1976). Once this learning-
dependent neuronal process has been identified, it is then necessary
to determine the generality of the process in terms of stimulus and
training variables, species, other learning paradigms, and its relations
to the "laws" or variables of learning. In the end, this approach will
result in definition and analysis of the brain mechanisms of learning.
O&N approach the problem from the other end, using their "neuro-
ethological" strategy. In essence, they wish to determine the "function"
of the hippocampus by study of the hippocampus, more or less in
isolation, in a wide range of behavioral situations (O'Keefe & Nadei
1978, pp. 190-196). A difficulty with their "neuroethological"
approach is of course that neither the hippocampus nor any other
brain structure exists in isolation. Further, it is doubtful if a complex
system like the hippocampus can be said to have a function. Another
difficulty is the fact that their approach to behavior, in common with
classical ethology, is basically observational. No time-locked simulta-
neous measurements of neural and behavioral events are made, nor is
the fine structure of behavior measured. Our basic finding concerning
the learning-dependent neuronal process in the hippocampus
described above would not have been possible without such measure-
ments.
Sn the end, the relative merits of the "model system" versus
"neuroethological" approaches to brain and behavior will be deter-
mined empirically. At this point we would simply note that in the
classical conditioning paradigms we have used, neuronal activity in the
hippocampus becomes massively engaged in a time-locked manner to
the learned behavioral response; at least 80 percent of pyramidal
neurons appear to become so engaged (Berger & Thompson 1978b,
Thompson & Berger, 1979). Furthermore, as noted above, the pattern
of increased frequency of hippocampal neuron discharge actually
models the temporal fine-structure of the learned behavioral response.
In marked contrast, neuroethological studies of hippocampal neuron
activity indicate only modest engagements in the behavioral observa-
tions and situations employed to date (O'Keefe & Nadel 1978; Ranck
1973, 1975, 1978). This is not meant in any sense to deny the
usefulness and importance of the extensive empirical studies of
hippocampal unit activity in the freely moving animal by these authors
and by others (e.g., Vinogradova 1975). In particular, the observations
of "spatial" units are most intriguing. We would, however, suggest that
the ultimate interpretation of the significance of such unit responses
must await a more fine-grained behavioral analysis.
Our final point concerns the logic of the lesion approach to brain
substrates of behavior. O&N imply (p. 194) that because hippocampal
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lesions do not impair simple learning, therefore the hippocampus plays
no role in simple learning. This would seem to be an example of a
"linear causality" argument. The motor systems of the mammalian
brain provide a helpful analogy. There are a number of brain structures
and systems categorized as "motor." They interact at all levels from
the cerebral cortex to the final common paths. In animal studies, the
effects of even large lesions of the motor structures and systems on
motor behavior can range from severe, to moderate or mild, to virtually
nondetectable. Yet these systems are all characterized as motor. Even
a motor structure as well developed in primates as the pyramidal tract
can be ambiguous. Studies by Evarts (1964) show a precise coding of
the force used in making hand and wrist movements by cells of origin
of pyramidal tract fibers in the motor cortex of the monkey. Towe
(1973), on the other hand, emphasizes the minimal nature of motor
deficits in monkeys who have had complete bilateral section of the
pyramidal tract. No one would argue from this absence of a lesion
deficit that the pyramidal tract therefore plays no role in the control of
movement.
In general, the lesion-behavior approach, per se, has not been
overly helpful in detailed analysis of the roles of brain structures in
behavioral movement. Why, then, should we expect so much more
from the lesion approach with regard to far more complex aspects of
behavior like learning and memory? Clearly, deficits in various learned
behaviors following hippocampal lesions are of interest; indeed, there
is a wide variety of such deficits. However, the absence of a deficit
does not necessarily imply an absence of function. To illustrate, O&N
note that hippocampal lesions do not impair simple acquisition of the
classically conditioned NMR (e.g., Schmaltz & Theios 1972). However,
they neglect to cite the lesion-behavior evidence which shows that the
hippocampus is very much involved in NM conditioning in more
complex paradigms (e.g., latent inhibition and blocking), where the
animal is required to learn temporal relations between the CS and the
UCS (Solomon 1977, Solomon & Moore 1975). These experiments
make it exceedingly difficult to argue that hippocampal lesion deficits
involve only spatial learning.
Note
1. On leave from Department of Psychology, Williams College, Williamstown,
Mass. 01297.
by Ho iger Ursin
Department of Physiological Psychology, Institute of Psychology, University of
Bergen, 5000 Bergen, Norway
Anatomical units in psychology
Even if it turns out that the hippocampus is no cognitive map after all,
neuropsychology will never be the same after this book. It is a
penetrating, challenging and educational theoretical work which is and
will remain obligatory reading for neuropsychologists for many years. It
is also a very elucidating treatment of spatial learning and cognitive
maps in normal, unoperated brains.
My evaluation is not affected by the fact that many of us think the
authors are wrong. It may even be said that the book has probably
shortened the spatial cue era in hippocampus research since it has
made this theory so explicit and testable. Recent work seems to bring
us back to square one. In their original work on memory deficits
following hippocampal lesions in rats, Kaada, Rasmussen and Kveim
(1961) found a deficit in the learning rather than the retention of
learned material, and they also pointed to the greater effect of
distraction in hippocampal or fornical lesioned rats. These seem to be
reconfirmed as the essential elements in the primary working memory
deficit suggested by recent work by Jarrard (1975) and Gaffan (1977).
The deficit does not specifically affect spatial cues (Olton, Becker and
Handelmann 1979), but I doubt that our insight would have progressed
as fast without the book, the impact of which was felt long before it
finally appeared from the publisher.
Essential elements of cognitive map theory remain even if the most
extreme formulations regarding space cues may be wrong. In particu-
lar, there is still a possible specific role for the hippocampus in more
complex or cognitive types of learning as opposed to simple S-R
associations. If there are specific brain mechanisms for the recognition
of complex cues, important issues are raised also for contemporary
learning theory. Unfortunately, animal work on compound stimuli is
complicated and difficult to perform.
The anatomical substrate discussed by O&N consists not only of the
hippocampus, but also of entorhinal cortex and the septal area. It
remains puzzling that each element in these flow charts seems to have
different functions. For instance, the effects of lesions on orienting
behavior, habituation and exploration differ, septal lesions do not
produce the same change as hippocampal lesions, which again differ
from entorhinal lesions (K0hler 1976a,b, Sundberg and K0hler 1979).
Livesey (1975) found differences among the pyramidal cells. Self-
stimulation properties differ between dentate cells and hippocampal
pyramidal cells, in spite of the fact that the dentate cells feed directly
and only into the pyramidal cells (Ursin, Ursin and Olds 1966). The
raison d'etre for neuropsychology, to my mind, is to compare and, if
possible, combine two sets of variables, one anatomical and one
psychological. There are problems in defining the units in both sets of
variables. Is it meaningful to treat the hippocampus as a whole? Are the
real units CA1, CA3-4, and the dentate area? What about the possible
difference between the ventral and dorsal parts? For the psychology
matrix the questions are even harder. Are memory or cognitive maps
useful constructs? What are our tests really measuring? How much of
the variance we observe is really explained by our theoretical
constructs, and are such constructions valid across tests? In other
words, if we claim to measure "spatial learning" in spatial test 1, do we
also measure the same thing in spatial test 2?
I believe we should take the multivariate nature of the phenomena
we study more seriously. I believe we have been trying to do canonical
analysis for a long time without really doing it. It should be admitted that
our own attempts to follow this strategy for the septal complex
produced distressing results (Ursin et al. 1978). In particular, our fairly
standard test battery did not produce consistent factors across tests.
This does not suggest that the approach is useless. But it does
suggest that the present theoretical framework is inadequate, or that
the relations between variables are so complex (for instance, curvilin-
ear) that ordinary correlation and regression studies are inadequate. If
so, the theoretical task may require very complex mathematical
methods.
Finally, our understanding of the interaction between structures
appears to be inadequate. The belief in flow charts and pathways does
not fit the facts. Summation of lesions is also problematic. Do
combined lesions of A and B produce the same effect as the sum of
lesions of A and B separately? One would hope that mathematical
techniques could also advance our understanding of such interactions.
Mishkin (1978) has recently found that amygdala and hippocampal
lesions combined produce a much more pronounced memory deficit
than either lesion alone. This also suggests that we should take vertical
connections on the traditional hippocampus slice more seriously, in
particular the angular bundle.
The cognitive map hypothesis may be wrong, at least in its most
extreme formulations. If so, O&N have helped us through that phase
quickly and intensively. In any case, they have offered us a broadening
and sharpening of our theoretical framework which I think the field
needed right now, whether we pursue this by classical tests or sharpen
our logical faculties by mathematical methods.
by CM. Vanderwolf
Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ont., Canada
N6A 5C2
Is hippocampai rhythmicai slow activity specifically
related to mowement through space?
O'Keefe and Nadel have proposed an interesting theory of the function
of the hippocampus in animal behavior. One of the assumptions of the
theory is that hippocampal rhythmical slow activity or RSA (especially
atropine-resistant RSA) is uniquely related to behaviors which translate
an animal's position in space. The frequency of RSA waves is assumed
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to be directly proportional to the velocity of such movement and/or the
distance to be moved.
Aithough I am favorably impressed by the O&N theory as a whole, I
doubt that the function it assigns to RSA is correct. First, some
behaviors, such as digging in sawdust or struggling when restrained,
are accompanied by clear 7-12 Hz RSA even though they do not
involve translation in space in the sense intended by the O&N theory.
The RSA accompanying struggling has been shown to be resistant to
large doses of atropine but the RSA accompanying digging has not
been challenged with atropine as yet. Another example of RSA
accompanying movement in a fixed location is the fact that the RSA
accompanying walking on a treadmill is indistinguishable from the
RSA accompanying ordinary walking (Whishaw & Vanderwolf 1973).
This is true in rats even when the head is rigidly clamped in a
stereotaxic frame by means of a metal attachment fixed to the skull
(unpublished observations). The RSA generated under such circum-
stances is resistant to atropine. On the other hand,
atropine-resistant RSA does not occur when a rat stands motionless,
regardless of whether the substrate is motionless relative to the earth's
surface or whether it is moved about (passive movement). Thus, if one
examines location, immobility, movement in space and absence of
movement in space in all four possible combinations, it is apparent that
atropine-resistant RSA is associated with the locomotion itself rather
than with translation in space.
O'Keefe (personal communications) tends to counter these objec-
tions by suggesting that treadmill walking is an unnatural situation
which subverts the normal function of walking as a means of moving
from one place to another. Similarly, strugging when restrained may
represent an attempt to escape from the place of restraint. Although
such defenses of the O&N theory may seem rather ad hoc, they do
have a certain plausibility. Other data are needed to settle the matter.
The precise correlate of variations in RSA frequency has never been
entirely resolved. When a rat makes sudden quick runs in a small
experimental enclosure, the associated RSA has a higher frequency
than the RSA associated with walking or slow runs. The RSA frequency
during the first second or two of running in a treadmill (i.e., after the
treadmill is started suddenly) also exhibits a positive correlation with
the velocity of the treadmill running surface. These facts may suggest a
relation of RSA frequency to running velocity or distance run. However,
when rats or gerbils run steadily at different speeds in a motor-driven
treadmill there is no relation of RSA frequency to velocity relative to the
running surface. Perhaps high frequency atropine-resistant RSA is
related to movements with an abrupt onset (i.e., with sudden increases
in velocity).
When rats are trained to jump out of a box of varying depths, the
higher jumps are associated with greater initial velocities as well as with
a greater distance traversed as compared to lower jumps. RSA
frequency begins to rise prior to a high jump and continues to rise after
the rat is launched, reaching a peak at a time when frame-by-frame
photographic analyses (Whishaw, personal communication) indicate
that the rat is engaged in a violent scramble to grasp the edge of the
box with its forepaws. Peak RSA frequency is directly related to the
height of the jump.
According to the O&N theory, RSA frequency should be correlated
with movement velocity and/or the distance jumped. If RSA frequency
is related to instantaneous velocity, it should peak early in the jump,
when body velocity is highest, then decline progressively during the
movement to the top of the box. Alternatively, if RSA frequency is
related to the distance to be jumped, the RSA occurring just prior to
launching should display particularly high frequencies on high jumps,
since it is at this time that total force (impulse) and acceleration are
adjusted to suit the height to be jumped. (Once launched, the rat's
behavior cannot affect the velocity or distance of the jump.) Since
neither of these predictions corresponds well to the observed data, I
conclude that RSA frequency is not related either to instaneous velocity
of movement or to distance moved. It remains possible, I think, that
high frequency RSA is related to movements with high acceleration.
I think the significance of RSA is to be found, not in some function
attributable to the hippocampus alone, but in the functional organiza-
tion of the forebrain as a whole. Type I movements, such as postural
adjustments, head movements and all forms of locomotion, are
accompanied not only by RSA but also by atropine-resistant neocorti-
cal low voltage fast activity and by changes in the amplitude of
neocortical evoked potentials (Pond & Schwartzbaum 1972, Vander-
wolf, Kramis & Robinson 1978). Comparable alterations in hippocam-
pal and neocortical activity do not accompany Type 2 behaviors such
as waking immobility, licking, chewing, face-washing or shivering.
Although the precise significance of these electrical events for brain
function and behavior remains to be determined, it does seem likely
that Type I motor patterns are controlled by a complex set of forebrain
circuits which are not directly involved in the performance of Type II
behavior. These Type I behavior control circuits may be involved in a
wide variety of functions including spatial navigation.
byj. Jacques Voneche
Department of Psychology, University of Geneva, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland;
The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1V6
CognitSwe maps: dimensionality and dewelo^raent
For all the intelligence and knowledge put together in this book, it
comes as a shock to the cognitive developmental psychologist of
Piagetian inclination. On the basis of very thin evidence spread from
rats to humans, the authors claim "that the brain must come equipped
to impose a three-dimensional Euclidean framework on expe-
rience. . . . " Furthermore, they "identify this absolute, nonegocentric,
spatial framework with a specific neural system centered in the
hippocampus."
These bold statements raise a certain number of questions that are
not adequately answered in the book. The first one is that of the
reason for this imposition of a three-dimensional framework. Why not a
four-dimensional or a six-dimensional one? It does not even seem to
dawn upon O&N that this could be possible, and that some of the
authors reviewed in the first chapter, such as Poincare, have convinc-
ingly argued in favour of such manifolds. What is experience for them?
The daily routine of the average human adult, the world of the
theoretical physicist or that of the child, or the animal, or all of them?
This is not clear in the book either, although it is a central question,
because the world of the physicist encompasses more than three
dimensions, for instance, and they seem to have a brain like anyone
else. Did Lobatchevski and Riemann not experience their own non-
Euclidean geometries? How would the invention of new geometries be
possible if the brain were imposing a three-dimensional Euclidean
framework upon experience?
As far as children are concerned, how could one speak of an
absolute, nonegocentric, spatial framework in them when - to take the
example given once again in the accompanying precis (so that the
reader can see that I am not truncating the quotations) - children
consider that two billiard balls of different colors have exchanged their
positions, since the color order is different on opposite sides of the
billiard table? How can one speak of such an absolute space, when
children are furthermore incapable of thinking that a person sitting in
front of them sees a perspective different from their own when they are
both looking at the same three-dimensional landscape? How can one
speak of such an absolute space when it is the experience of every
parent that the young child mirrors the gestures of the adult he or she is
facing when dressing, eating or gesturing?
Moreover, Euclidean geometry represents the most elementary form
of geometry available, and that explains why it was so primitive in the
history of human thought. It only considers intrafigural elements of
space (as do the authors, by the way) and not the interfigural or
transfigural ones. This explains, among other things, why children
represent the level of water in a tilted beaker not as horizontal
(interfigural reference) but as forming a 90° angle with the sides of the
beaker (intrafigural reference). They remain purely Euclidean in their
thinking.
I also find the book rather faulty at the level of the more specialized
literature. The authors dispose quite promptly of the remarkable
experiments of Don Stein at Clark University on the recovery of function
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in hippocampal rats. This is a truly developmental line of research
which, if taken seriously, would undermine considerably their own
position. It shows that rats, operated in two or more stages, compen-
sate for the loss of hippocampal matter in a remarkable way. This
indicates that the localization theory of space perception should at
least be reconsidered.
I have the utmost respect and admiration for those of us who write
books. It is a difficult and exhausting task. But I would wish that
academic pressures towards publishing were less effective so as to
permit more thinking to go into book writing. Obviously, O&N have
some very good ideas, such as the "spatial" analysis of language, for
instance; but they do not go far enough into their analysis to cover the
passage from displacements in the various spaces they identify:
identificational, influence, and circumstantial, to transformations. Rules
of transformation are at the root of the making of a stable universe of
experience in a flow of stimulation; this is the central philosophical
problem of our authors, who, unfortunately, like many new psycholo-
gists, find that a return to Kant is novel and appealing.
Authors' Response
by MbmQ'Keefe
Department of Anatomy and Embryology, University College London, London WC1E
6BT, England
and Lynn Nadei
Department of Psychology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S., Canada B3H4J1
The cognitive map as a hippocampus
Here we languish, a bunch of poor scholars,
Battered by extremes of hunger and cold.
Out of work, our only joy is poetry:
Scribble, scribble, we wear out our brains.
Who will read the works of such men?
On that point you can save your sighs.
We could inscribe our poems on biscuits
And the homeless dogs wouldn't deign to nibble.
Han-Shan, "Cold Mountain," No. 10
Our theory was meant to do two things: we wanted to show (1) how a
physiological theory could be interesting (and fun) when it addresses
cognitions, and (2) that by so doing it could serve as the thin edge of
the wedge, the base from which a broader cognitive neuropsycholog-
ical model could be constructed. In contrast to several commentators
(ISAACSON, GRAY, SWANSON, THOMAS), we feel that theories are prema-
ture only when there are no data. From the initial study, the first
handful of units, the scientist builds theories. These can be explicitly
stated or implicitly held, vaguely specified or precisely laid out,
changed or discarded (or even upheld) as new data are generated,
but they are always there. We find it hard to think about experiments
in vacuo. One can, of course, quibble with the kind of theory we
propose, as many rightly do, or even the way we chose to propose it,
but to suggest that we propose nothing at all seems misguided.
The role of theory
The broadest objection, as voiced by ISAACSON, is that it is improper to
formulate a theory of the role of a given brain structure because this
role depends on the function of those other ne?;ral structures with
which it interacts. While we can agree in general with the latter
point, we fail to see why this rules out theorizing altogether. Only in a
"tightly-coupled" brain must one "explain" all or nothing at all. In a
tightly-coupled mechanism, removal of a part results in large
changes in the working of all the remaining parts; in a loosely-
coupled mechanism, subsystems are relatively independent and can
be removed without great disturbance to the remainder. Adoption of
the loosely-coupled view seems necessary if one is going to do lesion
work at all.
HIRSH is quite right when he notes that brain entities can be
characterized both in terms of the operations they carry out and the
kinds of data upon which they operate. The issue here is that of
content versus form. Kant held that space was form, a way of
perceiving rather than what was perceived (see quote on p. 22 of the
book; subsequent references to page numbers also indicate the book).
We have followed this Kantian line by proposing that "spaceless"
data enter the hippocampal system and cognitive maps come out.
The spatial relations among objects which are embodied in the map
are constructed within the mapping system: this is the operation it
performs, its function, and our quest.
Another objection, voiced by SWANSON, is that philosophy and the
brain are not ready for each other quite yet. We think our colleague,
whose beautiful work on all aspects of hippocampal anatomy should
be stapled directly into the book just after Chapter 3, is being far too
modest here. Research on the role of experience in determining the
functions of the sensory systems has the most profound implications
for philosophers today, as does work on language acquisition in
primates, the effects of commissurotomy, and so on.
The job of theory is to piece together an extremely complex jigsaw
puzzle. Even though we have only a small sample of the pieces, there
are benefits to be had from starting to put them together. A
fragmentary theoretical framework helps us choose among the
available data those which are of especial interest, and tells us what
kinds we need to generate in "future research." Several commenta-
tors (and some passing, nodding, acquaintances) felt that we might
have put the puzzle together prematurely, or with unseemly haste
(GRAY, THOMAS, VONECHE); let them try convincing our publishers
(spouses, parents, children) of that. Others seem to feel that we put
the wrong puzzle together, more patches than pieces, and much of
what we have to say here will be addressed to these commentators.
Why a cognitive theory?
Our commitment to a cognitive theory of brain and behavior is
openly stated, and just as openly queried by some. What exactly do
we mean by cognitive, why do we need it (as MOORE wonders), and
what does a cognitive theory of brain function look like? By cogni-
tion we refer to knowledge acquired by the organism in the course of
its experiences - "knowledge that" - which cannot be characterized
in terms of stimulus-response linkages, or other similar forms of
association. The importance of the distinction between cognitive and
noncognitive modes of operation seems well understood by some
(AMSEL, THOMAS, Olton 1979). Others (MOORE) worry that this must
force us towards some form of dualism, or interactionism, in our
attempts to understand the brain. But the alternatives to linkages
between stimuli and responses are not merely mental representa-
tions, and hence of limited interest. The structure of the mind is one
of the core problems of psychology, and can be tackled by assuming a
limited identity theory, as Thomas notes.
We need a cognitive theory of brain function for one simple
reason: other kinds do not work. Of course, not all the animal's brain,
nor the brains of all the animals, are cognitive in the sense described
above. Our contention is that both cognitive and noncognitive
systems exist in the brains of higher animals, fulfilling different
functions. They are neither mutually exclusive, since they can act in
concert, nor simple points on a continuum, since they are different in
kind (to answer one of OLTON's queries). A large part of the theory, as
several noted (AMSEL, ELLEN, GRAY, MOORE, and others), is about these
two kinds of systems, and their features and functions. And while the
theory might not exactly stand or fall with the precise distinction we
drew between locale and taxon systems, this is a central point in our
analysis.
To briefly reiterate: the locale system, comprising the hippocam-
pus at its core, but also including neighboring structures such as
entorhinal cortex, septum, and subiculum (THOMAS, URSIN, others), is
a cognitive system, which we take to mean that it acquires informa-
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tion without the need for typical rewards, does it (probably) in a
single "trial," transforms this input into maps, and makes this "new"
knowledge available for future use. The way in which these maps get
used depends upon the way they are accessed, but it is always the
case that they are formed rapidly and used flexibly. The taxon
systems, comprising the remainder of the brain, are really many
separate systems, all apparently conforming to certain rules of
operation - incremental storage and little flexibility in usage. Added
to these characteristics, we attempted to specify as clearly as possible
the properties of behavior based on these systems. As AMSEL points
out, there is no necessary connection between cognitive systems and
rapid, nonreinforced, learning. Nor must it be true that the locale
system is relatively interference-free. The properties we attribute to
cognitive maps were proposed for speciic reasons, much as we
. assume they evolved to fulfill particular needs (Thomas's argument
about the ecological pressures responsible for the evolution of a
fast-acting cognitive mapping system could be an example of this).
The motivation for the particular properties we gave to the locale
and taxon systems must be strong to overcome the objections of GRAY,
who argues that we simply put the inexplicable deficits which follow
hippocampal lesions in a box labelled "taxon systems" and took this
as an explanation for these well-documented, if variously inter-
preted, effects.
There were four sets of considerations which influenced the
assignment of properties to the locale and taxon systems. First, we
analyzed the features of maps and routes. In an insightful book
unfortunately published too late to be included in our writing,
Downs and Stea (1977) make many of the same points we raised
concerning the distinction between locale and taxon learning.
Second, we made the assumption that the behavior of an animal after
a brain lesion at least partially reflects the normal operations of the
remainder of the brain (note how this assumption would probably
not be made if one held, even implicitly, the "tight-coupling" theory
of brain noted above). This assumption, as DOUGLAS saw, raises the
possibility of what we call an "environmental lesion"; by arranging
test conditions such that locale function is unnecessary, one should be
able to duplicate in intact animals the behavior seen in animals with
hippocampal dysfunction. One of us has some preliminary data in
support of this notion from studies applying the logic to the problem
of persistence (Nadel 1979a; unpublished observations). Third, the
known facts of hippocampal physiology and anatomy constrained
the possible properties of the locale system; in particular the data
from studies of unit activity were important. Finally, fourth, the fact
that synaptic changes can be rapidly induced in the hippocampus
(Bliss and L^mo 1970) dovetailed with our conviction that the map is
specialized for the rapid acquisition of information.
Of course, it remains for these verbally specified properties to be
translated into statements about how animals behave, as OLTON notes.
There are situations in which it is easy to say that locale or taxon
systems are involved; there are situations in which it is very hard.
This is partly because the two can act in tandem, or even in each
other's stead in certain cases (see later discussion of the unit data in
another context). The idea is to plan experiments which make it easy
to say what kind of learning is taking place, rather than ones which
wait until after the data are collected to ask what the animals might
have been doing, as we were forced to do in analyzing the available
studies for the book. This, of course, is why theories are crucial: they
tell one what kinds of experiments to do, and not to do.
Since we are on the topic, we might digress for a moment to
consider those commentators who addressed themselves to our view
on how experiments should be done. The issues at stake are very
important; anyone who reads the whole of the hippocampal litera-
ture cannot fail to be impressed by the need for better experiments. It
seems hard to believe that after many hundreds of lesion studies (and
countless thousands of animals) we are still arguing over the most
basic of questions concerning hippocampal function. There is a lot of
data, and if much of it tells us very little about what we need to
know, we should stop and ask ourselves why.
Our feeling, in agreement with the BLANCHARDS, is that too many
experiments are designed without adequate consideration of the
kinds of behaviors a particular species displays in its natural setting,
or any thorough understanding of the forms of behavior elicited by
the specific, artificial, test situations which are used. The elegant
work of the Blanchards and their colleagues over the past decade
stands out as one of the rare exceptions.
Neuroethology vs. eeuropsychology
Our views on single unit methodology induced several commentators
to take us to task (BERGER, BURES, THOMPSON et al), but they seem to
have missed our main point. Our claim was not that the neuroetho-
logical approach is inherently superior to the neuropsychological one,
only that they are appropriate at different stages in our understand-
ing of the functions of a given brain area. In our early ignorance, the
neuroethological approach is more appropriate because it makes
fewer assumptions about the behavioral correlates of unit firing and
should give us a better overall picture of the patterns of these
correlates - the "mountains" as we called them. Once we think we
have identified the overall pattern we can begin to ask specific
questions. Here we will find ourselves moving towards neuropsycho-
logical paradigms. Thus, in the book we said: "The advantages of the
neuropsychological approach are clear: it affords a degree of control
over the experimental situation which will eventually be necessary if
the laws governing the operations of the nervous system are to be
discovered. Its drawbacks result from its premature application" (pp.
193-194). It is our belief (perhaps not shared by the commentators)
that the study of many brain areas (excepting perhaps some visual
areas) is still in an early enough stage to demand a neuroethological
approach. THOMPSON'S example of the pyramidal tract is an unfortu-
nate one since we are not as convinced as he is that its function is
understood or that labelling it "motor" is very illuminating. To us,
the apparent discrepancy between lesion and unit work suggests that
the function of the pyramidal tract is not clearly understood. If it is a
motor system, why does it project to "sensory" areas such as the
dorsal column nuclei, and influence transmission through these
nuclei (Jabbur and Towe 1961). When Ranck (1973) and O'Keefe
(1976) found units in the hippocampus which were related to motor
behaviors, we did not jump to the conclusion that the hippocampus
was a motor system. The existence of other classes of units which
might not have been seen in simple motor tasks suggested a wide
function for the hippocampus. Perhaps a neuroethological approach
to the pyramidal tract would reveal a wider function concealed to
date by the narrow emphasis on its "motor" function.
Several commentators remark on the discrepancies amongst the
various laboratories studying hippocampal units (BERGER, GRAY,
HOLMES, RANCK). There are, however, two different types of discrep-
ancies: those of observation and those of interpretation. Ranck and
O'Keefe seem to be describing similar behavioral correlates, but give
them different interpretations. On the other hand, there does seem to
be a more fundamental discrepancy between this work on rats and
that on rabbits (BERGER, THOMPSON et al., Vinogradova 1975). Unpub-
lished work by one of us (O'Keefe) now indicates that this is due at
least in part to a species difference in the behavioral correlates of the
theta units. In both rat and rabbit these cells increase their firing rates
during certain movements. In the rabbit, however, they also increase
their firing in response to arousing stimuli. Thus, Vinogradova's
results may be due to an emphasis on this aspect of the theta cell
firing pattern. Whether or not the changes in unit firing during the
conditioning of the rabbit nictitating membrane response have a
similar explanation is not yet clear.
BURES has some hard words to say about the neuroethological
approach, in particular the use of relatively unstructured environ-
ments and the reluctance to use statistical analyses. To some extent,
these objections rest on a metatheoretical presupposition: that the
coding of information in the nervous system is subtle, too subtle to be
detected by the gross analyzers, eye and ear. If the neural code really
is so uncertain that random fluctuations in the biophysical properties
of the neuron spike generating process are an important factor (to
take one of Bures's examples), then clearly the neuroethological
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approach is doomed. If, on the other hand, even a significant
minority of cells in the nervous system transmit information by large
changes in their firing rate or pattern, then the neuroethological
approach is not only feasible but preferable. Bures is also afraid that
the neuroethological technique will introduce free will into science.
But there is really no way to purge it. In the neuropsychological
approach, the experimenter chooses the set of stimuli to be presented,
the response the animal must make to them, the statistical confidence
levels, and so on. The "hard" numbers which come out at the end are
only as good as the voluntaristic decisions made before the study
begins.
BURES suggests several techniques we could use to record more
objectively the relationship between behavior and single unit activi-
ty. He also suggests some neuropsychological experiments one could
do to test the place correlate hypothesis (put animals in trolleys). We
thoroughly agree with him that having used the neuroethological
approach and convinced ourselves that we had a good overview of
the behavioral and physiological correlates of hippocampal neurons,
we should now switch to the neuropsychological approach. We think
he will find that recent papers from our laboratory and those of
others (e.g., Ranck, Olton, Best) have done just that (see O'Keefe
1979b, for a review). He will also be reassured to know that several
laboratories have, for many years now, used the technique of
simultaneous recording of behavior and single unit activity on
videotape as an aid in the analysis of behavior-unit correlations,
much as he suggests. Frame-by-frame analysis does enable one to
answer questions such as whether the theta units increase their
activity before the onset of movement and, whether the place fields of
a place unit are the same when the animal faces in different
directions. To reiterate then, we think the criticisms levelled against
the neuroethological approach are misdirected. We are not against
the quantitative neuropsychological approach, only its premature
application. Bures may be right that the appropriate neuropsycho-
logical experiment would have revealed the place correlate of the
hippocampal cells. We certainly would not have selected it a priori
from the thousands of possible correlates. How many psychologists
are studying classical conditioning with a grandmother as the condi-
tional stimulus?
Anatomy of a cognitive map
How well does the theory fit with the anatomy of the hippocampal
system? Perhaps there is a cognitive map, but it is not localized in the
hippocampus (see DOWNS). It may be localized elsewhere or it may be
distributed across several brain systems. Several commentators have
reminded us that lesions to other parts of the brain are associated
with spatial deficits (DOUGLAS, HECAEN, KESNER, THOMAS). Frontal
cortex, caudate, cerebellum, parietal cortex, and the superior-
colliculus/pulvinar/visual-cortex system are prominently mentioned
in this regard. Several authors chide us for failing to discuss
adequately the work of Semmes et al. (1955, 1963), which purports to
show a generalized deficit in route following with parietal lesions.
We did, in fact, analyze these data closely, but chose not to describe
our conclusions. Briefly, the primary deficit seems to have been
shown in the tactile version of the study, and correlated well with a
deficit in two point discrimination; the deficit in the visual version of
the task was no more noticeable following parietal lesions than it was
following temporal or occipital lesions, all of which seemed some-
what more debilitating than frontal lesions. We think these particular
data are more consistent with the assertion of a deficit in tactile
discrimination in the patients with parietal lesions than with the
multimodal spatial deficit advanced by the authors. We still hold to
the view that many of these other spatial areas are involved in
egocentric spaces (see Hecaen), in which objects are located relative
to the organism (see pp. 381-383). One of the main tenets of the book
is that it is not sufficient to characterize the function of an area as
spatial since there are different kinds of space. Some evidence as to
the nature of the spatial processing In these areas might be obtained
by studies of single-unit activity therein. Clearly, the units recorded
in visual cortex and superior colliculus indicate egocentric functions,
while those recorded in frontal and parietal regions may suggest
egocentric or locale functions (see O'Keefe 1979b for a discussion).
One of our goals was to provide a plausible wiring diagram for a
cognitive map which was consonant with the known anatomy and
physiology of the hippocampus. One reason for attempting what
may appear a premature effort is to enable us to address ourselves at
some point to the type of partial lesion data which JARRARD and
others are generating. Jarrard finds that while in most tasks a lesion
of the CA1 field is equivalent to a total hippocampal lesion, this is not
true in the eight-arm radial maze. His results suggest that CA1 is
necessary to establish a map originally but that the map must be
established outside the CA1 region. Since total lesions of the hippo-
campus disrupt the task even when it is acquired preoperatively, it
would seem likely that the map is in the hippocampus, perhaps in
CAS or the dentate gyrus. As Jarrard notes, this is consistent with one
of the models outlined in the book. One problem with this analysis is
that it does not specify how the CA1 area, which generates and
changes maps, acts upon the CA3 area, which contains the maps. Is
there an anatomical pathway between these two which remains to be
discovered, or is the circuit through the entorhinal cortex? Note that
Mitchell and Ranck (1977) have reported place cells in the entorhinal
cortex.
SWANSON points out several inadequacies in our description of
hippocampal anatomy, due to the ever-changing picture. He is right
in his assessment that we would like to find sensory information
entering the hippocampus via the entorhinal cortex, and the absence
of a set of neocortical inputs to entorhinal cortex in the rat similar to
those demonstrated in the monkey may prove an embarrassment.
We will just have to wait until the anatomists tell us how the sensory
information reaches the hippocampus in the rat. We are less worried
about the minor changes in the topography of the intrahippocampal
connections, since the theory requires longitudinal connections
between the lamellae, and we had already mentioned the longitudi-
nal association bundle as a possible substrate for that (p. 118).
BLISS asks some tough questions about the details of the model of a
mapping system. He notes certain similarities in the formal proper-
ties of our model and that of Marr (1971). We appreciate and
welcome his interest. Our main project In the book was to present a
plausible model which was consistent with what was known at that
time. We are well aware that the details must be wrong, and are
prepared to consider changes to the model where it conflicts with the
data. Part of this process will undoubtedly lead us into a closer
consideration of the formal models proposed by others such as Marr,
and McLardy (1960) and his coworker, Kilmer (Kilmer and
McLardy 1970, 1971).
Finally, OLTON asks us to comment on the effects of differing sizes
of lesions in behavioral studies. This is easy. Big lesions make big
holes in the map; small lesions make small holes. Because of the
redundancy within the mapping system, however, there should not
be a linear relationship between lesion size and behavioral deficit.
Hippocampal place units
We do not agree with GRAY that unit data on the hippocampus are
fruitless.1 Nor, for that matter, do we concur with THOMPSON'S
dismissal of lesion studies. Rather, we try to take the more moderate
position that all techniques have something useful to contribute to
our understanding of the brain. One of us has recently reviewed the
latest work on the hippocampal place units (O'Keefe 1979b) and
many of the questions raised by the commentators are answered in
that article. Here, we will briefly summarize some of the more
important points, BERGER and DOUGLAS seem to have gotten the
impression that the place field of a place unit was determined solely
by distal extramaze visual cues. Although this is the case for some,
others are clearly multimodal (e.g., the unit shown in figs. '26 and 27,
pp. 205-210). There is, as yet, no evidence that the collection of place
cells representing an environment is knit together into a map
(HOLMES, SWANSON). The postulate that there is a map rather than
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merely a collection of place representations goes beyond the physio-
logical data but is necessary to explain some of the behavioral results
(e.g., the fact that normal, but not hippocampally lesioned, animals
seem to know in the start box of an alley what has happened to them
on the previous trial in the goal box; on this point, we refer GREENE to
pp. 342-344 of the book for a solution to the conundrum that might
tickle his fancy). We have not found the destination cells suggested
by HIRSH in the hippocampus or elsewhere, but would dearly love to
do so. Their existence would simplify the mechanism by which the
map guides behavior. To our knowledge place cells have not been
found in any other brain region except the hippocampus and
entorhinal cortex (THOMAS). But there are still many unexplored
regions of the brain, so this is more an assertion of ignorance than
anything else.
BERGER wonders whether our crude recording techniques obscure
subtle differences in place unit firing patterns, e.g., when the animal
is facing in different directions. We have seen some evidence for this
and it should clearly be investigated in detail using the neuropsycho-
logical method. Notice that even if it does turn out that the place cell
is "responding" to different sets of cues when the animal faces in
different directions, one is still left with the problem of explaining
why the cell responds to the cues perceived from that single location
rather than two different locations. How does it put together the two
sets of cues into a single place representation?
Finally, several commentators take us to task for giving such little
weight to the results of single unit experiments performed by others
(such as Olds). Our problem here was that these experiments were
done in such a different way from our own that it was hard for us to
make any meaningful connection between the two. Whereas we (and
Ranck) looked at several different behaviors, watched our animals,
and did not have strong preconceived notions as to what the units
might respond to, Olds trained his animals on a single conditioning
task in a sensorily restricted environment, did not make any behav-
ioral observations, and was interested only in the relationship of unit
firing to the different aspects of the conditioning process. Since his
group did not try to classify their units according to any physiological
criteria (except perhaps for firing rates), it was difficult to relate their
findings to ours in any way at all. Since hippocampal lesions had no
obvious effect on the conditioning task used (but see THOMPSON et
al. 's commentary on this point) and their results did not bear directly
on our theoretical position, we had little alternative but to keep our
references to that body of work to a minimum. The same is less true
of the unit work of Thompson, Berger, and their colleagues. They
have classified their cells according to several criteria (firing rates,
presence of complex spikes, activation from the fimbria), and it
should be possible to relate their findings to those of others (including
our own). Thus, there are good prospects for a reconciliation of the
apparent differences between hippocampal units in eye-blinking
rabbits and place-coding rats in the near future.
Before leaving the topic of unit recording we should consider an
important question raised by OLTON which might yield to a study of
unit behavior. Olton asks us to distinguish between a place strategy
and a direction strategy, and correctly points out that most place
tasks can be solved using a direction strategy. In fact, Blodgett et al.
(1949) reported that place learning was much more difficult for
normal rats than was direction or response learning. This would seem
to suggest that direction learning is different from place learning,
that many "place" tasks are really learned through the use of a
direction strategy, and that the place system does not have the
properties which we ascribed to it (e.g., rapid, all-or-none learning).
What, then, is the difference between direction and place learn-
ing? As OLTON correctly suspects, there is no unequivocal answer to
this question. To see why, let us do a thought experiment on one of
the place cells. Imagine that we are recording from a place unit in
Olton's example (his fig. 1, top) and find that the cell has a field on
the east arm. The cell fires whenever the animal enters the arm and
regardless of the direction which the animal faces on that arm.
Swapping physical arms around has no effect on the unit response so
there is prima facie evidence to consider this a place unit. Since it
fires regardless of the direction which the animal assumes it cannot
be a direction unit. What might the results be if we perform Blodgett
et al. s transfer test as proposed by Olton. The cell might continue to
fire in the same part of space as defined by the room: in this case it
would fire in the west arm. Alternatively, the cell might define its
field partially in terms of the apparatus and partially in terms of the
extramaze cues. In this case the cell would continue to respond in the
east arm on the transfer test. This type of cell would not be a pure
extramaze place cell, but it would not be a direction cell either. It
would define a place in terms of the configuration of the apparatus
and the orientation of the apparatus relative to the environment.
Animals acting on the basis of this information would make a
direction choice rather than a location choice in the Blodgett et al.
experiment. They would also not be affected by the translation of the
maze within the room after task solution, but would be affected by
maze rotation. Thus, Watson's maze translation results are not
evidence against our position, as suggested by DOUGLAS.
Furthermore, DOUGLAS'S (1966a) own spontaneous alternation
experiments might have a similar explanation. He found that rats
would alternate if the first trial was given in one room and the second
in another, adjacent room. He concluded that this ruled out distal
cues but this may not be true if these cues were common to the two
rooms (e.g., distant traffic noise, magnetic fields). We do not accept
his conclusion that the vestibular system has a prominent role to play
in place learning, although we agree that an animal deprived of
place information might have to rely on vestibular cues, as perhaps
was the case in Beritashvili's (1965) interesting neuroethological
experiments. The study mentioned by THOMAS is of some relevance
here. He showed, in a T-raaze alternation task, that hippocampal
lesions disrupt preoperative learning but that relearning is possible.
However, this relearning, presumably accomplished on the basis of
alternative sources of information (vestibular?), is affected by vari-
ables which do not particularly influence animals learning with their
brains intact. This indicates that relearning in the lesioned animals
involved a new strategy with different properties. According to
Beritashvili (1971), vestibular cues by themselves can support
performance only across rather short delays, which would explain
why Thomas's lesioned rats could not perform when delay intervals
were lengthened.
Let us conclude this section by acknowledging that OLTON has
focused on what remains a major problem: the difficulty in separat-
ing the two possible strategies for solving the direction task. The
place strategy (dependent on the mixed place cells described above)
and a guidance strategy (where a distant cue is approached) would
both work here. Although we must continue to search for behavioral
techniques with which to separate these two strategies (such as the
cue-controlled environment), it remains possible that an unambigu-
ous behavioral technique does not exist and that the distinction can
only be made at the physiological level.
Behavioral correlates of hippocampal theta
What is the relation between hippocampal theta and one's theory of
the hippocampus? One possibility is that one could read the function
of the hippocampus off the behavioral correlates of theta. Thus,
VANDERWOLF thinks that a correlation of theta with movements
indicates some function in motor control. Alternatively, the theta
system might provide a clue to the operation of part of the
hippocampal system which, taken in isolation, does not indicate the
overall function of the hippocampus. The latter is our position, and
from this perspective HIRSH'S revival of the question as to whether
theta is an active or inactive state of the hippocampus is inappro-
priate. The hippocampus is "working" in both the theta and large
amplitude irregular activity states: many place cells fire when the rat
is in the place field regardless of whether it is engaged in theta
behavior or not. So what does theta do? We have suggested that it
shifts the focus across the map as a function of the displacement
associated with movement. It does this in an a priori fashion: that is, it
calculates the distance that a movement would take an animal under
normal circumstances, rather than operating on the basis of the
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distance through which the movement actually translates the animal
(which is how the theta mechanism gets around one of the problems
raised by DOWNS). Here we are really following and extending
Vanderwolf's own reasoning concerning the relation between theta
and voluntary movements in general. For example, he concludes that
the relation holds even during REM sleep, but that the movement
signals which accompany theta during this state are blocked at the
level of the spinal cord. Similarly, we would argue that the occur-
rence of theta during struggling is not a valid counterexample since
the motor activation would translate the animal were it not
restrained. The rat nervous system did not evolve to function in an
environment of treadmills, skull clamps, and moving carts.
VANDERWOLF focuses attention on jumping as a good paradigm for
the study of the relation between movement and theta. Although we
(R. Morris and J. O'Keefe unpublished) have repeated the main
indings of their earlier paper (Whishaw and Vanderwolf 1973),
there are certain differences which bear on the present discussion. In
our experience, animals only scrabble at the end of the jump when
they are required to jump too high. During lower jumps the landing
is as smooth and coordinated as the take-off. If the rat scrabbles at the
top it defeats the purpose of the jump situation, since there are no
measures of force, acceleration, and so on available for this behavior.
Contrary to the results cited by Vanderwolf, we have not found an
increase in theta frequency during flight in our animals. Instead
there is either a peak frequency at the moment of launch followed by
successively lower frequencies until landing, or a peak frequency at
launch which is maintained (but not exceeded) until landing. Thus,
our observations are consonant with the asserted relation between
theta frequency and velocity (which is maximum at the launch and
decreases during the flight to zero). We should point out, however,
that even were Vanderwolf's assertions true they would not neces-
sarily lead to his conclusions unless one accepted only strict cotempo-
raneous correlations. We would be quite happy with a good correla-
tion between velocity at the launch and a peak theta frequency some
200 msec later. There is no theoretical reason why the correlation
must be cotemporaneous.
HOLMES wonders why no theta activity has been recorded from the
monkey and whether this implies that monkeys (and humans?) do
less cognitive mapping. After all, the rat is a highly spatial animal,
and might be peculiar in this way. We (and Menzel 1978) think not.
There are several reasons why the slow waves might not be an
accurate reflection of the underlying unit mechanisms. In the case of
hippocampal theta, there is the possibility that increasing levels of
theta unit activation result in an EEG amplitude function which first
increases but then decreases, perhaps even to the point of desyn-
chronization (see p. 153). Furthermore, the generation of synchro-
nous. EEG waves depends on the geometry of the hippocampal
elements and generators. There is some suggestion that a theta
mechanism exists in CA3 of the rat although good EEG theta cannot
be recorded there. We predict that there is a theta mechanism in
both monkeys and humans, albeit one more sophisticated than that
found in the rat.
Other functions of the hippocampus
As we argued earlier, the neuroethological approach is useful when
little is known for certain, and one wants to keep an open mind.
There can be little doubt that this was the case concerning the
hippocampus in the early 1970s, and many seem to feel it remains
that way today. The commentators, and other recent writers, have
managed to find a large number of functions other than spatial
mapping to attribute to the hippocampus. These include such things
as temporal mapping (HOLMES, KESNER, NONNEMAN, THOMPSON et al),
salience reduction (MOORE), general context coding, (HIRSH & KRAJ-
DEN, Winocur and Olds 1978), working memory (URSIN, Olton et al.
1979), holding still (BLANCHARDS), anticipation of negative events
(AMSEL), internal inhibition (DOUGLAS), dealing with uncertainty,
ambiguity, or interference (GRAY), and allowing memories to become
resistant to disruption (SQUIRE). Can all these possibly be right?
We have addressed a number of these suggestions elsewhere, and
our intention in the book was to avoid constant comparisons of one of
the above hypotheses with another. As suggested in an earlier paper,
there are differences between theories and hypotheses (Nadel and
O'Keefe 1974), and speaking to 300 rather than 30 or 3 studies is one
of them. Nonetheless, and contrary to our view that science is not an
adversary process, we feel compelled to consider some of the issues
raised by these suggestions, and by some of the studies mentioned in
the commentaries.
1. Internal inhibition (DOUGLAS). We have strongly criticized this
notion elsewhere (Nadel and O'Keefe 1974; Nadel, O'Keefe, and
Black 1975; Black, Nadel, and O'Keefe 1977). Perhaps Douglas's
claim that this idea remains viable should be bolstered with a
reasoned reply to these criticisms. We persist in seeing the inhibitory
failure as an effect, not a cause.
2. Holding still (BLANCHARDS). While we are uncertain about the
decreased immobility observed in studies 2 and 3 of Blanchard et al.
(1977), study 1 raises the likelihood that the immobility being
measured is, as the authors point out, a reflection of the shift from
flight to freezing, which presumably occurs when the animal
concludes that escape to a safe place is impossible. The interesting
question then becomes: what controls this freezing? We concluded
(pp. 299-302) that place fear is largely responsible for such
immobility, and that its absence in animals with hippocampal lesions
should lead to a loss of freezing. Blanchard, Blanchard, and Fial
(1970) reported data consistent with this idea. The decreased ability
of lesioned rats to hold onto hot grids, or balance on ledges, could be
due to a similar mechanism, or possibly to shifts in reaction to
low-level shock in the first case (Blanchard and Fial 1968), though
the data here are ambiguous. Woodruff and his colleagues
(Woodruff and Bailey 1979; Woodruff, Hatton, and Meyer 1975)
have shown that restraint-induced immobility is increased after
hippocampal lesions in rats and rabbits, indicating that in some cases
animals without a hippocampus can hold still even better than intact
animals.
3. Anticipation of negative events (AMSEL). We certainly agree with
the view that the hippocampus has a lot to do with anticipations, but
fail to see why this should be restricted to negative events such as
punishments and frustration (though the latter do seem to be
prominent concomitants of studying the hippocampus). Since there is
strong evidence that the mapping system is involved in match-
mismatch operations of all kinds, we prefer to see its role in
anticipatory frustration in terms of the anticipation rather than the
frustration. The assumption that the hippocampus is only involved in
certain aspects of frustration, without providing any justification for
partitioning frustration into separate functions in this way, makes
little sense to us.
4. Dealing with uncertainty (GRAY). That the hippocampus
somehow provides the basis for flexible behavior is uncontested; what
is called into question by Gray is our proposed source for this
capacity. According to Gray, there exists a system in the brain whose
function is to help out when an animal is in an ambiguous situation,
or one in which high interference is likely. Exactly how this sytem is
triggered into action, how it "knows" that the animal is in a tenuous
situation, or in one in which interference is likely, remains unstated.
We await the promised exhaustive treatment of the literature on
hippocampal lesions, and an explication of how uncertainty/
interference are detected by the animal. It is our guess that the
mechanism which accomplishes these functions will look rather like a
mapping system.
5. General context coding (HIRSH & KRAJDEN, Winocur and Olds
1978). Hirsh argues for the view that the hippocampus performs a
certain kind of logical operation on all forms of data, and that by so
doing it underlies all manner of contextual effects. This plausible
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suggestion runs into one major stumbling block: putting all
contextual functions into the hippocampus leaves little for the
remainder of the brain to do. One of us has considered the problem
of context at length (Nadel and Willner, in press), and concluded that
the hippocampus plays a role in spatial, but not other, context
effects.
6. Working memory (DOUGLAS, URSIN, Olton et al. 1979). In several
recent papers Olton and his colleagues have advanced the view that
the hippocampus is a working memory system capable of
temporarily holding any kind of information. This view has led some
to conclude that map theory is outdated already, as wilted as
yesterday's greens. We think this burial, even if well-attended and
carried out with requisite ceremony, somewhat premature. As we
have stated our views on this in several places (Nadel 1979a and b, in
press; O'Keefe, 1979a), we refrain from further comment here.
7. Temporal mapping (BLANCHARD & BLANCHARD, HIRSH & KRAJDEN,
HOLMES, KESNER, NONNEMAN, THOMPSON et al.). A n u m b e r of
commentators feel that a cognitive map should encode time as well as
space. Even though animals without a hippocampus have little
difficulty learning about temporal relations, Thompson et al. remain
convinced that the hippocampus is involved in such learning,
arguing from data on unit activity and on the effects of lesions on
complex Pavlovian paradigms such as latent inhibition, conditioned
inhibition, and blocking. We have recently addressed these issues
(O'Keefe, Nadel, and Willner, 1979; Nadel and Willner, in press) and
concluded that hippocampal involvement in these tasks does not
require the assumption that the hippocampus is involved in temporal
mapping.
More generally, we do not agree with those who would wish to
accord time the same status as space. Holmes suggests that we should
write a monograph on time to complement the one on space - we
suspect such a book would be mercifully thin. Not that time is
uninteresting philosophically or unimportant psychologically. On the
contrary, time is very important, but we see little evidence that it is
coded directly in the way space seems to be.
The book was somewhat ambiguous on the role of time in the
mapping system, eschewing it for rats while allowing it for humans.
Even in the latter, it remains unclear how judgments about temporal
"location" are accomplished beyond the recent past. Such work as
exists on the ability to assess when in the past something happened
indicates that our unaided performance in this domain can be quite
primitive (Linton 1975). A sharp distinction can be drawn between
this kind of temporal mapping, in which the locale system is
involved, and the kind which is concerned with the ongoing temporal
texture of events - the CS-US interval, for example. The lesion data
rule out an essential hippocampal role in such textural analyses,
though they do not rule out the possibility that the information about
such temporal intervals and sequences is normally made available to
the hippocampus for some purpose which is not essential to the
conditioning process itself. Models of this sort (MOORE, THOMPSON et
al.) give the hippocampus a role in overseeing certain consequences
of temporal pairings, such as the loss of salience which CSs undergo
when presented without USs (latent inhibition). Since lesion data
cannot currently invalidate this position, we must await physiological
data from appropriately designed unit studies.
8. Salience reduction (MOORE). In a recent article Moore (in press)
has provided a model for how temporal mapping might be
accomplished, and what: uses it could be put to: he proposes that the
hippocampus participates in the development of maps which code
both location and time. The hippocampus does this by acting to
reduce the salience of entities (places, cues, or responses) under
specified conditions. This position would seem to predict a crucial
role for the hippocampus in the "overshadowing" of a CS poorly
correlated with the US by a CS highly correlated with the US, for
such an arrangement of temporal pairings results in the reduction of
the poorly correlated CS's salience. P. Garrad, J. Rawlins and N.
Mackintosh (personal communication) have recently explored the
effects of hippocampal lesions on overshadowing, and found' that
they did not impair rats' ability to show the effect. This seems to
directly contradict Moore's position. In addition, it deprives the
temporal mapping view of its most likely function.
This overview of alternative suggestions (we take up Squire later)
provides much the same picture as our earlier assessments. Though
specific suggestions based on the results of one, two, or even a dozen
studies are often capable of accounting for some portion of the data,
they fail to go beyond this preliminary step. As several commentators
point out, the future success, if any, of these other perspectives rests
on their ability to wade through the mine-field of hippocampal lesion
effects and emerge relatively unscathed on the other side. We wish
we could provide our intrepid colleagues with a good map to the
location of the live mines, but ours is somewhat tattered by now.
Even though we cannot agree with those who seek to expand upon
the functions attributed to the hippocampus, there remain a number
of specific studies mentioned by various commentators which must
be noted. As was the case in our analysis in the book, not every study
falls neatly into place. For example, we have no ready explanation
for the data reported by Rawlins et al. (in press) concerning the
effects of hippocampal lesions on the partial reinforcement
extinction effect. While we are not surprised that hippocampal
lesions increase resistance to extinction in continuously rewarded
animals (p. 342) and decrease it in partially rewarded ones (p. 347),
we cannot readily explain why these two groups fail to differ from
one another. Admitting this does not, however, indicate acceptance
of GRAY'S conclusions, which may be mitigated by differences in
terminal acquisition rates (as seen in the goal speeds) or unexplained
sources of variability (such as that which produced greater
differences between the control groups of studies I and II than those
between the control and experimental groups within either study).
Somewhat less difficult to answer are those who query our analysis
of the effect of hippocampal lesions on the operant task known as the
differential reinforcement of low rates (DRL). In this task, animals
must refrain from responding for a period of time before being
rewarded for a response. This conflict situation has been interpreted
as involving timing behavior, though we prefer to see it as an
example of the need to develop strategies which help the animal
avoid the site of the manipulandum. Thus, intact rats can formulate
the strategy "go to a place on the other side of the box" and thereby
decrease the likelihood of temporally inappropriate responses.
Animals with hippocampal lesions sometimes have problems with
this kind of task, as both the temporal mapping and inhibitory views
might suggest, but this occurs, as ELLEN points out, only when there is
a conjunction of relatively large lesions and pretraining on
continuous reward. Exactly why the hippocampus should be
involved in "timing" only in these circumstances is unclear, and we
have little to add here to what we have already said (pp. 323-325).
What is still needed is a careful study of the precise behaviors - be
they place strategies or other - used by normal animals to help wait
out the interval. If there are no such differences between intact rats
and a group of lesioned rats, as ISAACSON suggests, then our analysis is
wrong. A study similar to that reported by Osborne and Black (1978)
should settle this issue (as well as bear on the temporal mapping
proposal).
Many commentators (DOUGLAS, GRAY, HIRSH & KRAJDEN, JARRARD,
and others) wonder about the deficit in reversal of nonspatial tasks,
taking this as an indication that the deficit after hippocampal lesions
is not specifically spatial. Let us consider these data, which are
indeed difficult for our theory to explain, in some greater detail.
Animals are trained to perform a visual or tactile discrimination with
the discriminanda shifted from location to location so as to avoid the
reinforcement of a particular place or orientation strategy. Having
learned to approach one of the cues, presumably through adoption of
a guidance strategy, the animals are confronted with a reversal of the
reward contingencies. Rats and cats with hippocampal lesions have a
well-documented deficit in this reversal procedure (see Table A19).
The defect, however, is of a certain form. Upon reversal, animals stop
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responding to the previously rewarded cue (the extinction phase)
rather soon; this is typically true for both intact and lesioned animals
(the Webster and Voneida [1964] study quoted by several
commentators is the exception that proves the rule, and is also the
only study using split-brain animals with unilateral hippocampal
lesions). Some trials later, animals begin responding to the previously
unrewarded cue. In the interim, other strategies are adopted and
discarded. The bulk of the defect in lesioned animals arises at this
stage; they seem to adopt the strategy of approaching a particular
side of the apparatus, and stick with it through an inordinate number
of trials. Why do lesioned animals fall into this trap while intact
animals manage to avoid it?
DOUGLAS makes two points concerning this situation. First, he
states that the locale system cannot be involved in simultaneous
discrimination (an assertion he also makes concerning the linear
maze). Second, he suggests that lesioned animals should be at an
advantage in reversal according to our analysis, since they have one
fewer incorrect strategy to try out. These seductive suggestions (see
GRAY, GREENE) are, unfortunately, a bit too simple. We opined in the
book (p. 280) that the learning of even simultaneous discriminations
could proceed differently in intact and lesioned animals, and
provided some support for this view. (Douglas is also wrong in his
assertion about the linear maze - see pp. 286-290). Devoid of place
strategies, lesioned rats choose among fewer strategies, and as a
consequence adopt orientation strategies more often during original
learning than do intact rats (Kimble 1975). Though such a strategy is
rewarded only 50 percent of the time, and is subsequently jettisoned
for a guidance strategy, this experience during learning could
increase the relative likelihood of the adoption of an orientation
strategy by the lesioned rats after reversal of the reward
contingencies. This being the case, we would predict that more
lesioned than intact animals would fall into the persistent orientation
trap. Only an aeimal-by-animal analysis of the strategies used during
initial learning and subsequent reversal can definitively answer the
question of why there is a defect. Such an analysis of performance in
successive discrimination, another task which is ostensibly nonlocale,
made sense of what otherwise seemed to be rather confused data (see
pp. 284-286).
Finally, VONECHE raises the question of the "recovery of function"
after multistage lesions. We treated these data in the book (pp.
377-379), where we suggested that "recovery" was only possible
when tasks which could be solved by either locale or taxon strategies
were used. In these mixed tasks, such as the ones Stein et al. (1969)
used, many interpretations of the data are possible, a point
emphasized by OLTON. THOMAS'S data on recovery support our view
that lesioned animals relearn using different, nonlocale strategies (see
also Isseroff 1979).
What kind of maps?
A number of commentators found themselves in general agreement
with, or were at least sympathetic to, the notion that animals form
cognitive maps, but questioned our views on the means by which
these maps are formed, the precise nature of the spatial information
they contain, or the relationship of these spatial representations to
other kinds of spatial codes.
We suggested in the book that maps are multimodal representa-
tions constructed during exploration, and that these maps are not
pictorial images, though portions of a map can be "projected" onto
the "mind's eye," to use current terminology. These maps were taken
to represent Euclidean, three-dimensional space, forming the basis
for our concept of absolute, unbounded space. One objection to this
formulation, raised by ELLEN, is that active exploration may not be
needed for map formation, raising doubts as to the role of the
movement-theta system in map construction. However, the studies
cited by Ellen in support of his contention are not particularly
convincing. Gleitman's (1955) rats acquired only the barest of
representations, and because distinctive cues were available to differ-
entiate each arm, it is possible that the learning in this study was not
place learning at all. This position is supported by McNamara et al.
(1956), who also compared rats allowed to run in a T-maze with
others passively transported. In their first study, obvious extramaze
cues which could support guidance strategies were available, and
passive transportation was as effective as active movement. However,
when these guidances were removed, transported animals were no
longer able to learn; active movement became essential. Thus, these
data indicate that, at least for the rat, active exploration is necessary
for place learning and, presumably, map formation. Data suggesting
that map construction can proceed in higher animals (cats, dogs,
primates) without movement are intriguing, but they require syste-
matic replication. Perhaps a study along the lines of those reported
by Menzel (1978), but concerned with map acquisition rather than
utilization, would settle the issue.
Taking a somewhat different tack, DOWNS raises a number of
interesting questions about the kinds of maps formed in the hippo-
campus, questions we cannot meaningfully answer at this time. As
Downs points out, the very assertion that there is a neural locus for
cognitive mapping provides the basis for asking these questions, and
it was certainly our hope that researchers in allied fields would begin
to investigate some of these issues. Our choice of a Euclidean metric
for the map was influenced of course by the considerations sketched
in Chapter 1, but it also has the merit of permitting easy testing. Such
testing seems hardly necessary for VONECHE. Having overlooked our
footnote (p. 23) where we admitted that we had no explanation for
why absolute psychological space was three-dimensional, he asks
what is experience for us? We cannot pretend that it is the daily
routine of the average human adult (whatever that statistical fiction
might be), but that is not the point. What is important is the
environment which the brain (and behavior) have evolved to handle,
and that physical environment is most simply characterized in
three-dimensional Euclidean terms.
It is our guess that the inventors of non-Euclidean geometry did
not, in fact, directly experience these spaces, but that this would not
prevent them from discovering their existence. Experience is a tricky
word: in what sense can it be said that we experience infinity, or an
irrational number? We also fail to understand how a cognitive
developmental psychologist of Piagetian inclination can assert that
children who represent the level of water in a tilted beaker as
forming a 90° angle with the sides of the beaker "remain" purely
Euclidean in their thinking, VONECHE seems to imply that Euclidean
geometry, being the most elementary form, comes first in the
developing child, just as it did in the history of human thought. This
inverts the progression of geometrical thought ascribed to children
by Piaget, though not in fact by us (see pp. 41-45, and especially the
footnote on p. 45).
PINKER provides useful criticism by outlining a scheme within
which three different kinds of spatial representations reside. The
elegant work of Kosslyn, Pinker, and their coworkers (Kosslyn et al.,
this issue) has established the existence both of a visual imagery
system akin to a pictorial surface and an intrinsic three-dimensional
shape system which permits the recognition of objects according to
this shape. Pinker suggests, and we agree, that the mapping system is
an abstract framework containing markers which "stand for" the
objects occupying specific locations. This tripartite arrangement
makes sense not only of the data from normal subjects engaged in
cognitive mapping tasks, but of amnesic subjects as well. The latter
are capable of generating images and have no trouble recognizing
three-dimensional objects in various perspectives (a parietal cortex
function?), but fail at map formation (see pp. 422-425, 434). On this
note we can turn to what was surely the least acceptable part of the
book - the extension of the model to humans.
Mapping In humans
One of the major motivations behind our extension of the model to
humans was our conviction that a theory of hippocampal function
would be worth pursuing only if it managed to extend beyond rats,
cats, and monkeys to include humans. Several assumptions guided
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our attempt to span the species. First, we concluded on the basis of
our anatomical review that there was little evidence suggesting a
major alteration in the hippocampal machinery in humans, as
compared to other species: electrophysiological data were consistent
with this view (Babb 1973). What do seem to change, even between
closely related species, are input and output patterns. Here, we are in
agreement with HIRSH & KRAJDEN that the hippocampus performs
certain operations upon a new set of inputs, in this case leading to
"spatial" maps for language, what we have called semantic maps.
Second, we felt that, as in the rat, the hippocampus in humans had to
be a memory system. We supposed that there are many kinds of
memory systems, each storing the results of its operations, and that
the hippocampus was a special, spatial, kind of memory system. This
was simply an elaboration of the position taken by the theory on
infrahumans. Third, we assumed that the hippocampus in the left
hemisphere, concerned as it was with language, must be constructing
something like a spatial map for "verbal" entities. We were encour-
aged in this line by the work of those linguists who saw important
connections between cognition and semantics (Jackendoff 1976,
Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976). Finally, fourth, we accepted the
dogma that damage to the hippocampus resulted in amnesia (Milner
1968a) with only minor, and perhaps insufficient, contact with
amnesia patients. In so doing, we relied heavily on (then) currently
available data about the specific features of the amnesic syndrome.
All these considerations led us to the view, expressed in the book, that
the hippocampus in humans was a memory system concerned with
mapping aspects of both space and language.
The detailed specifications of the model for humans, as for the
neural nuts and bolts of the map itself, were our best guesses, and
would, we hoped, serve as useful starting points from which to
elaborate better versions of the model. While we saw no reason to
change the major tenets of the mapping model based on rats, it was
clear to us that human maps are probably more sophisticated than
those of rats. Thus, for example, we supposed that in the human the
ability to store, and keep separate, individual maps of related
experiences would allow for a more pronounced temporal dimension
in memory (as noted above), though we were aware of how inaccu-
rate such temporal memory appears to be, at least in comparison to
spatial memory. This led us to the view that the mapping system
might serve as the substrate for what Tulving has called episodic
memory.
We find little reason to alter most of these assumptions. However,
the comments of HOREL, SQUIRE, and JACKENDOFF seem to require at
least some modifications of our position. In his extensive and well-
documented article Horel (1978) suggests that the amnesia conse-
quent upon mesial temporal lobe resection (as in patient H.M.) has
more to do with damage to the temporal stem than with damage to
the hippocampus. Horel is quite right when he asserts that our theory
adapts to, rather than predicts, the global amnesic syndrome. He goes
too far, however, when he tries to rob the hippocampus of all its
mnestic functions. It is undoubtedly the case that some aspects of the
memory loss in amnesia stem from damage to taxon structures such
as the amygdala and temporal neocortex. However, we maintain that
those aspects of the memory disorder relating to space (see HECAEN)
relate to hippocampal damage. Additionally, and in contrast to
Horel's comments, we do insist on placing the source of exploratory
behavior in the hippocampus; the compulsive behavior of monkeys
with Kluver-Bucy syndrome hardly constitutes exploration. This
being said, the problem of specifying where the role of a spatial
memory system ends, and that of nonspatial memory begins, is quite
difficult.
Consider the mechanisms by which we retrieve information from
long-term memory. In a recent thesis Williams (1977) has probed the
strategies used by subjects in retrieving the names of their fellow
high-school graduates. Among the strategies used were "general
associations," "locations," "name generation," "picture scanning,"
and "activities." What stands out in these data is the extent to which
spatial locations (contexts) were used in retrieving from very long-
term memory, even when ostensibly nonspatial strategies such as
"activities" were being used. For example, in a protocol demonstrat-
ing the use of this strategy, specifically "playing in the band," the
subject started by imagining herself in the band room. This indicates
that recall might depend importantly on the ability of subjects to find
an appropriate context "containing" the desired information. As
Williams points out, the problem of finding a context only exists in
recall paradigms which, it seems, can involve largely reconstructive
processes. Given an appropriate context, recall of the entities within
it becomes relatively easy (see Chapter 14 for our expression of
similar ideas). In recognition paradigms, the problem is one of
choosing the appropriate context. These data demonstrate not only
the importance of contexts (typically specific spatial locations) in
long-term memory assessed by either recall or recognition tech-
niques, but also the way in which access to information available in
taxon systems can be crucially dependent upon the locale system.
Such considerations led us to speculate that there would be
extensive loss from premorbid memory of those forms of information
stored in the locale system, as well as a marked inability to use
contexts as retrieval aids. As SQUIRE points out, however, the recent
data gathered in long-term memory studies suggest a marked discon-
tinuity between premorbid and postmorbid memory loss. As impor-
tant as these data are, they do not directly address the above position,
because in these tasks the subjects were presented with the retrieval
contexts, either in the form of faces to be recognized, or the names of
the old TV shows for which details were to be recalled. Given these
contexts, the ability to reconstruct details should be relatively
unimpaired in amnesic patients, as Squire and others have indeed
shown. (The story is more complicated in Korsakoff patients, who
were included in our analysis with some reluctance, see pp. 414-416.)
In the Marslen-Wilson and Teuber (1975) study, for example, H.M.'s
performance was vastly improved by certain kinds of cues (as
controls' might have been were it not for a ceiling effect), but he
fared rather poorly with cues of a circumstantial nature. We would
predict that in the Williams task of recalling high-school graduates
amnesic patients would be selectively deficient in their ability to
generate spatial strategies, but unaffected in their use of such things
as initial letters as aids to retrieval.
The problem of why amnesic patients seemingly have difficulty
forming new taxon memories remains. H.M. can learn some new
faces, so the defect is not complete even in this most severe case, and
HOREL is surely right in asserting that some of the memory problem
relates to extrahippocampal damage. We assume that if the locale
system is important for getting things out of taxon stores (by
providing retrieval contexts), it must play an important role in
getting them in. SQUIRE emphasizes this point in his discussion of the
possible role of the hippocampus in a "restructuring" process by
virtue of which memory is reformed and strengthened. Here, he
alludes to what appears to be a shift, over time, in the form of normal
memory from the specific to the general. This shift seems to be
associated with the point at which the hippocampus is no longer
needed for accurate remembering, and has occasioned considerable
research and speculation (e.g., Wickelgren 1979). We think Squire is
right in pointing out that the hippocampus becomes less important in
recall as the memories one seeks fade into the past. In our view, this
results from the way in which events are stored within the hippocam-
pus. As the unit work shows, the same neuron takes part in many
maps. If specific memories are being laid on top of one another
within the mapping system, at a certain point access to the older ones
should become exceedingly difficult, to be accomplished perhaps by
unusual events such as brain stimulation (Penfield 1958), or seizures,
or the usual event of aging, which is accompanied by changes in
synaptic function and plasticity within the hippocampus (Barnes
1979), as well as by selective losses in place learning (Barnes, Nadel,
and Honig, in press).
In the last analysis, our view of the amnesic syndrome, and its
relation to hippocampal damage, will be judged by how well the
theory accounts for the facts of normal memory. Present evidence,
and the commentaries of HECAEN, DOWNS, and PINKER, encourage us
to feel that, at least as far as specifically spatial information is
concerned, our views are reasonable. When one considers the role of
the left hippocampus in memory, however, things become less clear.
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Semantic maps
Our section on semantic maps was the most speculative and under-
standably elicited the most resistance from the commentators. Here
our main goal was to see how far one would have to stretch the basic
attributes of the mapping system to produce a system which could
explain the specific loss of linguistic memories following left hippo-
campal damage. We strongly concur with JACKENDOFF that word lists
and the like are hardly the sort of thing one wants to study here.
Unfortunately, the data available to us were largely of this "neuro-
psychological" form. We hoped to provoke the linguists into consid-
ering the thesis that a psychological cognitive map could serve as the
deepest level of representation underlying sentences. Jackendoff has
certainly been provoked, although often in directions unsympathetic
to our ideas. Aside from a semantic quibble over the use of the term
"deep structure," Jackendoff makes four criticisms of our ideas.
First, he argues that our syntactic rules for generating surface
sentences from semantic maps are too primitive and would not be
accepted by most linguists. Second, that our distinction between
absolute and relative spatial strategies is not reflected in the gram-
matical structure of sentences about these strategies. Third, that all of
long-term memory cannot be located in the locale system. And,
fourth, that the distinction between a right hippocampal map
devoted to nonverbal spatial functions and a left hippocampal map
devoted to semantic functions is untenable.
We did not set out to provide a complete linguistic system and it is
somewhat unfair of JACKENDOFF (and VONECHE) to berate us for this
failure. Nevertheless, his query as to why our system would not
generate ungramrnatical sentences like the examples he cites is a
reasonable one, and we will try to answer it. Unfortunately, his first
example - To the ground, the rock fell from the roof - although
stylistically awkward, does not strike our ears as egregiously ungram-
matical, especially if said with a Yiddish accent and a certain degree
of chutzpah (see NONNEMAN). The second sentence - The roof, the
rock fell from to the ground - is clearly ungrammatical, but would
not have been generated from our map. The relationship between a
place (the roof) and its contents (the rock) is identified by (subject)
has (object) (see p. 404). So, entering the place first and its contents
second yields the kernel sentence - The roof has the rock (on it) - or
some suitable transform of this. Subject, object is not a legitimate
reading of place and its contents. Similarly, prepositional phrases are
readings of places in the map, or motions in or out of places, and
cannot be arbitrarily separated from the names of those places. It
does not seem difficult to generate the rules by which legitimate
separation could be achieved. For example; The ground is where the
rock fell to and the roof is where it fell from suggests that the
reading of a movement from or to a place must be completed before
another can begin.
JACKENDOFF'S second point is that the difference between absolute
and relative spaces is not reflected in grammatical distinctions. But
this is a misreading of the relationship between the left and right
hippocampus. The left hippocampus operates on principles similar to
those of the nonverbal locale system, but it does not contain the same
information. There is no reason to believe that the left hippocampus
contains only information about absolute space. Following Jacken-
doff's example, we have already shown how it could contain infor-
mation about nonspatial entities such as maps of possession, so we see
no reason to restrict its spatial content to absolute spatial information.
The analogy is with the principles of operation of the nonverbal
locale system, not with the content. Such interesting spatial concepts
as along, around, through, and back can be captured in this system.
For example, around can mean either near or encircling. As we
pointed out in the book (p. 8), such concepts as near or neighboring
usually depend on the overall context in which they occur. Encircling
can be represented by a place circumscribed by another place.
JACKENDOFF'S third point, that there must be some long-term
memory located outside the locale system, seems to derive from a
simple misunderstanding. The attribution of long-term memory to
both locale and taxon systems is a central feature of the theory, but
the properties of these memory systems and their contents are
assumed to differ.
Finally, JACKENDOFF doubts whether the split between the verbal
and nonverbal systems is as large as we seem to indicate, since many
sentences depend on an interaction between verbal and nonverbal
entities. We agree with him, but plead not guilty. The large hippo-
campal commissural connections would seem to indicate that the two
hippocampi, as with the two hemispheres in general, must speak
enough of a common language to keep each other informed of
activities of mutual interest. And where there is a common language
there is at least hope for understanding.
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
John O'Keefe was supported by the MRC (U.K.) while Lynn Nadel
was supported by the NSEEC (Canada) and lately his family.
Locations have played a major role in the writing both of the book
and our reply to the commentators. In London, we despoiled the
napkins of the Pizza Express, the Kebab House, and the Natraj. The
reply was written partly in a motel in Newport Beach, but mostly in
Larry Squire's justly famous house on the Pacific. Many thanks.
N O T E
1. Some of GRAY'S scepticism about single unit data seems to rest on a
misunderstanding of the extent and nature of the information provided by this
approach. Firstly, extracellular recording, as opposed to intracellular recording,
tells us what cells do with information, not what information they get.
Secondly, unit recording provides data not only about these transformations,
but also about their temporal relations to other events of interest, such as the
animal's behavior. To follow Gray's analogy, we know not only who possess the
train timetable, but also when they use it relative to the movements of the train
itself. The train driver (hypothalamus?) consults it throughout the journey; the
porter (ventral horn?) checks to see when passengers needing assistance will
arrive; and the station chief (frontal cortex?) checks it once a fortnight against
the actual performance. We will refrain from extending the analogy to include
the obvious conclusion that the locations of the timetables in the station
(hippocampus?) provide important clues to function.
REFERENCES
Adey, W. R. (1967) Role of hippocampus in attention and learning. In: Adey,
W. R., and Tokizane, T. (eds.), Structure and function of the limbic sys-
tem: Progress in brain research, vol. 27. New York: Elsevier. [JEH]
Adey, W. R., Dunlop, C. W., and Hendrix, C. E. (1960) Hippocampal slow
waves: Distribution and phase relationships in the course of learning. Ar-
chives of Neurology, 3:74-90. [JEH]
Altman, J., Brunner, R. L., & Bayer, S. A. (1973) The hippocampus and behav-
ioral maturation. Behavioral Biology, 8:557-596. [AA]
Babb, T. L., Carr, E., and Crandall, P. H. (1973) Analysis of extracellular firing
patterns of deep temporal lobe structures in man. Electroencephalogra-
phy and Clinical Neurophysiology-EEG Journal, 34:247-257. [JO'K]
Baddeley, A. D., and Warrington, E. (1970) Amnesia and the distinction be-
tween long- and short-term memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and
Verbal Behavior, 9:176-189. [JO'K]
Barlow, J. S. (1970) Vestibular and non-dominant parietal lobe disorders. Dis-
eases of the Nervous System, 31:667-673. [RJD]
Barnes, C. A. (1979) Memory deficits associated with senescence: A neurophy-
siological and behavioral study in the rat. Journal of Comparative and
Physiological Psychology, 93:74-104. [JO'K]
Barnes, C. A., Nadel, L., and Honig, W. K. (in press) Spatial memory deficits
in senescent rats. Canadian Journal of Psychology. [JO'K]
Bartlett, F. C. (1932) Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
[LRS]
Becker, J. T., Olton, D. S., Anderson, C. A., & Mayolier, R. S. (1979) Both ob-
ject and spatial reversal are impaired after frontal or hippocampal system
damage in rats. Neuroscience Abstracts 5:113. [RH]
Berger, T. W., Alger, B. E., and Thompson, R. F. (1976) Neuronal substrate of
classical conditioning in the hippocampus. Science, 192:483-485.
[TWB,RFT]
Berger, T. W., Laham, R. I, and Thompson, R. F. (1979) Hippocampal unit-
behavior correlations during classical conditioning. Unpublished manu-
script. [TWB]
Berger, T. W., and Thompson, R. F. (1978a) Neuronal plasticity in the limbic
system during classical conditioning of the rabbit nictitating membrane
528 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1979), 2
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00064244
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:54:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
References/O'Keefe & Nadel: Hippocampus as cognitive map
response: I. The hippocampus. Brain Research, 145:323-346.
[TWBJBR.RFT]
(1978b) Identification of pyramidal cells as the critical elements in hippo-
campal neuronal plasticity during learning. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences (Wash.), 75:1572-1576. [TWB,RFTJ
Beritoff (Beritashvili), I. S. (1965) Neural mechanisms of higher vertebrate be-
havior (W. T. Liberson, ed. and trans.). Boston: Little, Brown.
[RJD,PE,JO'K]
Beritashvili, I. S. (1971) Vertebrate memory: Characteristics and origins. New
York: Plenum Press. [JO'K]
Berry, S. D., & Thompson, R. F. (1978) Prediction of learning rate from the
hippocampal EEC Science, 200:1298-1300. [RFT]
Best, M. R., and Best, P. J. (1976) The effects of state of consciousness and la-
tent inhibition on hippocampal unit activity in the rat. Experimental
Neurology, 51:564-573. [TWB]
Bowen, F. P., Hoehn, M., and Yahr, M.D. (1972) Alterations in spatial orienta-
tion as determined by a route-walking test. Neuropsychologia, 10:355-
361. [FBB]
Black, A. H., Nadel, L., and O'Keefe, J. (1977) Hippocampal function in
avoidance learning and punishment. Psychological Bulletin, 84:1107-
1129. [JAGJWMJO'K]
Blanchard, D. C, Blanchard, R. J., Lee, E. M. C, & Fukunaga, K. K. (1977)
Movement arrest and the hippocampus. Physiological Psychology, 5:331-
335. [DCBJO'K]
Blanchard, R. J., Blanchard, D. C, and Fial, R. A. (1970) Hippocampal lesions
in rats and their effect on activity, avoidance and aggression. Journal of
Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 71:92-102. [JO'K]
Blanchard, R. J. and Fial, R. A. (1968) Effects of limbic lesions on passive
avoidance and reactivity to shock. Journal of Comparative and Physio-
logical Psychology, 66:606-612. [JO'K]
Bliss, T. V. P. and L^mo, T. (1970) Plasticity in a monosynaptic cortical path-
way. Journal of Physiology (London), 207:61P. [JO'K]
Blodgett, H. C, McCutchan, K., and Mathews, R. (1949) Spatial learning in
the T-maze: The influence of direction, turn, and food location. Journal
of Experimental Psychology, 39:800-809. [JO'K),DSO]
Branch, M. H., Olton, D. S., and Best, P. J. (1976). Spatial characteristics of
hippocampal unit activity. Neurosdence Abstracts, 2:368. [JO'K]
Bresnan, J. (1978) A realistic transformational grammar. In: Halle, M., Bres-
nan, J., and Miller, G. (eds.) Linguistic theory and psychological reality,
pp. 1-59. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. [RJ]
Butters, N., and Cermak, L. S. (1974) Some comments on Warrington and
Baddeley's report of normal short-term memory in amnesic patients.
Neuropsychologia, 12:283-285. [JO'K]
(1975) Some analyses of amnesic syndromes in brain-damaged patients. In:
Isaacson, R. L. and Pribram, K. H. (eds.), The hippocampus, vol. 2. New
York: Plenum Press. [RPK]
Butters, N., Soeldner, C, and Fedio, P. (1972) Comparison of parietal and
frontal lobe spatial deficits in man: Extrapersonal vs personal (egocentric)
space. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 34:27-34. [RPK]
Caul, W. F., Jarrard, L. E., Miller, R. E., & Korn, J. H. (1969) Effects of hippo-
campal lesions on heart rate in aversive conditioning. Physiology and Be-
havior, 4:917-922. [RH]
Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton. [JO'K]
(1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
[JO'K,RJ]
(1972) Studies on semantics in generative grammar. The Hague: Mouton.
[RJ]
Clark, C. V. H., & Isaacson, R. L. (1965) Effect of bilateral hippocampal abla-
tion on DRL performance. Journal of Comparative {? Physiological Psy-
chology, 59:137-140. [PE]
Correll, R. E., and Scoville, W. B. (1965) Performance on delayed match fol-
lowing lesions of medial temporal lobe structures. Journal of Compara-
tive and Physiological Psychology, 80:360-367. [JAH]
Corsi, P. M. (1972) Human memory and the medial temporal region of the
brain. Unpublished doctoral thesis. McGill Univ. Dept. of Psychology.
[LRS]
Critchley, M. (1953) The parietal lobes. New York: Hafner. [RPK]
Crowne, D. P., Konow, A., Drake, K. J., and Pribram, K. H. (1972) Hippocam-
pal electrical activity in the monkey during delayed alternation problems.
EEC and Clinical Neurophysiology, 33:567-578. [JEH]
Dashiell, J. F. (1930) Direction orientation in maze running by the white rat.
Comparative Psychology Mongraphs.,1:1-72. [JO'K]
Deadwyler, S. A., West, M., and Lynch, G. (1979) Activity of dentate granule
cells during learning: Differentiation of perforant path input. Brain Re-
search, 169:29-43. [JBR]
Dean, P. (1974) The effect of inferotemporal lesions on memory for visual
stimuli in rhesus monkeys. Brain Research, 77:451-469. [JAH]
Dick, A. O. (1976) Spatial abilities. In: Whitaker, M. and Whitaker, H. A.
(eds.), Studies in neurolinguistics, vol. 2. New York: Academic Press.
[RPK]
Disterhoft, J. F., Kwan, H. H., & Lo, W. D. (1977) Nictitating membrane con-
ditioning to tone in the immobilized albino rabbit. Brain Research,
137:127-143. [RFT]
Douglas, R. J. (1966a) Cues for spontaneous alternation. Journal of Compara-
tive and Physiological Psychology, 62:171-183. [RJD JO'K]
(1966b) Spontaneous alternation and middle ear disease. Psychonomic
Science, 4:243-244. [RJD]
(1967) The hippocampus and behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 67:416-442.
[RJD]
(1972) Pavlovian conditioning and the brain. In: Boakes, R. and Halliday, M.
(eds.), Inhibition and learning, pp. 529-553. London: Academic Press.
[AA,RJD]
(1975) The development of hippocampal function: Implications for theory
and for therapy. In: Isaacson, R. and Pribram, K. (eds.), The hippocam-
pus, II. pp. 327-361. New York: Plenum Press. [RJD]
Douglas, R. J., Mitchell, D., and Del Valle, R. (1974) Angle between choice al-
leys as a critical factor in spontaneous alternation. Animal Learning and
Behavior, 2:218-220. [RJD]
Douglas, R. J., and Pribram, K. H. (1966) Learning and limbic lesions. Neuro-
psychologia, 4:197-220. [RH,RPK]
Downs, R. M., and Stea, D. (1977) Maps in minds: Reflections on cognitive
mapping. New York: Harper and Row. [JO'K]
Ellen, P., & Aitken, W. C, Jr. (1970) Absence of overresponding on a DRL
schedule by hippocampally-lesioned rats. Physiology <&• Behavior, 5:489-
495. [PE]
Ellen, P., Aitken, W. C, Jr., & Walker, R. (1973) Pretraining effects on per-
formance of rats with hippocampal lesions. Journal of Comparative <b
Physiological Psychology, 81, 622-628. [PE]
Ellen, P., Wilson, A. S., & Bruell, E. W. (1964) Septal inhibition and training
behavior in the rat. Experimental Neurology, 10:120-132. [PE]
Evarts, E. V. (1964) Temporal patterns of discharge of pyramidal tract neurons
during sleep and waking in the monkey. Journal of Neurophysiology,
27:152-171. [RFT]
Fillmore, C. J. (1968). The case for case. In Bach, E. E., and Harms, R. T.
(eds.), Universals in linguistic theory, pp. 1-88. New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston. [JO'K]
(1971). Types of lexical information. In Steinberg, D. D. and Jakobovits,
L. A. (eds.), Semantics, pp. 370-392. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
[JO'K]
Finke, R. A., & Kosslyn, S. M. (in press) Mental imagery acuity in the periph-
eral visual ield. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Percep-
tion and Performance. [SP]
Finke, R. A. & Schmidt, M. J. (1977) Orientation-specific color aftereffects fol-
lowing imagination. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Per-
ception and Performance, 3:599-606. [SP]
Fodor, J. (1975) The language of thought. New York: Crowell. [RJ]
Gaffan, D. (1977) Monkey's recognition memory for complex pictures and the
effect of fornix transection. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psycholo-
gy, 29:505-514. [HU]
Gibson, J. J. (1950). The perception of the visual world. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin. [JO'K]
(1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin. [JO'K]
Glazer, H. I. (1974) Instrumental conditioning of hippocampal theta and sub-
sequent response persistence. Journal of Comparative and Physiological
Psychology, 86:267-273. [AA]
Gleitman, H. (1955) Place learning without prior performance. Journal of
Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 48:77-79. [PEJO'K]
Gormezano, I., Schneiderman, N., Deaux, E., & Fuentes, I. (1962) Nictitating
membrane: Classical conditioning and extinction in the albino rabbit.
Science, 138:33-34. [RFT]
Grastyan, E., Lissak, K., Madarasz, I., and Donhoffer, H. (1959) Hippocampal
electrical activity during the development of conditioned reflexes. EEC
and Clinical Neurophysiology, 11:409-430. [JEH]
Gray, J. A. (1970) Sodium amobarbital, the hippocampal theta rhythm, and
the partial reinforcement extinction effect. Psychological Review, 77:465-
480. [JO'K]
(1977) Drug effects of fear and frustration: Possible limbic site of action of
minor tranquilizers. In: Iversen, L. L., Iversen, S. D., & Snyder, S. H.
(eds.), Handbook of psychopharmacology: 8. Drugs, neurotransmitters <&
behavior. New York & London: Plenum Press. [AA]
Gray, J. A., Feldon, J., Rawlins, J. N. P., Owen, S., and McNaughton, N. (1978)
The role of the septo-hippocampal system and its noradrenergic afferents
in behavioural responses to nonreward. In: Elliott, K., and Whelan, J.
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1979), 2 529
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00064244
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:54:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
References/O'Keeie & Nadel: Hippocampus as cognitive map
(eds.), Functions of the septo-hippocampal system,Cib3L Foundation Sym-
posium No. 58 (n.s.), pp. 275-300. Amsterdam: Elsevier. [JAG]
Green, J. D. and Arduini, A. (1954) Hippocampal electrical activity in arousal.
Journal of Neurophysiology, 17:533-557. [JEH]
Harper, R. M. (1971) Frequency changes in hippocampal electrical activity
during movement and tonic immobility. Physiology and Behavior, 7:55-
58. [JEH]
Hebb, D. O. (1968) Concerning imagery. Psychological Review, 75:466-477.
[SP]
Henke, P. G. (1974) Persistence of runway performance after septal lesions in
rats. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 86:760-767.
[AA]
Herrnstein, R. J., and Boring, E. G., eds. (1966). A source hook in the history
of psychology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. [JO'K]
Hill, A. J. (1976). Neuronal activity in hippocampus during a spatial alterna-
tion task. Neuroscience Abstracts, 2:388. [JO'K]
Hirsh, R. (1974) The hippocampus and contextual retrieval of information
from memory: A theory. Behavioral Biology, 12:421-444. [RFT]
Hoehler, F. K., & Thompson, R. F. (1980) The effect of temporal single-alter-
nation on learned increases in hippocampal unit activity in classical condi-
tioning of the rabbit nictitating membrane response. Physiological Psy-
chology, in press. [RFT]
Holmes, J. E., and Adey, W. R. (1960) Electrical activity of the entorhinal cor-
tex during conditioned behavior. American Journal of Physiology,
199:741-744. [JEH]
Horel, J. A. (1978) The neuroanatomy of amnesia: A critique of the hippocam-
pal memory hypothesis. Brain, 101:403-445. [JAHJO'K.LRS]
Hubel, D., and Wiesel, T. (1962) Receptive fields, binocular interaction, and
functional architecture in the cat's visual cortex. Journal of Physiology,
160:106-154. (JAG]
Hull, C. L. (1932) The goal gradient hypothesis and maze learning. Psycholog-
ical Review, 39:25-43. [JO'K]
(1934) The concept of the habit-family hierarchy and maze learning, I. Psy-
chological Review, 41:33-54. [JO'K]
Hutt, S. J., and Hutt, C. (1970) Direct observation and measurement of behav-
ior. Springfield, 111.: Thomas.
Hyvarinen, J., and Poranen, A. (1974) Function of the parietal associative area
7 as revealed from cellular discharges in alert monkeys. Brain, 97:673-
692. [HH]
Inglis, J. (1970) Shock, surgery and cerebral asymmetry. British Journal of
Psychiatry, 117:143-148. [LRS]
Isseroff, A. (1979) Limited recovery of spontaneous alternation after extensive
hippocampal damage: Evidence for a memory impairment. Experimental
Neurology, 64:284-294. [JO'K]
Jabbur, S. J. and Towe, A. L. (1961) Cortical excitation of neurons in dorsal co-
lumn nuclei of cat, including an analysis of the pathways. Journal of Neu-
rophysiology, 24:499-509. [JO'K]
Jacobson, C. F., and Nissen, H. W. (1937) Studies of cerebral function in pri-
mates: IV. The effect of frontal pole lesions on the delayed alternation
habit in monkeys. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 23:101-112.
[GJT]
Jackendoff, R. (1.972) Semantic interpretation in generative grammar. Cam-
bridge: M.I.T. Press. [RJ]
(1976) Toward an explanatory semantic representation. Linguistic Inquiry,
7:89-150. [RJJO'K]
(1978) Grammar as evidence for conceptual structure. In: Halle, M., Bres-
nan, J., and Miller, G. (eds.) Linguistic theory and psychological reality,
pp. 201-228. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. [RJ]
(in preparation) Semantics and Cognition. [RJ]
Jarrard, L. E. (1975) The role of interference in retention by rats with hippo-
campal lesions. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology,
89:400-408. [LEJ,HU]
(1976) Anatomical and behavioral analysis of hippocampal cell fields. Jour-
nal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 90:1035-1050. [LEJ]
(1978a) Selective hippocampal lesions: Differential effects on performance
by rats of a spatial task with preoperative versus postoperative training.
Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 92:1119-1127.
[LEJ]
(1978b) Selective hippocampal lesions and spatial discrimination in the rat.
Society for Neuroscience Abstracts, 3:222. [LEJ]
Jarrard, L. E. & Becker, J. T. (1977) The effects of selective hippocampal le-
sions on DRL behavior in rats. Behavioral Biology, 21:393-404. [LEJ]
Jarrard, L. E., and Isaacson, R. L. (1965). Hippocampal ablation in rats: Effects
of intertrial interval. Nature (London) 207:109-110. [JO'K]
Jones-Gotman, M., & Milner, B. (1978) Right temporal-lobe contribution of
image-mediated verbal learning. Neuropsychologia, 16:61-71.
Kaada, B. R., Rasmussen, E. W., and Kveim, O. (1961) Effects of hippocampal
lesions on maze learning and retention in rats. Experimental Neurology,
3:333-355. [HU]
Kandel, E. R. (1976) The cellular basis of behavior. San Francisco: Freeman
press. [RFT]
Kesner, R. P. (1980) An attribute analysis of memory: The role of the hippo-
campus. Physiological Psychology, in press. [RPK]
Kilmer, W. L., and McLardy, T. (1970) A model of hippocampal CA3 circuit-
ry. International Journal of Neuroscience, 1:107-112. [JO'K]
(1971) A diffusely preprogrammed but sharply trainable hippocampus mod-
el. International Journal of Neuroscience, 2:241-248. [JO'K]
Kimble, D. P. Hippocampus and internal inhibition. (1968) Psychological Bul-
letin, 70:285-295. [RJD]
(1969) Possible inhibitory functions of the hippocampus. Neuropsychologia,
7:235-244. [AA]
(1975) Choice behavior in rats with hippocampal lesions. In: Isaacson, R. L.,
and Pribram, K. H. (eds.), The hippocampus, vol. 2. New York: Plenum
Press. [JO'K]
Kliiver, H., and Bucy, P. C. (1939) Preliminary analysis of functions of the
temporal lobes in monkeys. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry,
5:33-54. [JAH]
Kfttiler, C. (1976a) Habituation of the orienting response after medial and lat-
eral septal lesions in the albino rat. Behavioral Biology, 16:63-72. [HU]
(1976b) Habituation after dorsal hippocampal lesions: A test dependent phe-
nomenon. Behavioral Biology, 18:89-110. [HU]
Kosslyn, S. M., Ball, T. M., & Reiser, B. J. (1978) Visual images preserve metric
spatial information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Per-
ception and Performance, 4:47-60. [SP]
Kosslyn, S. M., Pinker, S., Smith, G., & Shwartz, S. P. (1979) On the demystifi-
cation of mental imagery. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 2:535-
581. (JO'K,SP]
Lakoff, G. (1971) On generative semantics. In: Steinberg, D., and Jakobovits,
L. (eds.) Semantics: An interdisciplinary reader, pp. 232-296. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. [RJ]
Landfield, P. W. (1976) Function of synchronous EEG rhythms. In: Gispen,
W. H. (ed.), Molecular and functional neurobiology. New York:
Elsevier. [JEH]
Linton, M. (1975) Memory for real-world events. In: Norman, D. A., Rurael-
hart, D. E., and the LNR Research Group, Exploration in cognition. San
Francisco: Freeman.
Livesey, P. J. (1975) Fractionation of hippocampal function in learning. In:
Isaacson, R. L., and Pribram, K. H., (eds.), The hippocampus: 2. Neuro-
physiology and behavior, pp. 279-301. New York: Plenum Press. [HU]
Lotze, H. (1886). Outlines of psychology: Dictated portions of the lectures of
Hermann Lotze (trans G. T. Ladd). Boston: Ginn. [JO'K)
Mach, E. (1897). Contributions to the analysis of the sensations (trans. C. M.
Williams). Chicago, III: Open Court. [JO'K]
McKellar, P. The investigation of mental images. (1965) In: Baret, S. A., and
McLaren, A. (eds.), Penguin Science Survey B (Biological Sciences). New
York: Penguin Books. [SP]
McLardy, T. (1960) Neurosyncytial aspects of the hippocampal mossy fibre
system. Confina Neurologica, 20:1-17. [JO'K]
McNamara, H. J., Long, J. B., and Wike, E. L. (1956) Learning without re-
sponse under two conditions of external cues. Journal of Comparative
and Physiological Psychology, 49:477-480. [DEJO'K]
Mahut, H. (1971) Spatial and object reversal learning in monkeys with partial
temporal lobe ablations. Neruopsychologia, 9:409-424. [JAH]
Mahut, H., and Cordeau, J. (1963) Spatial reversal deficit in monkeys with
amygdalohippocampal ablations. Experimental Neurology, 7:426-434.
[JAH]
Marr, D. (1971) Simple memory: A theory for archicortex. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society (London) [Biological Science], 262:23-
81. [JO'K,TVPB]
Marr, D., & Nishihara, H. K. (1978) Visual information processing: Artificial
intelligence and the sensorium of sight. Technology Review, 81:1-23.
[SP]
Marslen-Wilson, W. D., and Teuber, H.-L. (1975) Memory for remote events
in anterograde amnesia: Recognition of public figures from newsphoto-
graphs. Neuropsychologia, 13:353-364. [JO'K,LRS]
Menzel, E. W. Cognitive mapping in chimpanzees. (1978) In: Hulse, S. H.,
Fowler, H., and Honig, W. K. (eds.), Cognitive processes in animal be-
havior. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. [JO'K,GJT]
Mesulam, M., Van Hoesen, G. W., Pandya, D. N., and Geschwind, N. (1977)
Limbic and sensory connections of the inferior parietal lobule (area PG) in
the rhesus monkey: A study with a new method for horseradish peroxy-
dase. Brain Research 136:393-414. [HH]
Miller, G., and Johnson-Laird, P. (1976) Language and perception. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. [RJJO'K]
530 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1979), 2
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00064244
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:54:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
References/O'Keete & Nadel: Hippocampus as cognitive map
Milner, B. (1965) Visually-guided maze learning in man: Effects of bilateral
hippocampal, bilateral, frontal, and unilateral cerebral lesions. Neuropsy-
chologia, 3:317-338. [HH,JO'K,LRS]
(1968a) Preface: Material specific and generalized memory loss. Neuropsy-
chologia, 6:175-179. [RPKJO'K]
(1968b) Visual recognition and recall after right temporal-lobe excision in
man. Neuropsychologia, 6:191-209. [LRS]
(1972) Disorders of learning and memory after temporal lobe lesions in man.
Clinical Neurosurgery, 19:421-446. [LRS]
Mishkin, M. (1954) Visual discrimination performance following partial abla-
tions of the temporal lobe: II. Ventral surface vs. hippocampus. Journal of
Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 147:187-193. [JAH]
(1978) Memory in monkeys severely impaired by combined but not by sepa-
rate removal of amygdala and hippocampus. Nature, 273:297-298.
[HU,LRS]
Mishkin, M., and Oubre, J. L. (1976) Dissociation of deficits on visual memory
tasks after inferior temporal and amygdala lesions in monkeys. Neurosci-
ence Abstracts, II, pt. 2: p. 1127. [JAH]
Mitchell, S., and Ranck, J. B., Jr. (1977) Firing patterns and behavioral corre-
lates of neurons in entorhinal cortex of freely moving rats. Neuroscience
Abstracts 3:202. [JO'K]
Moore, J. W. (1980) Information processing in space time by the hippocampus.
Physiological Psychology, in press. [JO'K,RFT]
Morris, R. G. M., Black, A. H., and O'Keefe, J. (1976). Hippocampal EEG dur-
ing a ballistic movement (abstract). Neuroscience Letters, 39:102. [JO'K]
Mountcastle, V. B. (1976) The world around us: Neural command functions for
selective attention. Neurosciences Research Program Bulletin, 14, suppl:
1-47. [HH]
(1978) Some neural mechanisms for directed attention. In: Buser, P. A., and
Rougeul-Buser, A. (eds.), Cerebral correlates of conscious experience, IN-
SERM Symposium. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company.
[HH]
Mountcastle, V. B., Lynch, J. C, Georgopoulos, A., Sakata, H., and Acuna, C.
(1975) Posterior parietal association cortex of the monkey: Command
functions for operations within extrapersonal space. Journal of Neuro-
physiology, 38:871-908. [HH]
Myhrer, T. (1975) Locomotor, avoidance, and maze behavior in rats with se-
lective disruption of hippocampal output. Journal of Comparative and
Physiological Psychology, 89:759-777. [LEJ]
Nadel, L. (1977) Amnesia and cognitive mapping in humans. Paper presented
at the Society for Neuroscience Seventh Annual Meeting, Anaheim, Calif.
[AJN]
(1979a) Cognitive maps: At the choice point again. Paper presented at the
American Psychological Association Meetings, New York. [JO'K]
(1979b) Working memory won't work. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
Vol. 2, No. 4. [LNJO'K,DSO]
(in press) Cognitive and neural maps. In: Juscyzk, P. W., and Klein, R. (eds.),
Essays on the nature of thought: A symposium in honor of D. O. Hebb.
Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. [JO'K]
Nadel, L., and O'Keefe, J. (1974) The hippocampus in pieces and patches: An
essay on modes of explanation in physiological psychology. In: Bellairs, R.
and Gray, E. G. (eds.), Essays on the nervous system. A Festschrift for
Prof. J. Z. Young. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [LNJO'K]
Nadel, L., O'Keefe, J., and Black, A. H. (1975) Slam on the brakes: A critique
of Altman, Brunner and Bayer's response inhibition model of hippocam-
pal function. Behavioral Biology, 14:151-162. [LNJO'K]
Nadel, L., and Willner, J. (in press) Context and conditioning: A place for
space. Physiological Psychology. [JO'K]
Nonneman, A. J., and Isaacson, R. L. (1973). Task dependent recovery after
early brain damage. Behavioral Biology, 8:143-172. [JO'K]
Norman, D. A., and Rumelhart, D. E. (1975) Explorations in cognition. San
Francisco: Freeman. [LRS]
O'Keefe, J. (1976) Place units in the hippocampus of the freely moving rat. Ex-
perimental Neurology, 51:78-109. [TWBJO'K]
(1979a) Hippocampal function: Does the working memory hypothesis work?
Should we retire the cognitive map theory? Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 4. [LN]
O'Keefe, J. (1979b) A review of the hippocampal place cells. Progress inNeu-
roUology 13:419-34. [JO'K]
O'Keefe, J., and Black, A. H. (1978) Single unit and lesion experiments on the
sensory inputs to the hippocampal cognitive map. In Functions of the
septo-hippocampal system, pp. 179-192. Ciba Foundation Symposium
58. New York: Elsevier. [JAG]
O'Keefe, J., and Dostrovsky, J. (1971) The hippocampus as a spatial map: Pre-
liminary evidence from unit activity in the freely-moving rat. Brain Re-
search, 34:171-175. [JAG]
O'Keefe, J., Nadel, L., Keightley, S., and Kill, D. (1975) Fornix lesions selec-
tively abolish place learning in the rat. Experimental Neurology 48:152-
66. [JAG]
O'Keefe, J., and Nadel, L. (1974) Maps in the brain. New Scientist, 62:749-
751. [RFT]
(1978) The hippocampus as a cognitive map. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[JO'K,RETetal.]
O'Keefe, J., Nadel, L., and Willner, J. (1979) Turning out irrelevancy? Com-
ments on Solomon's temporal mapping view of hippocampus. Psychologi-
cal Bulletin. 86:1280-9 [JO'K]
Olds, J. (1965) Operant conditioning of single unit responses. Proceedings of
the 23rd Congress of Physiological Sciences. Excerpta Medica Interna-
tional Congress Series., no. 87:372-380. [JO'K]
(1972) Learning and the hippocampus. Revue Canadienne de Psychologie,
31:215-238. [A A]
Olds, J., Disterhoft, J. F., Segal, M., Kornblith, C. L. and Hirsh, R. (1972)
Learning centers of rat brain mapped by measuring latencies of condi-
tioned unit responses. Journal of Neurophysiology, 35:202-219.
[TWB,RFT]
Olton, D. S. (1969) Fear, hippocampal lesions and avoidance behaviour. Com-
munications in Behavioral Biology A 3:259-262. [JO'K]
(1978) Characteristics of spatial memory. In: Hulse, S. H., Honig, W. K., and
Fowler, H. (eds.), Cognitive processes in animal behavior, pp. 341-373.
Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. [DSO]
(1979) Mazes, maps, and memory. American Psychologist, 34:583-596.
[DSO]
Olton, D. S., Becker, J. T., and Handelmann, G. E. (1979) Hippocampus,
space, and memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 4.
[RJD,JAG,AJN,JO'K,DSO,HU]
Olton, D. S., and Isaacson, R. L. (1968) Hippocampal lesions and active avoid-
ance. Physiology and Behavior, 3:719-724. [JO'K]
Olton, D. S., and Papas, B. C. (in press) Spatial memory and hippocampal
function. Neuropsychologia. [LEJ]
Olton, D. S., and Samuelson, R. J. (1976) Remembrance of places passed: Spa-
tial memory in rats. Journal of Experimental Psychology - Animal Be-
havior Processes, 2:97-116. [DSO]
Orbach, J., Milner, M., and Rasmussen, T. (1960) Learning and retention in
monkeys after amygdala-hippocampus resection. Archives of Neurology,
3:230-251. UAH]
Osborne, B., and Black, A. H. (1978) A detailed analysis of behavior during the
transition from acquisition to extinction in rats with fornix lesions. Behav-
ioral Biology, 23:271-290. [JO'K]
Pearlnian, C. A. (1979) REM sleep and information processing: Evidence from
animal studies. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 3:57-68.
[JEH]
Penfield, W. (1958) The excitable cortex in conscious man. Liverpool: Liver-
pool Univ. Press. [JO'K]
Penfield, W., and Mathieson, G. (1974) Memory: Autopsy findings and com-
ments on the role of hippocampus in experiential recall. Archives of Neu-
rology, 31:145-154. [JEH]
Perkel, D. H., and Bullock, T. H. (1968) Neural coding. Neurosciences Re-
search Program Bulletin, 6. [TWB]
Pinker, S. (1979) The representation of three-dimensional space in mental
images. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. [SP]
Pinker, S. and Finke, R. A. (in press) Emergent two-dimensional patterns in
images rotated in depth. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance. [SP]
Pinker, S. and Kosslyn, S. M. (1978) The representation and manipulation of
three-dimensional space in mental images. Journal of Mental Imagery,
2:69-84. [SP]
(in press) Mental imagery and the third dimension. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General. [SP]
Pohl, W. (1973) Dissociation of spatial discrimination deficits following frontal
and parietal lesions in monkeys. Journal of Comparative and Physiologi-
cal Psychology, 82:227-239. [RPK]
Poincare, H. (1913) The foundations of science (trans. G. B. Halsted). Lancas-
ter, Pa.: Science Press. [JO'K]
Pond, F. J., and Schwartzbaum, J. S. (1972) Interrelationships of hippocampal
EEG and visual evoked responses during appetitive behavior in rats. Brain
Research, 43:119-137. [CHV]
Ranck, J. B., Jr. (1973) Studies on single neurons in dorsal hippocampal forma-
tion and septum in unrestrained rats: I. Behavioral correlates and firing
repertoires. Experimental Neurology, 41:461-531.
[TWB,JEH,JO'K,RFT]
(1975) Behavioral correlates and firing repertoires of neurons in the dorsal
hippocampal formation and septum of unrestrained rats. In: Isaacson,
R. L., & Pribram, K. H. (eds.), The hippocampus, II. New York: Plenum
Press. [JO'K,RFT]
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1979), 2 531https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00064244
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:54:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
References/O'Keefe & Nadel: Hippocampus as cognitive map
(1978) Hippocampal units and theta activity (General Discussion II). In Ciba
Foundation Symposium 58 (new series), Functions of the septo-hippo-
campal system, pp. 309-319. Amsterdam: Elsevier/Excerpta Medica/
North-Holland. [RFT]
Rawlins, J. N. P. (1979) Advancing memorial theories of hippocampal func-
tion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 4. [JAG]
Rawlins, J. N. P., Feldon, J., and Gray, J. A. (in press) The effects of hippocam-
pectomy and of fimbria section upon the partial reinforcement extinction
effect in rats. Experimental Brain Research. [JAGJO'K]
Restle, R. (1957) Discrimination of cues in mazes: A resolution of the "place-
vs.-response" question. Psychological Review, 64:217-228. [DSO]
Robinson, D. L., and Goldberg, M. E. (1978) Sensory and behavioral properties
of neurons in posterior parietal cortex of the awake, trained monkeys.
Federation Proceedings, 37:2258-2261. [HH]
Robinson, D. L., Goldberg, M. E., and Stanton, G. B. (1978) Parietal association
cortex in the primate: Sensory mechanisms and behavioral modulations.
Journal of Neurophysiology, 41:910-932. [HH]
Roesen, D. L., and Van Hoesen, G. W. (1977) Hippocampal efferents reach
widespread areas of cerebral cortex and amygdala in the Rhesus monkey.
Science, 198:315-317. [HH]
Schmaltz, L. W., and Isaacson, R. L. (1966a) The effect of preliminary training
conditions upon DRL performance in the hippocampectomized rat. Phys-
iology 6- Behavior, 1:175-182. [PE]
(1966b) Retention of a DRL 20 schedule by hippocampectomized and par-
tially neodecorticate rats. Journal of Comparative <6- Physiological Psy-
chology, 62:128-132. [PE]
(1968) The effect of blindness on DRL 20 performance exhibited by animals
with hippocampal destruction. Psychonomic Science, 11:241-242. [PE]
Schmaltz, L. W., and Theios, J. (1972) Acquisition and extinction of a classi-
cally conditioned response in hippocampectomized rabbits (Oryctolagus
cunniculus). Journal of Comparative IT Physiological Psychology,
79:328-333. [RFT]
Segal, M. (1973) Flow of conditioned responses in limbic telencephalic system
of the rat. Journal of Neurophysiology, 36:840-854. [TWB JBR.RFT]
Serames, J., Weinstein, S., Ghent, L., and Teuber, H.-L. (1955) Spatial orienta-
tion in man after cerebral injury: I. Analysis by locus of lesions. Journal of
Psychology, 39:227-244. [RJDJO'K]
(1963) Correlates of impaired orientation in personal and extrapersonal
space. Brain, 86:747-772. [RJDJO'K.RFT]
Shepard, R. N. (1978) The mental image. American Psychologist, 33:125-137.
[SP]
Shepard, R. N., and Metzler, J. (1971) Mental rotation of three-dimensional ob-
jects. Science, 171:701-703. [SP]
Silveira, J. M., and Kimble, D. P. (1968) Brightness discrimination »;id reversal
in hippocampally lesioned rat. Physiology and Behavior, 3:025-630.
[RH]
Solomon, P. R. (1977) Role of the hippocampus in blocking and conditioned in-
hibition of the rabbit's nictitating membrane response. Journal of Com-
parative i? Physiological Psychology, 91:407-417. [RFT]
(1980) Temporal versus spatial information processing theories of hippocam-
pal function. Psychological Bulletin, in press. [JWM,RFT]
Solomon, P. R., and Moore, J. W. (1975) Latent inhibition and stimulus gener-
alization of the classically conditioned nictitating membrane response in
rabbits (Oryctolagus cunniculus) following dorsal hippocampal ablations.
Journal of Comparative <b Physiological Psychology, 89:1192-1203.
[RFT]
Squire, L. R. (1980) The neuropsychology of amnesia: An approach to the
study of memory and aging. In: Fozard, J., and Poon, L. (eds.), Memory
and aging. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. [LRS]
Squire, L. R., and Cohen, N. (1979) Memory and amnesia: Resistance to dis-
ruption develops for years after learning. Behavioral and Neural Biology,
25:115-215. [LRS]
Squire, L. R., and Moore, R. Y. (1979) Dorsal thalamic lesion in a noted case of
chronic memory dysfunction. Annals of Neurology, in press.
[LRS]
Squire, L. R., & Schlapfer, W. T. (1980) Biochemical aspects of learning, mem-
ory and its disorders. In: Praag, H. M. van, Lader, M. H., Rafaelsen, O. J.,
& Sachar, E. J. (eds.), Handbook of biological psychiatry: II. Brain mecha-
nisms and abnormal behavior. New York: Marcel Dekker. [LRS]
Squire, L. R., & Slater, P. C. (1978a) Bilateral and unilateral ECT: Effects on
verbal and nonverbal memory. American Journal of Psychiatry, 11:1316-
1320. [LRS]
(1978b) Anterograde and retrograde memory impairment in chronic amne-
sia. Neuropsychologia, 16:313-322. [LRS]
Squire, L. R., Slater, P. C, & Chace, P. M. (1975) Retrograde amnesia: Tempo-
ral gradient in very long-term memory following electroconvulsive thera-
py. Science, 187:77-79. [LRS]
Squire, L. R., Slater, P. C, & Miller, P. (1980) Retrograde amnesia following
ECT: Long-term follow-up studies. Archives of General Psychiatry, in
press. [LRS]
Sundberg, H., and K^hler, C. (1979) Orienting and habituation after lesions of
the medial entorhinal cortex in the albino rat. University of Bergen, in
preparation. [HU]
Stein, D. G., Rose, J. J., Graziadei, J., Mishkin, D., & Brink, J. (1969) Central
nervous system: recovery of function. Science, 166:528-530. [JO'K]
Suzuki, A., Augerinos, G., and Black, A. H. (in press) Stimulus control of spatial
behavior on the eight arm maze in rats. Learning and motivation.
Talland, G. (1965) Deranged memory. New York: Academic Press.
[JO'K,LRS]
Tolman, E. C. (1932). Purposive behaviour in animals and men. New York:
Century. [JO'K]
(1948) Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 55:189-208.
[PEJO'K]
Teitelbaum, H. (1964) A comparison of the effects of orbito-frontal and hippo-
campal lesions upon discrimination learning and reversal in the cat. Ex-
perimental Neurology, 9:284-289. [RH]
Thomas, G. J. (1978) Delayed alternation in rats after pre- or post-commissural
fornicotomy. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology,
92:1128-1136. [GJT]
Thomas, G. J., & Brito, G. N. O. (in preparation) Medial prefrontal cortex, sep-
to-hippocampal circuitry and T-maze alternation in rats. [GJT]
Thompson, R.F., & Berger, T. W. (1979) Responses of single hippocampal
neurons during classical conditioning. Neuroscience Abstracts, 5:722.
[RFT]
Thompson, R. F., Berger, T. W., Cegavske, C. F., Patterson, M. M, Roemer,
R. A., Teyler, T. J., & Young, R. A. (1976) The search for the engram.
American Psychologist, 31:209-227. [RFT]
Thompson, R. F., & Glanzman, D. G. (1976) Neural and behavioral mecha-
nisms of habituation and sensitization. In: Leaton, R. N., & Tighe, T. J.
(eds.), Habituation: Perspectives from, child development, animal behav-
ior, and neurophysiology. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. [RFT]
Towe, A. L. (1973) Motor cortex and the pyramidal system. In: Maser, J. D.
(ed.), Efferent organization and the integration of behavior. New York:
Academic Press. [RFT]
Tulving, E. (1972) Episodic and semantic memory. In: Tulving, E., and Don-
aldson, W. (eds.), Organization of memory, New York: Academic Press.
[RPK]
Ungher, J., & Sirian, S. (1971) Vestibular short-term memory deficits due to
behavior disturbances induced by fornix lesions in cat. Review of Rou-
manian Neurology, 8:407-417. [PE]
Ursin, H., Dalland, T., Ellertsen, B., Herrmann, T., Johnsen, T. B., Livesey, P.,
Zaidi, Z., and Wahl, H. (1978) Multivariate analysis of the septal syn-
drome. Ciba Foundation, Symposium on Functions of the septo-hippo-
campal system. London [HU]
Ursin, R., Ursin, H., and Olds, J. (1966) Self-stimulation of hippocampus in
rats. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 61:353-359.
[HU]
Vanderwolf, C. H. (1969) Hippocampal electrical activity and voluntary
movement in the rat. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysio-
logy, 26:407-418. [JO'K]
(1971) Limbic-diencephalic mechanisms of voluntary movement. Psycho-
logical Review, 78:83-113. [JO'K]
(1975) Neocortical and hippocampal activation in relation to behaviour: Ef-
fects of atropine, eserine, phenothiazines and amphetamine. Journal of
Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 88:300-323. [JO'K]
Vanderwolf, C. H., Bland, B. H., and Whishaw, I. Q. (1973) Diencephalic hip-
pocampal and neocortical mechanisms in voluntary movement. In: Maser,
J. D., (ed.), Efferent organization and the integration of behaviour, pp.
229-262. New York: Academic Press. [JO'K]
Vanderwolf, C. H., and Heron, W. (1964) Electrocephalographic waves with
voluntary movement: Study in the rat. Archives of Neurology, 11:379-
384. [JEH]
Vanderwolf, C. H., Kramis, R., & Robinson, T. E. (1978) Hippocampal electri-
cal activity during waking behavior and sleep: Analyses using centrally
acting drugs. In: Elliott, K., and Whelan, J. (eds.), Functions of the septo-
hippocampal system. Ciba Foundation Symposium No. 58, pp. 199-221.
Amsterdam: Elsevier. [CHV]
Vinogradova, O. S. (1970) Registration of information and the limbic system.
In: Horn, G., and Hinde, R. A. (eds.), Short-term changes in neural activ-
ity and behaviour, pp. 95-140. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
[JO'K]
(1975) Functional organization of the limbic system in the process of regis-
tration of information: Facts and hypotheses. In: Isaacson, R. L., & Pri-
bram, K. H. (eds.), The hippocampus, vol. II. New York: Plenum Press.
[JO'K,RFT]
Vinogradova, O. S., and Brazhnik, E. S. (1978) Neuronal aspects of septo-hip-
532 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1979), 2
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00064244
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:54:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
References/O'Keefe & Nadel: Hippocampus as cogoitive map
pocampal relations. In: Elliott, K., and Whelan, J. (eds.), Functions of the
septo-hippocampal system. Ciba Foundation Symposium No. 58 (n.s.),
pp. 145-177. Amsterdam: Elsevier. [JAGj
Warrington, E. K., and Weiskrantz, L. (1973) An analysis of short-term and
long-term memory defects in man. In: Deutsch, J. A. (ed.), The physiolog-
ical basis of memory. New York, Academic Press. [RPK]
Watson, J. B. (1901) Kinaesthetic and organic sensations: Their role in the reac-
tions of the white rat to the maze. Psychological Review, monogr. suppl.
33, pp. 43-142. [RJD]
Webster, D. B., and Voneida, T. J. (1964) Learning deficits following hippo-
campal lesions in split-brain cats. Experimental Neurology, 10:170-182.
[JAG.RHJO'K]
Whishaw, I. Q., and Vanderwolf, C. H. (1973) Hippocampal EEG and behav-
ior: Changes in amplitude and frequency of RSA (theta rhythm) asso-
ciated with spontaneous and learned movement patterns in rats and cats.
Behavioral Biology, 8:461-484. [JO'K,CHV]
Wickelgren, W. A. (1979) Chunking and consolidation: A theoretical synthesis
of semantic networks, configuring in conditioning, S-R versus cognitive
learning, normal forgetting, the amnesic syndrome and the hippocampal
arousal system. Psychological Review, 86:44-60. [LRS]
Wikmark, R. G. W., Divac, I., & Weiss, R. (1973) Retention of spatial delayed
alternation in rats with lesions in the frontal lobes. Brain, Behavior, and
Evolution, 8:329-339. [GJT]
Williams, M. D. (1977) Search: Some observations on the process of retrieval
from very long term memory. Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of California, San
Diego. [JO'K]
Winocur, G., and Breckenridge, C. B. (1973) Cue-dependent behavior of hip-
pocampally damaged rats in a complex maze. Journal of Comparative
and Physiological Psychology, 82:512-522. [RJD]
Winocur, G., and Olds, J. (1978) Effects of context manipulation on memory
and reversal learning in rats with hippocampal lesions. Journal of Com-
parative and Physiological Psychology, 92:312-321. [JO'K]
Winson, J. (1972) Interspecies differences in the occurrence of theta. Behavio-
ral Biology, 7:479-487. [JEH]
(1976a) Hippocampal theta rhythm. I. Depth profiles in the curarized rat.
Brain Research 103:57-70. [JO'K]
(1976b) Hippocampal theta rhythm. II. Depth profiles in the freely moving
rabbit. Brain Research 103:71-80. [JO'K]
(1976c) Topographic patterns of hippocampal theta rhythm in freely mov-
ing rat and rabbit. In De France, J. F. (ed.), The septal nuclei, pp. 463-
480. New York: Plenum Press. [JO'K]
(1978) Loss of hippocampal theta rhythm results in spatial memory deficit in
the rat. Science, 201:160-163. [RJD]
Woodruff, M. L., and Bailey, S. D. (1979) Hippocampal lesions and immobility
responses in the rat. Physiological Psychology, 7:254-258. [JO'K]
Woodruff, M. L., Hatton, D. C, and Meyer, M. E. (1975) Hippocampal abla-
tion prolongs immobility response in rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus).
Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 88:329-334.
[JO'K]
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1979), 2 533https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00064244
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:54:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
